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1. Introduction
The importance of size and productivity in determining rm-level decisions and, consequently, in
shaping the aggregate trade ows has been the subject of several studies in the literature starting
from the workhorse model of Melitz (2003).
The crucial insight of this literature is that rms are dierent along several dimensions ob-
servable in the data (e.g. size and productivity). This dierence necessarily reects into their
participation in the international markets; in particular, rms that are productive enough can
select into exporting activity. Among those, only a narrow subset of them can aord the costs
associated with the multinational activity (see Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)).
Specically, the bulk of the most productive rms is responsible for the large amount of em-
ployment and trade. According to Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009), rms that participate in the
international trade, either as an exporter or importer, employ almost 50% of the workforce in the
US. Moreover, multinational enterprises account for 90% of US trade.
Using an adapted version of Helpman et al. (2004), Yeaple (2009) nds supporting evidence in
the data that more productive rms enter a larger number of countries. Furthermore, a rm can
transfer its core productivity across the border as the aliates generate relatively high revenues
in their host countries. Additionally, countries becoming more attractive to less productive rms
are able to magnetize a larger amount of foreign direct investment. However, this framework
still does not capture several patterns observed in the data. For example, dierently from what
predicted by the model, large rms enter too few locations, whereas smaller rms enter too many
locations. In addition, small rms enter less attractive locations more than predicted. Moreover,
the last economic crisis showed how multinational rms reconsidered their location and produc-
tion decisions in the dierent countries as a response to the negative economic downturn. In
particular, countries that proved to be more resilient to the crisis became relatively attractive
destinations for FDI ows. In addition, the share of sales of multinational rms increases relative
to that of pure exporters.
The theory provided by Helpman et al. (2004) works reasonably well with manufacturing
data, as shown in Yeaple (2009). However, it does not t well the patterns relative to the the
services industry because the ranking between selection into international activity of a rm and
productivity is reversed in some circumstance.
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The present dissertation, consisting of two self-contained chapters, builds upon the frame-
work featuring heterogeneous rms and proposes two empirical contributions to this area of
the literature. In particular, the second chapter, which is a joint work with Ekaterina Kazakova,
provides empirical evidence that multinational rms conducting horizontal FDI operate as risk
averse agents. The third chapter, also joint with Ekaterina Kazakova, analyzes the eects of the
risk associated with quality perception in foreign markets on the entry mode selected by MNEs
operating in the service sector. For both analyses, we rely on the development and estimation of
structural models which allow us to run conterfactual analysis and evaluate the eects of policy
changes.
Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, we build a structural model of rms that engage in horizontal FDI
and are subject to demand risk, represented by the presence of aggregate and correlated across
countries demand shocks. Firms decide where to locate their production plants, how much to
produce in each of them, and where and how much to ship to the single destination market. The
above decisions depend both on the expected demand for each market and the correlation structure
of demand shocks across destination markets as the MNE manages the demand risk. The problem
of the rms is analogous to that of an investor who holds a portfolio of risky activities: rms hold
foreign risky sales whose magnitude can be correlated across foreign markets. In particular, we
show that markets which oer better hedging opportunities to multinationals induce larger sales
and are more attractive locations for establishing a production unit. Given that an MNE can use
its foreign production facility as an export platform, the margin for diversication does not reduce
only to the market in which the facility is physically present but involves also the surrounding
markets served by the production facility itself. For the empirical analysis, we use rm-level
data for German multinational enterprises to obtain rm-specic risk aversion coecients. We
pin down the level of rm’s risk aversion by using MNE’s sales in the foreign markets. Our
main ndings are the following: multinationals behave as risk averse agents, on average; the
degree of risk aversion is heterogeneous across the rms; at the industry level, the degree of risk
aversion correlates with the characteristics of demand rather than with the technological features
of the sector; a subsequent counterfactual analysis suggests that the eect of a trade liberalization
policy occurring in China spread to the other markets due to the presence of correlated demands.
Our model is able to explain why large (small) rms tend to enter in fewer (more) locations
than predicted by the framework of Helpman et al. (2004) and rationalizes the behavior of the
multinational rms during the last nancial crisis.
Chapter 3 In Chapter 3, we study the foreign-market entry patterns associated with the pro-
fessional services industry. Among the service rms operating in foreign markets, the selection
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mechanism entails a reversal of the ranking with respect to manufacturing. In particular, the
best rms select into exporting activity, whereas rms characterized by a lower level of quality
establish foreign aliates to serve the host market. We link this empirical nding to the imperfect
transferability of technology and to the uncertainty regarding the perception of core quality in new
markets. To analyze these mechanisms, we build a structural model of horizontal FDI with rms
that are heterogeneous in terms of service quality. Firms can choose to serve foreign markets via
exporting, cross-border mergers (M&A), or greeneld investment. The proximity-concentration
tradeo drives the choice between greeneld investment and exporting. In addition, reproducing
high quality abroad potentially increases the xed entry costs associated to greeneld invest-
ment, inducing high-quality service rms to export. Furthermore, both greeneld investment and
exporting determine some uncertainty for the rm regarding the foreign perception of its core
quality. Cross-border M&A can solve this uncertainty as it allows the multinational to access to
the demand of the acquired rm. We structurally estimate the fundamental parameters of the
model using rm-level FDI and trade data for a sample of German rms. Finally, we calibrate the
model equilibrium for services industry to the data on multinational and trade ows among the
EU, the US, and the rest of the world. Simulation of the service-trade liberalization between the
EU and the US, as provided for in TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), shows
that the reduction of non-tari trade barriers and the introduction of quality standards reallocate
quality across entry alternatives, making FDI a relatively more prominent entry type.
3

2. The Structure of Multinational Sales
under Demand Risk
joint with Ekaterina Kazakova
2.1. Introduction
The activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) comprises a set of complex location and sales
decisions. First, MNEs decide in which countries to establish production facilities through foreign
direct investment (FDI); in doing so, they typically weigh the benet of proximity to customers
against the cost of setting up a foreign plant. Second, MNEs decide how much to produce in each
foreign plant; in particular, the output of a foreign plant can serve the local and the neighboring
markets if MNEs use their production facilities as export platforms.1
Crucially, MNEs make the investment and production decisions before observing the realiza-
tion of demand in each market. In addition, such realizations can be correlated across the foreign
markets served by the MNEs. In other words, the MNEs’ activity is subject to the risk of unfa-
vorable demand uctuations which can be correlated across foreign markets. This is what we
dene as demand risk. If MNEs are risk averse, then the location and sales decisions hinge both
on the expected demand for each market and the correlation structure of demand realizations
across destination markets.
Demand risk is an important determinant of multinational activity. For example, the UNCTAD
World Investment Report 2010 describes how MNEs adjusted their investment ows and organiza-
tion of production in response to the demand uctuations following the outbreak of the nancial
crisis. Specically, FDI ows favored, in relative terms, countries less aected by the economic
downturn.2
1According to the World Investment Report 2017, foreign aliates of MNEs exported approximately 20% of their
total output abroad in 2016.
2Though global FDI ows decreased after 2008, the ratio of FDI inows into developed compared to developing
countries substantially changed. Specically, FDI ows in developed countries contracted by 44% in 2009, whereas
those in developing and transition economies fell by 27%. Thanks to their rapidly expanding local demand and
resilience to the crisis, the developing regions accounted for the majority of worldwide FDI inows for the rst time.
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This chapter addresses the question of how demand risk shapes investment and sales decisions
of MNEs. For this purpose, we propose a structural model of horizontal FDI with rms that are
heterogeneous in terms of productivity and risk aversion. MNEs decide about the locations of
their production facilities, which countries to serve from each plant and the volume of production
to sell in each market. They make all the above decisions under demand risk, i.e. before observing
the realizations of demand in the destination markets. With risk averse MNEs and correlated
demand realizations, investment and sales decisions are interdependent and similar to a complex
portfolio choice problem. In particular, each market in which the MNE sells its output yields a
risky return which imperfectly correlates with the returns oered by other foreign markets. Thus,
the sales depend on the expected return, related to the expected demand realization in the market,
and the diversication opportunities, related to how the market demand correlates with that of the
other markets. Ceteris paribus, markets that oer better hedging opportunities to multinationals
induce larger sales, and the more risk averse the rm is, the more benecial the diversication is.
Foreign plants serve as export platforms since they can originate sales to local and third markets.
Such export platforms reduce the eective distance between the MNE and a destination market.
This results in an expected demand increase in the market itself. Moreover, establishing the plant
eases MNE’s access to markets, which may be possibly correlated in a favorable fashion to the
ones the MNE already sells to. However, setting up a foreign plant comes at a xed cost. Thus,
MNEs have to trade o the described increase of the expected demand paired with the reduction
in demand risk against the xed set-up cost. Due to complementarities, the attractiveness of each
foreign plant depends on the set of other plants owned by the MNE. Hence, the location entry
choice of MNEs is a complex combinatorial discrete choice problem with complementarities. In
particular, withN locations and a given host country of the MNE, there are 2N−1 eligible location
sets.
Several theoretical implications related to the MNEs’ activities result from our model.
First, our model rationalizes why expected sales in a given market are not a sucient statistic for
the entry decisions of multinationals in this market. Standard models of horizontal FDI (Helpman
et al., 2004) have the counterfactual implication that distance-adjusted market size determines a
monotone ranking in terms of entry: all rms sell to close and large markets as they are associated
with large expected sales. However, only more productive rms aord to sell to smaller and more
distant markets as they command lower expected sales. By contrast, in our model the described
ranking does not necessarily obtain because the attractiveness of establishing a plant in a foreign
country depends also on the diversication opportunities oered by this location, which depend,
in turn, on the characteristics of other MNE’s locations. As a consequence, if a low productive
MNE opens up a foreign production facility, say, both in France and China, a highly productive
one does not necessarily set up a plant in these two countries too as also demand risk matters.
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These results hold when core productivity varies given the level of risk aversion and vice versa.
Specically, a larger degree of risk aversion does not automatically reduce the number of foreign
locations a rm decides to enter.
Second, heterogeneity in risk aversion leads to country-rm-specic markups even when the
elasticity of demand is constant. In fact, the rm chooses a quantity to ship in each country which
reects three factors: (i) country’s demand variance and (ii) diversication potential, and (iii) the
degree of risk aversion of the rm. As a result, the rm scales up or down the optimal quantity it
would sell under no risk by a factor which reects (i) – (iii), implying a dierent realized price in
each of the markets.3
Third, demand risk diversication can impact on the outcomes of trade policies. A tari
reduction in a country which oers a good hedging potential can magnify the eect of a trade
liberalization on trade ows compared to standard models.4 Moreover, trade liberalization can
give rise to third-country eects. In other words, sales ows may change also in countries which
are not directly interested by the policy change, with the direction of the change depending on
the sign of the correlation. To be specic, countries oering a demand hedge with respect to
the market for which trade costs have been reduced experience an increase in imports, whereas
markets whose demand is highly and positively correlated with the liberalized market are subject
to negative spillovers.
The empirical analysis uses rm-level data on German multinationals operating in the man-
ufacturing sector. The data represent the universe of German multinational rms holding an
investment position in a foreign country and contain information about the balance sheet and
location of the foreign aliates. By exploiting the properties of the solution to the MNE’s op-
timization problem described in the present chapter, we match the observed sales to the ones
predicted by our model to obtain a measure of rm-specic absolute risk aversion. We nd that
the German multinational companies are risk averse. Moreover, the degree of risk aversion is
heterogeneous across rms. The ndings are consistent with our theoretical model which predicts
that the level of correlation across foreign markets directly aects the composition of the sales
portfolio of German multinationals. Compared to the risk neutral benchmark, rms tend to sell
relatively more to the countries providing a better hedge. We estimate the risk aversion elasticity
of aggregate sales to be 0.8 (in absolute value). We nd that risk aversion varies across the dier-
ent manufacturing sectors included in our analysis. Specically, risk aversion correlates with the
demand characteristics of the sector rather than with technological features. Furthermore, more
risk averse rms operate in industries characterized by a relatively more disperse demand. In a
3In our framework, the price can be thought of as the residual equalizing the realized demand to the supply.
4On the contrary, a lower hedging potential or higher demand volatility may dampen the eect of a trade
liberalization.
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counterfactual analysis, we assess the eect of a tari reduction on products exported to China.
We nd that the policy change increases the sales of German MNEs not only in China but also in
the USA and Japan, whereas neighboring countries like Hong Kong and Singapore are negatively
aected. Other, less correlated countries are less aected. We also demonstrate how a change
in risk aversion of German companies (e.g. due to the entry of new rms or to the reduction of
nancial constraints) produces a larger variation in the sales toward those countries which are
more correlated with Germany, whereas more distant regions are less inuenced.
2.1.1. Related Literature
The present chapter relates to the literature studying rm’s incentives to conduct horizontal FDI
versus export (the so-called proximity-concentration tradeo) in the presence of uncertainty. The
closest contribution to the chapter is Tintelnot (2017) who proposes a structural model of rms
engaging in multinational activities where they can use foreign aliates as export platforms. His
analysis assesses the costs involved in multinational production and the incentives of rms in
designing their global operations under imperfect transferability of technology from the parent
company to its subsidiaries. As Tintelnot (2017), we account for the importance of export platforms
in shaping the multinational organization of production. However, we rather concentrate our
attention on the role played by export platforms in aecting the sales structure of MNEs when the
demand is risky and MNEs are risk averse. Indeed, the possibility of reaching markets dierent
from the local one makes it possible for a rm to fully exploit the diversication opportunities
oered by the foreign sales. The impact of technological and demand uncertainty on the choice
between exporting and establishing a foreign production facility has been also addressed by
Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2013). In particular, they study the above tradeo in the presence
of country-specic shocks to the production costs and to the demand. The rm’s dynamic choice
between export and FDI hinges on the heterogeneous correlation existing between production
costs across home and foreign countries. In particular, rms are more likely to select export
over FDI in markets characterized by productivity shocks poorly correlated with those at home.
In particular, as demand and costs are positively correlated, engaging in multinational activity
entails high foreign production cost when the foreign demand is high and this partly osets the
benets from FDI compared to exporting, which requires domestic inputs. With reference to
the demand shocks, they nd that rms are more likely to serve volatile locations by exporting
activity. Dierently from them, we focus on the demand side and highlight the importance of
demand correlations across dierent markets in shaping entry and production choices. Other
contributions investigating multinational activity under uncertainty are Rob and Vettas (2003),
who discuss uncertain demand growth in foreign markets, and Chen and Moore (2010), who
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concentrate on idiosyncratic shocks to rm demand in the foreign market. With reference to
the last paper, the authors nd that more productive rms are more likely than less ecient
ones to enter into tougher markets. Their result does not necessarily obtain in our framework
since allowing for risk averse rms and demand interdependencies across countries break the
monotonicity in the rms’ entry choice with respect to productivity. Campa (1993), Goldberg
and Kolstad (1995), and Russ (2007) introduce risk in the form of exchange rate uctuations and
nd that rms take into account the exchange rate volatility when they solve the proximity-
concentration tradeo. Aizenman and Marion (2004) analyze the role of uncertainty on the choice
between vertical and horizontal FDI, demonstrating how higher uncertainty should induce rms
to favor horizontal over vertical FDI. This conclusion is in line with the idea that MNEs diversify
their demand risk by using their production and sales structure. Ramondo and Rappoport (2010)
explore the role of FDI ows both as an asset available to consumers for diversication and as
a means for transferring technology across countries; the existence of multinational production
aects the amount of goods available in each state of the world and reduces consumption risk
as long as foreign aliates are located in regions characterized by good hedging properties with
respect to the world consumption risk.
The chapter also closely relates to the growing literature on the role of demand risk in interna-
tional trade. Specically, Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012) analyze the risk content of exports
and show that cross-country specialization patterns depend both on the comparative advantage
and the riskiness of those sectors in which they have a comparative advantage. Kramarz, Martin,
and Mejean (2016) quantify the contribution of idiosyncratic demand shocks and the structure of
trade to the volatility of exports, and link the volatility of exporters to the low level of diversi-
cation in the client portfolio held by a rm. Conconi, Sapir, and Zanardi (2016) show that rms
learn about their protability in a foreign market by entering there as exporters before engaging
in FDI activities. Our model implicitly assumes immediate learning; upon entering into a foreign
market all uncertainty about the demand realization unravels.
We also contribute to the growing literature regarding the relation between rms’ preferences
toward risk and international trade. In particular, De Sousa, Disdier, and Gaigné (2017) and
Esposito (2017) analyze risk averse exporters in the presence of demand shocks. The present
chapter diers from these contributions along several dimensions. First, De Sousa et al. (2017)
and Esposito (2017) focus on pure exporters.5 MNEs typically face lower marginal costs compared
5In comparison with pure exporters, multinational enterprises typically have more opportunities of adjusting
their sales across markets since they are present in several foreign countries. In this regard, the UNCTAD World
Investment Report 2008 highlights how multinationals exhibited more stable sales than pure exporters during the
crisis, in line with the idea that multinational rms benet more extensively from diversication than other rms.
Therefore, demand risk diversication plays a greater role for MNEs than for exporters. In addition, such a role can
be assessed only in a framework which allows for the presence of export platforms. Not taking into account this
possibility would lead to consider a (potentially) misspecied demand.
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with exporters; as a consequence, it is more likely that for the latter the benets of diversication
outweigh the transportation costs. Second, we distinguish from De Sousa et al. (2017) since we
allow for correlated expenditures across destination markets and abstract from the possible eects
of skewed demand shocks; with regard to Esposito (2017), we focus on the risk aecting a rm
both at the industry and macroeconomic levels, whereas he focuses on rm-specic demand
shocks.6 Riaño (2011) considers the investing and exporting decisions of risk averse managers in
a framework where both productivity and demand are subject to rm-specic shocks. He proves
that exporting increases the volatility of the rm’s sales.
The present chapter also contributes to the literature on interdependent foreign markets. In
Nguyen (2012a), rms learn the demand realization in potential foreign destinations by exporting
given the positive correlation of demands across countries. Albornoz, Calvo Pardo, Corcos, and
Ornelas (2012) consider a model of experimenting exporters who learn about their own protabil-
ity by entering into foreign markets. Under the assumption that prots exhibit the same positive
correlation across dierent foreign destinations, risk regarding prots reduces over time not only
in the markets the rm is present in, but also in the other unexplored markets. With respect to the
above contributions, we relax the assumption that demand correlations are positive. Vannooren-
berghe (2012) shows that foreign and domestic sales are negatively correlated at the rm level,
which supports the hypothesis that rms diversify by selling abroad. Vannoorenberghe, Wang,
and Yu (2016) shows that volatility of exports increase (decrease) with the level of diversication
of destination countries reached by a small (large) rm. This result is justied with the pres-
ence of xed costs and short-run demand shocks. Our analysis extends the above contribution
by highlighting the role of heterogeneity in risk aversion and the importance of multinational
activity.
Finally, this chapter is connected to the recent contributions on export platforms and multi-
national production. In particular, we model export platforms similarly to Tintelnot (2017) and
Head and Mayer (2017).7 Analogously to Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007) and Arkolakis,
Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare, and Yeaple (2018), we nd the spillover eects of liberalization arising
from the complexity of global value chains. Dierently from their papers, we introduce demand-
side spillovers aecting multinational production. However, to our knowledge, we are the rst to
highlight the importance of export platforms in enhancing sales diversication.
6In addition, in our framework, the rms are heterogeneous in terms of risk aversion. Cucculelli and Ermini
(2013) provide evidence that managers dier in risk attitudes in a sample of Italian manufacturing rms. In particular,
they nd that about 76% of the managers display a risk averse attitude, 17% a risk neutral attitude and the rest a risk
loving attitude. Hence, 93% of managers in their sample exhibit a (weak) risk aversion. This heterogeneity is also
correlated with rm’s characteristics like size, age, and innovativeness. Moreover, dierent nancial conditions can
result in dierences in hedging opportunities by other means than sales.
7In our framework, the choice of serving a foreign market from an aliate is deterministic.
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the theoretical
model and shows how risk aversion enters into rm’s production and FDI decisions. Section 2.3
discusses the data used in the estimation. Section 2.4 describes the estimation procedure. Section
2.5 presents the main empirical results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2. Model
This section proposes a version of Chaney (2008) with N countries indexed by
d ∈ D ≡ {1, . . . , N}, and I + 1 sectors indexed by i = 0, . . . , I .
2.2.1. Demand
In each country d, there is a representative consumer whose total income equals Yd. Her pref-
erences are represented by the following quasi-linear utility function in the homogeneous good
Q0d
Ud =
I∑
i=1
αid lnQid +Q0d, (2.1)
where αid > 0 is the absorption relative to the sector i and destination d, and Qid denotes a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate good i in country d, that is,
Qid =
[∫
ω∈Ωid
qid(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
. (2.2)
The elasticity of substitution σ between any two varieties and ω′ is larger than 1. The set Ωid
represents the varieties of Qid sold in country d.
The absorption αid is random. In particular, one can think of it as a shifter to consumer’s pref-
erences with respect to the aggregate good Qid, describing uctuations occurring at the industry
and aggregate levels. For example, it can represent a change in the quality of the product produced
in the industry i or an exogenous change in country d’s total income or aggregate demand.
Realizations of absorptions in dierent countries can be correlated; they tend to move in the
same (opposite) directions in countries either characterized by similar (opposite) tastes for a certain
product or displaying more (less) integrated economies.
We assume that the vector of absorption αi = (αi1, . . . , αid, . . . , αiN) has a bounded expected
value, denoted by α¯i = (α¯i1, . . . , α¯id, . . . , α¯iN), where α¯id is the expected absorption for the good
Qid. In addition, αi has a full-rank variance-covariance matrix Σi. The element in position (d, d′)
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of the matrix Σi represents the long-run covariance between the absorption in countries d and d′
and is denoted by Σi(d, d′). We assume that, if d 6= d′, then it holds
−1 < Σi(d, d
′)√
Σi(d, d)Σi(d′, d′)
< 1. (2.3)
The above restriction on Σi excludes the possibility that the cross-correlations between the
demand realizations in two destination countries are perfect.8
The representative consumer observes the realizations of the vector αid for i = 1, . . . , N and
makes any consumption decision accordingly.
The consumption bundle chosen by the consumer follows from the solution of the following
utility maximization problem
max
I∑
i=1
αid lnQid +Q0d
s.t. Q0d +
I∑
i=1
∫
ω∈Ωid
pid(ω)qid(ω)dω = Yd,
(2.4)
from which we obtain Q0d = Yd −
∑I
i=1 αid and PidQid = αid, where Pid is the price index
associated to Qid.9 In addition, the inverse demand for the variety is given by
pid(ω) = Aidqid(ω)
− 1
σ , with Aid ≡ αidQ−
σ−1
σ
id and Υid ≡ Q
−σ−1
σ
id , (2.5)
where pid(ω) is variety ’s price in country d.
For the following discussion, we let ΣAi ≡ Υ′iΣiΥi denote the variance ofAi = (Ai1, . . . , ANi).
2.2.2. Firms
Each rm produces exclusively one variety of the dierentiated good Qid. We index this variety
by ω. Since there exists a one-to-one relation between rms and varieties, we drop any industry-
related subscript.
Firms also dier with respect to the level of productivitiesϕ, risk aversion r, xed entry costs f ,
and origin country o. Hence, a rm is fully characterized by the vector of variables (ω,ϕ, r,f , o).
In this section, we consider an arbitrary rm so we suppress also the index referring to the
variety ω it produces.
8As the estimated industry variance-covariance matrix satises this requirement, the assumption is not stringent.
9We assume that Yd is large enough to avoid the possibility of incurring in a corner solution.
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A rm can observe the above variables at no cost before making any choice. Its prots are
determined by three simultaneous decisions. First, a rm makes a location decision, i.e. it picks
the set of locations in which to establish a foreign aliate.10 We denote a location set by L with
L ∈ L = 2N−1 as we assume that the rm is always present in its home country. Second, a rm
makes a shipment decision, i.e. it chooses the optimal location as origin for shipping the variety in
a given destination market. Third, a rm makes a production decision, i.e. it selects the quantity
of the variety to sell in each destination. Crucially, the three decisions are made before observing
the actual realizations of demand in the destination markets. Hence, a rm decides under demand
risk. In particular, the fact that the produced quantity cannot be adjusted following the realization
of the demand implies that a rm is exposed to price uctuations in the destination markets.11
In the following paragraphs, we closely describe rm’s technology and each decision.
Technology and production costs. The rm has to pay a xed entry cost fl to set up a plant
in the foreign location l. The xed entry cost represents the rm-specic cost of building or
acquiring a foreign plant in the country.12
In addition, the rm has a dierent level of productivity associated to each of its foreign plants.
This assumption reects two things. On the one hand, the rm can face productivity losses due to
the imperfect transferability of technologies and production skills within its boundaries. On the
other hand, the rm can possibly take advantage of the production infrastructure of its foreign
aliate.13
When rm produces in location l, it has to bear a variable production cost which is inversely
proportional to the rm’s location-specic productivity ϕl. The variable cost of producing ql units
in country l is, then, given by
C(ql) =
ql
ϕl
. (2.6)
The rm can use its plant in location l to serve both the local and any other destination market.
This means that the rm owns an export platform in country l. However, if the rm uses the
production facility in country l to serve the foreign destination market d, then it has to pay an
iceberg trade cost τld > 1.14
We denote the constant marginal cost of producing the variety in location l and shipping it to
country d by cld ≡ τld/ϕl.
10Note that we assume that a parent company can maintain at most one foreign plant in each destination market.
11We discuss a relaxation of this assumption in Appendix G.
12In other words, we do not distinguish between greeneld and browneld investments.
13More concretely, existing contracts with foreign counterparts, lower input prices, or the adoption of advanced
techniques can make a foreign aliate more productive than its parent. Need for learning, institutional dierences
between foreign countries and home, or technology adjustment cost can lead to productivity losses in a foreign
market.
14If l = d, then τll = 1.
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As in Tintelnot (2017), we abstract from the presence of any export xed cost.15 This restric-
tion can be motivated by two considerations. First, MNEs tend to enter sequentially in foreign
markets;16 manufacturing rms generally start their activity abroad with exporting rather than
operating a foreign production facility. When a rm sets up a foreign aliate, the rm substi-
tutes the origin of its trade ows for some of the foreign destination markets. This means that
those destination markets, previously reached by the home production, can be served by the new
production facility. Thus, the rm has already previously paid the xed cost of exporting to the
market. Second, one can think that part of the xed export entry cost collapses into the xed
entry cost associated to the FDI.
Production decision. We assume that the rm does not observe the size of the aggregate
demand in the destination markets before making any production decision. Hence, rm’s prot is
a random variable. As rm is risk averse, this implies that it does not only consider the (expected)
prot in a prospective destination market but also its volatility and how it comoves with the
prots in the other markets.
In line with this, sales across dierent destination markets can be seen as risky assets held as a
sales portfolio by the rm, similarly to the standard setting of portfolio choice.17 As the demand
realizations are correlated across foreign markets, the sales of an aliate not only depend on the
local productivity, the size of the surrounding markets, and the cost of reaching them but also on
the set of other locations where the rm is present, and the correlation structure in the destination
markets. All these factors together aect the composition of the production portfolio chosen by
the rm.
In the production decision, rm chooses how much to ship to each destination. We assume that
rm’s preferences are represented by a mean-variance utility function of prots in destination
markets. This representation of preferences has been extensively used in the literature, and it can
be also considered as a second-order Taylor approximation of a twice-dierentiable increasing
and concave utility function around the expected prots.18
15Estimating export entry costs would require us to observe data on multinational sales disaggregated by destina-
tion.
16See Conconi et al. (2016).
17The crucial dierence with respect to the standard setting of portfolio choice relates to the presence of non-linear
shares due to the CES preferences. As a consequence, the expected returns of the rm’s portfolio vary with the size
of share chosen by the rm.
18See Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (2005). In particular, the second-order Taylor approximation is exact if
(i) the Bernoulli utility function is CARA and (ii) the distribution of the random variable is fully characterized by the
rst two moments.
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Throughout this section, we drop the location subscript l from the quantity qld under the
assumption that the rm makes the optimal shipment choice (see successive paragraph). Given
that, the realized prot of the rm selling to the destination countries d = 1, . . . , N is given by
Π(q|L,ϕ, r) =
∑
d
(pdqd − cdqd) (2.7)
=
∑
d
(
q
σ−1
σ
d
(
Ad − cdq
1
σ
d
))
, (2.8)
where q = (q1, . . . , qd, . . . , qN) denotes the amount of the variety shipped to the destination
markets given the optimal shipment choice. Hence, the expected prot is given by
E[Π(q|L,ϕ, r)] =
∑
d
(
q
σ−1
σ
d
(
E[Ad]− cdq
1
σ
d
))
, (2.9)
whereas the variance of prots is given by
var (Π (q|L,ϕ, r)) =
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)q
σ−1
σ
d q
σ−1
σ
d′ . (2.10)
Note that the variance does not depend directly on production costs, as risk only relates to the
uctuations of demand in the destination markets.19
Conditional on the choice of the location, the utility function of the rm is then given by
u(Π(q|L,ϕ), r) = E [Π (q|L,ϕ, r)]− r
2
var(Π(q|L,ϕ, r)) (2.11)
where r is the rm’s risk aversion. To nd the optimal vector of quantities to ship to the foreign
destination markets, the rm solves the following utility maximization problem
V (L) ≡ max
q∈RN+
E [Π(q|L,ϕ, r)]− r
2
var (Π (q|L,ϕ, r)) , (2.12)
where V (L) denotes the indirect utility function associated to the location set L.
19Other sources of risk, like unexpected change to the production costs, are not taken into account in the present
chapter.
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For d ∈ D such that qd > 0, the rst-order necessary20 and sucient conditions21 with respect
to qd is given by
∂u(Π(q|L,ϕ, r))
∂qd
=
∂E [Π(q|L,ϕ, r)]
∂qd
(2.13)
− r
2
∂var (Π (q|L,ϕ, r))
∂qd
= 0, (2.14)
where
∂E[Π(q|L,ϕ, r)]
∂qd
=
σ − 1
σ
E[Ad]q
− 1
σ
d − cd,
and
∂var(Π(q|L,ϕ, r))
∂qd
=
2(σ − 1)
σ
(
q
− 1
σ
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)q
σ−1
σ
d′
)
.
Hence, for all d such that qd > 0, it holds
q
− 1
σ
d
σ − 1
σ
(
E[Ad]− r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)q
σ−1
σ
d′
)
= cd. (2.15)
Proposition 1. (Existence and Uniqueness). If the matrix Σ has cross-correlations bounded away
from −1 and 1, there exists a unique solution to the rm’s utility maximization problem.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 implies that the optimal production portfolio of rm exists and is unique given
the set of locations of foreign aliates. Since rm’s realized sales are a random variable due to
the presence of aggregate demand uctuations, the proposition also implies that their mean and
variance are well-dened and unique. As we will show later, this guarantees that the measure of
rm’s risk aversion implied by our model is well-dened and theoretically identied.
For arbitrary values of σ, the above non-linear system of equations (2.15) does not have a
closed-form solution. However, to provide some intuition on the optimal level of quantities sold
in each destination, we show how the rst order condition looks like for the case in which σ = 2.
In particular, the rst-order conditions for this case can be rewritten as
qd =
(
E[Ad]
2cd
)2
·
1− r
∑
d′ 6=d cov(Ad,Ad′ )q
1
2
d′
EAd
1 + r var(Ad)
2cd

2
. (2.16)
20We notice that the utility function is not dierentiable when qd = 0. However, as export xed costs are set to
zero, the rm always sells a positive amount to each destination markets.
21We defer the discussion about the concavity of the objective function to a later stage.
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The rst factor of the right hand side of equation (2.16) represents the quantity chosen by the
rm if there is no risk aversion or uncertainty. If the expected market size in the market d is large
relatively to the marginal cost of production inclusive of the trade costs, then the rm’s sales to
country d are large. The second part, instead, is the factor by which the rm optimally rescales the
level of production shipped to country d due to the joint eect of risk aversion and demand risk.
Specically, this factor decreases with the specic risk associated to the destination d (captured
by the variance var(Ad) in the denominator), whereas it increases with the opportunities of
diversication oered by the market d (captured by the covariances cov(Ad, A′d) in the numerator).
Hence, countries characterized by larger variance or lower diversication potential attract smaller
sales the more risk averse the MNE is.
Additionally, the rst-order necessary and sucient conditions in (2.15) can also be rearranged
to obtain the risk aversion coecient r implied by the solution to the rm’s utility maximization
problem.
Proposition 2. (Risk aversion measure). The measure of risk aversion is a function of the optimal
production portfolio, and is equal to
r =
∑
d (Epdqd − p˜dqd)(
q
σ−1
σ
)′
ΣAq
σ−1
σ
,
where Epd is the expected price in country d, p˜d = σσ−1cd is the price under certainty in country d,
and q
σ−1
σ is a vector whose d component is q
σ−1
σ
d , where qd is the optimal quantity sold in country d.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the representation of risk aversion oered in Proposition 2, the denominator is given by the
variance of sales in the destination markets, whereas the numerator measures the risk premium
a rm demands in terms of revenues as a compensation for the risk. Therefore, the risk aversion
parameter shows the amount of extra markup a rm requires for a given level of riskiness of its
sales portfolio. Given the heterogeneity in risk aversion, our model predicts that more risk averse
rms charge higher markups, on average. Moreover, the adjustment of prices after the realization
of demand shocks result in rm-destination-specic markups implied by the rm’s choices. As
the quantities shipped to each destination are dierent for similarly productive but dierently
risk averse rms, we can rationalize heterogeneous adjustment of prices to demand shocks.
Finally, the following results show the relation between the aggregate sales and the level of
risk aversion.
Proposition 3. (Risk Aversion and Aggregate Sales). The rm’s aggregate sales are decreasing with
risk aversion.
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Proof. See Appendix E.
A more risk averse MNE tries to limit the demand risk it faces in its international activity by
reducing the intensive margin of sales. It is worthwhile to notice that a change of risk aversion does
not proportionately change the contribution of each destination to the MNE’s sales portfolio. In
particular, an increase of risk aversion induces the rm to substitute out relative risky destinations
with safe ones (and vice versa).
Our framework assumes that a rm selects the optimal quantity rather than the optimal price
to charge in each market. In Appendix F, we discuss how the results would dier when the rm
sets the price instead.
As a reference point, it is useful to compare the case of risk aversion when (i) we remove the
presence of export platforms, and (ii) we exclude risk.
No export platforms. Without export platforms, the system of equations (2.15) reads as
q
− 1
σ
l
σ − 1
σ
(
E[Al]− r
∑
l′
cov(Al, Al′)q
σ−1
σ
l′
)
= cl, (2.17)
where l is a location in which the MNE holds a production facility. From equation (2.17), we notice
that the diversication opportunities that the rm can achieve in this case are just a subset of
those achievable in the model with export platforms, xing the location set. In particular, only the
covariances associated to the markets in which the rm has established a foreign aliate appear
in (2.17). As the rm sells the variety produced in l only to the local market, the marginal cost
simply reduces to 1/ϕl. For the special case of σ = 2, we obtain an expression similar to (2.16).
In particular, we have
ql =
(
E[Al]
2cl
)2
·
1− r
∑
l′ 6=l cov(Al,Al′ )q
1
2
l′
EAl
1 + r var(Al)
2cl

2
. (2.18)
If a rm uses the foreign plant l as an export platform, then the quantity predicted by the model
sold to location l is not correct when we do not consider export platforms. In particular, the
factor that scales up or down the quantity the rm wants to sell under no risk aversion or no
uncertainty just considers the sales realized locally by the dierent foreign facilities without taking
into account the possibility of demand risk diversication oered by the other markets in which
the MNE is not physically present.
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No risk aversion. In this case, the solution to the optimization problem has a closed form.
In particular, it holds
qd =
(
σ − 1
σ
Ad
cd
)σ
. (2.19)
Equation (2.19) shows how the quantity shipped to each destination increases with the realized
size of the market, the productivity of the origin production facility, and decrease with trade costs.
Assume that location l serves the subset of destinations D˜.22 Using equation (2.19), we obtain that
the revenues rl realized in a given location l are given by
rl =
∑
d∈D˜
pdqd = κϕ
σ−1
l
∑
d∈D˜
αd
P 1−σd
τ 1−σld , (2.20)
where κ ≡ (σ−1
σ
)σ−1. The expression for the revenues realized in a given location is similar to the
one in Tintelnot (2017). In particular, if there is only one industry, then αd = Yd. In the equation
(2.19), it is easy to see that the revenues realized in some location increase with the productivity
of the location whereas decrease with the distance between the foreign aliate and the customers
in the destination markets.23
Shipment decision. This paragraph describes how the rm selects the optimal location for
shipping its variety to a given destination market.
The shipment decision hinges on the rm’s productivity vectorϕ given the locations in which
it is present, and on the trade costs associated to the possible location-destination pairs. As the
shipment cost is independent of demand risk, the optimal decision exclusively relies on rm’s
productivity and iceberg trade costs. In particular, as returns to scale are constant, a standard cost
minimization argument implies that the destination d is served from the location l if the unit cost
cld is the lowest possible one. In other words, qld > 0 only if cld = min
l′
{cl′d : l′ ∈ L}.24 It is worth
to note that the optimal location-destination pair strictly depends on the location set L chosen by
the rm.
Location decision. As stated, rm has to pay a xed cost fl for entering location l and setting
up a plant there. This cost is observed by the rm before making its location choice. In our
22How the MNE makes this decision is the object of the next paragraph.
23If we also drop the assumption that rms can use a foreign location as an export platform, then equation (2.19)
reduces to
rl = κϕl
αl
P 1−σl
.
24This analysis abstracts from any possible indeterminacy arising when cld, cl′d ∈ arg min
l′
{cl′d : l′ ∈ L} for
l 6= l′. As productivities can be thought as draws from a continuous distribution, such event has probability equal to
0.
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framework, the sum of xed costs is considered as the price of holding a portfolio of risky assets
associated to the locations from which it is possible to serve the local and foreign markets. The
xed costs enter as a constant in the utility of the rm. The observation implies that the sum of
xed costs associated to any location set can be separately subtracted from the value function
obtained from the production and shipment decisions for that location set. As a consequence, in
order to nd the optimal location L∗ for its multinational activity under demand risk, the rm
solves the following discrete maximization problem
max
L∈2N−1
V (L)−F(L), where F(L) =
∑
l∈L
fl. (2.21)
2.2.3. Comparative Statics
In this section, we describe the eect of risk aversion on the MNE’s production and location choices
by means of some illustrative examples. First, xing rm’s productivity and chosen location set,
we show how dierent demand correlation structures aect the rm’s aggregate and relative
sales across countries. Second, we conduct a trade liberalization exercise to show the existence
of spillovers on trade ows to third countries when rms are risk averse. Finally, we consider
how the location choice can be aected by the presence of risk aversion: in particular, to assess
the eect of heterogeneous attitudes towards risk on the location decision, we analyze how rms
with dierent levels of risk aversion and equal level of home productivity select dierent locations
for establishing their foreign aliates; we then conduct a similar exercise to show how dierently
productive rms, equally averse to risk, can select dierent location sets that do not necessarily
nest.
The Role of Demand Correlations
Throughout the subsection, we consider an economy consisting of three countries, A, B, and C .
The variance of demand realizations, the (expected) market sizes, and the trade costs are equal
for the three countries.25 In addition, the rm holds its unique aliate in country A. Given the
above assumptions, we represent the absolute and relative sales of a rm to each country for a
given level of risk aversion.
25We do not focus on the distinction among safer and riskier markets but rather concentrate our attention on
isolating the pure eect of diverse correlation structures on the sales structure. Notice that the assumption that the
expected size and variance are the same across the markets means the three countries exhibit the same coecient of
variation. Moreover, because the variances are the same, the covariances are a sucient statistic for the degree of
integration between the economies of any pair of countries.
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Equally correlated economies. Assume that the demand correlations between A and B, B
and C , and A and C are equal, positive but not perfect.26 In the left panel of Figure 2.1, we notice
how the absolute sales in country A are comparatively larger than those in countries B and C
for any level of risk aversion. As the rm operates its aliate in country A, it benets from the
proximity to the nal customers. Hence, it ships a larger amount of the variety to the local market.
Furthermore, given that the foreign countries B and C are symmetric, the rm sells the same
amount to the two countries. In addition, a larger level of aversion to risk induces the rm to sell
less to each country, as they are risky. The presence of risk aversion aects not only the absolute
value of sales but also the relative shares among countries as it can be seen in the right panel of
Figure 2.1. Indeed, a larger degree of risk aversion reduces the share of sales associated to country
A and increases the shares of country B and C . The reason for that result is to be linked with
the fact that a more risk averse rm exploits more extensively the diversication opportunities
as they are more concerned with the demand risk.
Figure 2.1.: Case 1, Equally correlated economies
Sales in country A
Sales in country B
Sales in country C
Share of sales in country A
Share of sales in country B
Share of sales in country C
Dierently correlated economies. Next, we consider the case in which the correlations of
demand realizations between countries A and B, and A and C is lower than the correlation
between countries B and C .27 In this specication, the gap between sales in country A and
26This can be thought as the case of a German rm (aliate in countryA), producing only domestically and being
able to serve additionally France (country B) and the UK (country C).
27This can be thought as the case of a German rm (aliate in country A) producing only domestically and being
able to serve additionally Japan (country B) and South Korea (country C).
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countriesB andC widens (see Figure 2.2). Though the structure of correlations has changed from
the previous case, still countries B and C are symmetric so the rm ships the same amount to
both countries. Additionally, we observe two things. First, country A displays a relatively poor
demand correlation with bothB and C ; second, the demand correlation between countries B and
C is now relatively large. The two observations together imply that, compared with the previous
case, the rm wants to sell more to country A and reduces its exposure in countries B and C (see
the left panel of Figure 2.2). Regarding the relative sales, a similar pattern to the previous case
can be observed in the right panel of Figure 2.2. However, the adjustment of shares is now less
remarkable than before as the countries B and C have a lower diversication potential.
Figure 2.2.: Case 2, Poorly correlated economies
Sales in country A
Sales in country B
Sales in country C
Share of sales in country A
Share of sales in country B
Share of sales in country C
Mixed case. In the last case, we assume that the demand correlation between A andB is larger
than the correlations between countries A and C , and B and C .28 Given the structure of demand
correlation, country C now provides the rm with a better hedge to negative uctuations in
country A’s demand compared to country B. In the left panel of Figure 2.3, it is possible to note
that, when risk aversion is large enough, the country with the largest diversication potential, that
is country C , attracts the largest share of sales in absolute terms so that diversication benets
outweigh the marginal cost of selling in a foreign market. The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows
28This can be thought as the case of a German rm (aliate in country A) producing only domestically and being
able to serve additionally France (country B) and Japan (country C).
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that, when risk aversion increases, the shares of sales in B and C increase, whereas the share of
sales in A decreases.
Figure 2.3.: Case 3, Mixed case
Risk aversion
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Sales in country B
Sales in country C
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Share of sales in country B
Share of sales in country C
Risk aversion and firm sales – Both in highly (B) and poorly (C) correlated economies
In the above examples, the diversication strategies of an MNE distort the sales distribution
compared with the risk neutral model.29 The distortion is particularly relevant either when risk
aversion or diversication opportunities are large. Importantly, rms with dierent risk aversion
value dierently each destination market as each of them provides dierent hedging opportunities.
The possibility of serving more conveniently a destination market can result into diverse location
choices and reaction to trade policies as we will discuss later. Moreover, for a given level of risk
aversion, the shares of sales in each location is not going to be aected by a change productivity.
This nding plays an important role in separately identifying risk aversion and productivity
separately.
Finally, it is interesting to see under which correlation structure rms sells more (Figure 2.4).
Comparing aggregate sales across the above scenarios, a multinational rm sells more on average
when the dispersion of correlations among the available countries is the largest, as a consequence
of the largest diversication opportunities. Thus, we expect rms to sell more in industries
characterized by a wider spread of demand correlations. This observation is also in line with the
evidence that exporters’ sales decrease more than MNEs’ sales during the crisis; as MNEs can
29In the risk neutral model, the absolute sales are at with respect to risk aversion. Moreover, the sales realized
in country B and C represent a downward shift of the sales realized in country A, whose extent depends on the
magnitude of the trade costs.
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typically reach a larger number of countries, they access to a more favorable correlation structure
than exporters do. Therefore, this mechanism can explain why the sales of MNEs were more
stable than those of pure exporters during the last crisis.
Figure 2.4.: Diversication opportunities and aggregate rm sales
Risk aversion
T
o
t
a
l
s
a
le
s
Risk aversion and firm sales – Different diversification scenarious
Only in highly correlated economies
Only in poorly correlated economies
Both in highly (B) and poorly (C) correlated economies
Liberalization Spillovers
Next, we evaluate the eect of a bilateral trade liberalization when demand realizations are cor-
related and rms are risk averse. Similarly to the previous part, we consider a scenario with
three countries and look at the eect of a tari reduction for the good imported into country B
from A. Without risk averse rms, a tari reduction in country B does not aect sales in A and
C . However, when we introduce risk averse rms and correlated demand shocks, spillovers can
emerge as a byproduct. In the case of three countries, the eect of the described policy change
depends on the sign of the correlation of demands among the three countries. When sales in
country B increase, the spillover eects in countries A and C depend on the possibility to hedge
the larger exposure to risk due to the sales increase in country B.30 In particular, if the demand in
C , which is a third country, is positively correlated with the demand in countryB, the sales to the
destination C drop. On the contrary, a negative correlation between countryB and C determines
a sales increase in country C due to the fact that rms can reduce their exposure to demand risk.
Table 2.1 shows the change in sales in the three countries for each combination of correlation
signs.
30For a discussion on the eect of a trade liberalization see Appendix H.
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Similar demand-side spillovers emerge for any country-specic change, e.g., an improvement
of investment climate in one particular country results in the reshuing of trade ows in all
correlated foreign markets.31
Table 2.1.: Eects of trade liberalization
Reduction of τAB Sales A Sales B Sales C
corr(A,B) > 0, corr(B,C) > 0 – + –
corr(A,B) > 0, corr(B,C) < 0 – + +
corr(A,B) < 0, corr(B,C) > 0 + + –
corr(A,B) < 0, corr(B,C) < 0 + + +
Risk Aversion and Entry
The above numerical exercises assume a xed set of foreign aliates in which the MNE operates.
In what follows, we remove this restriction and consider the possibility that a rm self-selects into
foreign locations. This exercise allows us to evaluate the impact of risk aversion and productivity
on the entry choices.
In the trade literature studying the determinants of rm’s entry in a foreign market (Helpman
et al., 2004), the entry decision is typically described by a destination-specic productivity thresh-
old. In particular, a rm engages in any foreign activity if and only if its level of productivity is
large enough. Furthermore, a prediction of these models is that only suciently productive rms
nd it protable to pay the xed entry cost in a foreign location. In a multi-country environment
where rms can establish a foreign plant in many locations, this prediction results in a hierarchical
ordering of entry decisions. As a consequence, the location sets chosen by the rms constitute a
sequence of nesting sets with respect to rm’s productivity. In our model, since countries are no
longer independent, rms decide on the set of foreign locations also accounting for the hedging
opportunities the set provides. Therefore, we can rationalize the presence of non-hierarchical
entry, as observed in the data (e.g. Yeaple (2009)).
To illustrate this point, we consider a world consisting of six countries. In all scenarios, country
A is the origin country of the multinational rm.32 First, we x rm’s productivity and look at
the entry decisions for dierent values of risk aversion. In the numerical example, the sets of
locations chosen by the rm are not nested as the upper panel of Table 2.2 shows. Moreover, a
higher degree of risk aversion does not necessarily reduce the number of foreign locations the
rm decides to be present in.
31Note that patterns in trade ows change are more complicated when more than three countries are involved as
they depend on the entire structure of the variance correlations matrix.
32Costs of entry in the home country are set to zero.
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Table 2.2.: Entry decision and risk aversion
Risk aversion Country A Country B Country C Country D Country E Country F
Low risk aversion Yes No No Yes Yes No
Medium risk aversion Yes Yes No No Yes No
High risk aversion Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Very high risk aversion Yes No No No No Yes
Productivity Country A Country B Country C Country D Country E Country F
Low productivity Yes No No Yes Yes No
Medium productivity Yes No No No Yes No
High productivity Yes No No No Yes Yes
Very high productivity Yes No No No Yes No
indice
Note: “Yes” stands for entry to the market, “No” stands for no entry.
For a rm with a medium level of risk aversion, it is protable to enter two locations – country
B and countryE, while a more risk averse rm enters three locations –C ,D and F (see Table 2.2).
Analogously, given the level of risk aversion, changing the productivity can aect not only the
number of entered locations but also the compositions of the optimal location set. Specically, a
more productive rm does not need to enter more locations. Additionally, a more productive rm
does not necessarily enter all locations a less productive rm is present in. The reason behind
this outcome hinges on the dierent attractiveness as demand-risk hedge oered by each location.
More productive rms are less concerned about the costs of serving foreign locations due to their
advantage in terms of marginal costs. Hence, they can benet from the presence of demand risk
diversication even if they enter into fewer locations. Instead, rms with low productivity have
to bear larger marginal costs; in order to exploit the diversication potential of sales, they has to
select into more foreign locations in order to reduce the distance from the customers. Therefore,
the model predicts that small (large) rms enter relatively more (less) locations than predicted by
the standard proximity-concentration tradeo literature. This rationalizes the nding of Yeaple
(2009).
2.3. Data
For the empirical analysis, our main data source is the Microdatabase Direct investment33 (MiDi),
which contains rm-level information about foreign aliates of German multinational compa-
nies.34 More specically, the data include balance sheet variables of foreign companies in which
33Deutsche Bundesbank (2016): Microdatabase Direct Investment 1999-2014. Version: 2.0. Deutsche Bundesbank.
Dataset. http://doi.org/10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03
34The database is maintained by the Deutsche Bundesbank. For other research using the MiDi see Tintelnot (2017),
who analyzes cost structure of vertical export platforms, Becker and Muendler (2008), who estimate responses of
MNEs employment at the extensive and intensive margins.
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German MNEs have directly (or indirectly) at least 10% (50%) of the shares or voting rights. In
addition to the standard balance sheet variables (as capital stock, labor and turnover), we observe
the locations of foreign aliates and the industries35 they operate in.
The empirical estimation relies on 952 German multinational rms operating in 19 dierent
industries36 and 45 foreign countries37 with 3,232 aliates38 in 2007. We consider only those
foreign aliates in which a German multinational holds the control rights. Table 2.3 shows the
total sales and the number of rms present in each of the top 10 destinations.39 The United States,
Spain and France are the three countries from which German aliates sell the most. It is worth
noting that the number of entrants in a country cannot be perfectly mapped to the productivity
level (or size) of the median entrant. In addition, Appendix D shows that the average distance of the
foreign aliates from Germany does not monotonically increase in the number of aliates itself.
These observations gives us room for discussing the importance of demand factors in aecting
the choice of foreign locations. Moreover, the relevance of foreign countries with respect to the
aggregate sales diers for small-medium and large multinationals (see Appendix C for descriptive
statistics). We note that the top countries in generating aggregate sales are Brazil and Japan for
large MNEs, whereas they are Poland, Austria, Italy and Switzerland for small and medium MNEs.
With respect to the entry pattern, the top locations are China and France for large MNEs, the US
and Poland for small MNEs.
Since our model focuses on the contribution of the demand components to explaining the
global production structure, we restrict our sample to those MNEs that conduct horizontal FDI.
MiDi does not provide any information about the type of FDI chosen by a rm. In order to control
35Industries are classied on 2-digit level NACE Rev. 1.1.
36We aggregate the industries 1500 (manufacture of food products and beverages) and 1600 (manufacture of
textiles). This consolidation is in line with NACE Rev. 1.1, which aggregates these two industries at the upper
level DA (manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco). Moreover, in order to fulll the condentiality
requirements for the usage of the dataset, we exclude the industry 2300 (manufacture of other non-metallic mineral
products).
37The set of countries consists of 26 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom), 9 Asian countries
(China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey), 5 South American countries (Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru), two African countries (South Africa, Tunisia), Canada and the United States in North
America, and Australia in Oceania. These are the countries where at least three dierent German MNEs operate
an aliate. Given this set of countries, we account for 96% of the total aliates of MNEs operating in 2007 and
performing horizontal FDI. Furthermore, the share of the aliates we consider generates 99% of the total aliate
sales.
38We aggregate the capital, labor and sales for the aliates of one MNE operating within the same country. As
production fragmentation does not provide us with any information about the eect of country characteristics on
the incentive to diversify, our main results do not change.
39The ranking is built with respect to the total amount of sales.
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Table 2.3.: Descriptive Statistics on Foreign Aliates and Parents by Country
Countries Totalsales
Sales aliate Sales MNE Employment MNE Average
productivity NAverage SD Average SD Average Median
United States 47.5 257 1340 1758 89960 4497 883 3.38 185
Spain 22.2 239 995 4201 15665 11419 1809 3.38 93
France 16.9 105 225 2522 11709 6673 1210 3.53 161
Brazil 16.6 238 1060 4685 809 13290 3255 3.71 70
United Kingdom 15.5 135 442 4151 15042 10772 1434 4.18 115
Czech Republic 13.9 104 694 2279 12622 6621 909 3.58 134
China 10.8 60 178 2002 8733 6290 1453 3.64 181
Poland 9.9 75 301 1705 9417 4495 778 3.91 132
Hungary 9.6 117 646 1838 5760 6324 1252 4.09 82
Mexico 9.2 196 877 7207 21378 18309 2644 3.49 47
Germany 577.2 594 3620 873 5522 2557 676 3.90 971
Note: Total sales are expressed in billion Euro. Sales of aliate and MNE are expressed in million Euro.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct invest-
ment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
for the presence of vertical FDI, we use the standard proxy considering an investment relation as
horizontal if both parent and aliate rms operate within the same industry.40
We integrate the information in AMADEUS database to complement the balance sheet data
on the home plants of German multinational rms. In particular, we observe the level of home
sales, the number of employees, and the capital of the parent companies.
Figure 2.5 shows the variation in MNE sales and employment. We notice that the set of rms
in our analysis is not solely restricted to the largest German rms; the variability in the rm sales
is particularly evident.
Table 2.4 shows some descriptive statistics about foreign aliates operating in each industry.
First, we can notice that the average and median sales of rms vary across industries, being
particularly high in the manufacturing of auto, electrical machinery and basic metals. Moreover,
these three industries are characterized by a large range of rm sales and sizes. With regard
to foreign entry, producers operating in the chemical and transport sectors hold more aliates
on average (in the other industries, the average MNE is present only in one foreign country).
Industries are quite dispersed in terms of share of multinational production. On average foreign
aliate sales generate 27.6% of the total sales of a German MNE. In some industries, the sales
produced by aliates are larger (auto, minerals, printing) whereas in other sectors most of the
production is carried out by the parent rm in Germany (wood, machinery and basic metals). At
the same time, foreign market participation cannot be perfectly mapped to the concentration of
40This assumption leaves us with 86% of the initial sample. Literature proposed also to proxy for horizontal FDI
using the data on intrarm trade. Unfortunately, MiDi does not contain this information explicitly. Nonetheless,
intrarm trade can be proxied by the share of aliate current assets of which claims on the aliated enterprises.
This measure is less restrictive and includes our subsample. See Overesch and Wamser (2009), who use current assets
claim to proxy for horizontal FDI in MiDi.
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Figure 2.5.: Distribution of German MNEs’ sales and employment in 2007 in manufacturing
(a) Sales (b) Employment
Note: Firms with employment level to the right of the bold vertical line are considered to be large rms (more than
1000 employees). Sales are expressed in the logarithm of million euros. Employment is expressed in the logarithm of
the number of employees.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment
(MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
sales across aliates. The largest level of sales concentration occurs in basic metals and textile,
while this measure is lower in other transport and paper manufacturing. One of the hypothesis
that can explain this result is that industry characteristics can aect the way an MNE spreads its
sales across aliates.
To estimate non-rm-specic parameters, such as trade costs, production indexes, and the
co-variance matrix of country demands, we use data from UN databases and CEPII.41
2.4. Estimation
In this section, we describe the estimation procedure we follow to obtain estimates of the risk
aversion coecient of the MNEs. Given the location set L in which the aliates of rm operate
and the aggregate sales
∑
d pdqd of the multinational group, we determine the rm-specic risk
aversion parameter r. Our model yields uniqueness of the risk aversion measure for a given
choice of the location set. The estimation of risk aversion requires additional parametrization
and estimation of rm- and country-industry-specic parameters (ϕ, τ ,σ, α¯,Σ,Q). First, we
discuss the estimation of productivities, trade costs, and quantity indexes, and parametrize the
41Trade ows and home production data are from the COMTRADE, INDSTAT and IDSB. Gravity dummies and
distances are from CEPII. COMTRADE concordance tables provide industry-country trade ows in NACE Rev. 1.1
classication.
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Table 2.4.: Descriptive Statistics on Aliates by Industries
Industry Sales Employment Numberof aliates
Concentration
measure
Foreign
share (%) NAverage SD Average SD
Food and tobacco 185 589 356 469 1.6 0.36 29.7 116
Textile 38 49 240 287 1.5 0.42 28.8 50
Wearing and leather 70 84 440 435 1.5 0.48 26.4 33
Wood 69 115 363 321 1.0 0.40 19.8 14
Paper 120 182 351 395 1.2 0.35 23.2 40
Printing 88 210 342 634 2.4 0.37 32.6 94
Chemicals 271 1118 640 1939 3.7 0.43 29.9 433
Plastic 69 175 312 529 2.1 0.36 30.5 290
Minerals 95 130 488 755 2.2 0.38 33.4 136
Basic metals 376 1112 924 2496 1.3 0.49 22.6 79
Metal products 73 129 380 575 1.8 0.42 25.4 262
Machinery n.e.c. 135 377 516 1321 2.0 0.47 22.2 598
Electrical 377 2227 1644 8026 2.1 0.41 26.8 235
Communication 360 954 957 1437 1.9 0.39 30.4 90
Medical 65 101 308 444 2.0 0.46 27.7 207
Auto 1180 5950 2648 11347 3.3 0.38 34.8 319
Other transport 226 460 826 1670 2.6 0.46 25.4 65
Furniture 46 47 289 274 1.2 0.33 31.3 31
Note: Sales are expressed in million Euro.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment
(MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
other country-industry-specic parameters. Second, we show the procedure to derive the risk
aversion coecients.
2.4.1. Productivities and Industry Parameters
Productivities
German companies operating in dierent countries exhibit dierent productivity levels across
aliates. This observation can stem from the non-perfect cross-border transferability of technolo-
gies and dierent quality of inputs across countries. Hence, as to disentangle the role of demand
from that of technology, we need to control for the heterogeneity in productivities across aliates
of one rm.
Since the estimates of productivities enter the risk aversion measure, we discuss the identi-
cation of the latter. Productivities and risk aversion aect rms’ sales at a dierent levels. In
our framework, productivities are aliate-specic, whereas risk aversion coecients are group-
specic. In particular, for a risk neutral rm higher productivity in one aliate makes it cheaper
to serve all destination markets associated with this location. Therefore, without risk aversion,
we expect higher sales to each destination market from the more productive aliate. At the same
time, risk aversion shapes sales ows due to the presence of demand correlations. When risk
30
aversion is positive, an increase in the aliate productivity results in a reshuing of the sales
portfolio and changes the sales shares in each destination market served from the aliate in a
way that is proportional to the hedging opportunities oered by the location. Moreover, a risk
averse rm adjusts the sales realized in all other aliates. Since we observe the aliate sales of
rms with dierent productivities, we can disentangle the eect of productivity on sales from
that of diversication. We use the variation of sales at the aliate level to capture the supply-side
parameters, whereas we use the aggregate sales to determine the rm’s risk attitude.
In the estimation of productivity, we control for rm- and market-specic demand parameters
to obtain productivity estimates in the presence of a positive risk aversion. The equation we
estimate at the aliate level by industry reads as
ln(salesjlω) = β1 + βk ln(capitaljlω) + β` ln(laborjlω) + βa ln(agejlω)
+ βcconcentration measureω + βvcoecient of variationl
+ βppremiuml + ξjlω,
(2.22)
where j denotes the aliate, l the location of aliate j, and ξjlω the aliate-multinational-specic
productivity shock. From the previous specication, we obtain the productivity estimate ϕˆjlω
according to ϕˆjlω = exp(ξˆjlω + βˆ1).
We include a measure of sales concentration to capture the diversication incentives of a rm
to take into account dierent degrees of risk aversion across rms.42 Moreover, we include the
coecient of variation of the demand associated to the location where the aliate operates in. We
nd a signicant negative relation between aggregate sales and the volatility of destination market
demand. Another problem can potentially arise from the fact that we estimate productivity using
realized sales rather than expected sales (i.e. sales before the realization of the shocks). Indeed,
higher sales to a destination can be just due to a higher realization of the market demand rather
than to the level of productivity of the rm in the given market. Therefore, to proxy for the eect
of the realized market size, we include the dierence between the realized and expected market
size.43 We show in Section 2.5 that the productivity estimates are not correlated with the estimated
risk aversion coecients when controlling for other rm characteristics. Moreover, we nd that
German MNEs are, on average, more productive at home than in the host countries (see Figure
2.7).
42The construction of the concentration measure of sales is discussed in the Appendix D.
43For the estimation of expected market size, see subsection 2.4.1.
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Figure 2.7.: Distribution of productivities of foreign aliates and parents (in logs)
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment
(MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
Industry Parameters
A set of parameters is common to all rms operating within an industry. For convenience, we
distinguish between supply side parameters, i.e. trade costs, and demand side parameters, i.e.
the elasticity of substitution, quantity indexes, variance-covariance matrix of market sizes, and
expected market sizes.
The estimation of trade costs and quantity indexes is based on the methodology proposed by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for cross-sectional data. In particular, a partial equilibrium
model for import ows at the industry level delivers the following equation:
log
(
md′d
Md
)
= (1− σ) log (τd′d) + (σ − 1) log(Pd) for d, d′ ∈ 1, ..., N, (2.23)
where md′d is import from d′ to d, and Md is the sum of total import and consumption in
country d. Therefore, the share of country d′ in total consumption in country d is described by
trade costs between countries, the level of prices in country d, and the elasticity of substitution.
Similar to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we can estimate trade costs and price indexes
only conditional on the elasticity of substitutions σ. As we do not estimate industry-specic
elasticity of substitution, we assume σ = 6.44
44This value is in line with Head and Mayer (2004) and Chen and Novy (2011). Note that this value implies a
markup equal to 17% in a risk neutral framework. Importantly, estimates of risk aversion parameters exhibits a low
sensitivity to the choice of the elasticity of substitution. This is linked to the fact that risk aversion represents a ratio
between the sales premium and variance, which are scaled by the same sigma. See Proposition 2.
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We model trade costs as a function of the distance between the two countries, contiguity, and
common language. More precisely, we have
log(τd′d) = β1 log(distd′d) + β2contigd′d + β3langd′d for d, d′ ∈ 1, ..., N. (2.24)
To estimate industry-specic price indexes, we introduce dummies as in Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006). The nal equation we are estimating is
log
(
md′d
Md
)
= β˜1 log(distd′d) + β˜2contigd′d + β˜3langd′d + γd + d′d, (2.25)
where β˜b = (σ − 1)βb for b = 1, 2, 3, γd = (σ − 1) log(Pd), is a country dummy.
We assume that trade costs and price indexes are 2-digit industry-specic, and correspondingly
use import ows at the 2-digit disaggregation level. Country-industry-specic quantity indexes
are obtained from the industry i equilibrium condition in country d: PidQid = αid.
Finally, we proxy the total expenditure parameter αid using data on the industry-level con-
sumption from the IDSB dataset. This dataset contains information about country’s values of
production, export and import at a 2-digit level. We obtain co-variance matrices from time-series
data on total expenditure for the 46 countries in our sample from 2002 to 2006.
We assume that αid depends on its rst lagged value. In particular, we assume that
αid,t = α
β
id,t−1 exp
INDi+COUNTRYd+id,t , (2.26)
where id,t is an innovation term45 with mean 1, and β captures the persistence in the evolution
of α. We then estimate the following equation in logs
logαid,t = β logαid,t−1 + INDi + COUNTRYd + id,t, (2.27)
where we include control dummies for industry and country. From this equation we obtain a
prediction for αid,t given the value of αid,t−1. Hence, we compute the entry (d, d′) of the variance-
covariance matrix Σi in the following way
Σi(d, d
′) =
T∑
t=1
(αid,t − α¯id,t) (αid′,t − α¯id′,t)
T − 1 , (2.28)
where α¯id,t and α¯id′,t denote the expectations ofαid,t andαid′,t given the level ofαid,t−1 andαid′,t−1,
respectively, and T is the number of years we are using for our estimation.
45We do not restrict this shock term to be uncorrelated across countries and industries.
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2.4.2. Risk Aversion
Uniqueness of the solution of the rm’s problem ensures that aggregate sales across aliates
are a well-dened function of risk aversion. Therefore, we match theoretical sales, predicted by
our structural model, with aggregate MNE sales, observed in the data.46 We do not restrict risk
aversion to be positive. For each rm, the matching proceeds as follows:
1. Guess the risk aversion parameter r.
2. Given the location set L observed in the data, solve the rm’s utility maximization problem.
3. Obtain q, and compute the implied aggregate theoretical sales
∑
d∈D
pdqd.
4. Update r if the distance between theoretical and empirical sales is larger than the tolerance
level.47
It is important to note that the updating of r is based on the characteristics of the solution to
the utility maximization problem. Everything else equal, the rm’s aggregate sales are strictly
decreasing in risk aversion as shown in the Proposition 3.
2.5. Results
We perform the estimation of risk aversion coecients for 952 MNEs in the sample in 2007.
Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of the estimates of the risk aversion coecients. We observe
that estimated risk aversion coecients are positive for all rms in the sample. The majority of
MNEs display risk aversion coecients ranging between 0 and 1. In particular, the average risk
aversion coecient in the sample is 0.34 (s.d. equal to 1.16).
Table 2.5 shows that coecients of risk aversion greatly dier across industries. The average
risk aversion ranges from 0.10 in paper manufacturing sector to 1.39 in the manufacturing of
basic metals sector.
The heterogeneity in risk aversion can be explained by several factors related to industry
characteristics. In particular, the volatility of demand in the industry seems to play an important
role. Figure 2.9 displays the spread in the coecient of variation in each industry given countries
in our sample. On average, larger risk aversion coecients occur in industries with larger median
coecient of variation (basic metals, medical, electrical). In highly volatile industries, rms are
46Note that we do not observe expected sales in the data. However, sales to each destination are decreasing with
the level of risk aversion. This together with uniqueness of the solution allows us to match empirical sales.
47We assume convergence when the absolute dierence between empirical and theoretical sales is less than
0.001%.
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Figure 2.8.: Estimated Density of Risk Aversion
Mean SD p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 N
Risk aversion 0.34 1.16 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.31 0.72 952
Note: Outliers on the right tail are removed.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Mi-
crodatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
indeed more exposed to demand shocks. Therefore, for these industries, rms consider the demand
risk as a more relevant factor. In terms of our model, this implies a larger level of risk aversion.
Interestingly, risk aversion is poorly correlated with average industry size and sales of aliates. In
addition, estimated risk aversions is mainly connected to industry-specic demand characteristics
rather than to technological variables.
Next, we evaluate the relation between risk aversion and rm-specic characteristics to assess
how the risk attitude correlates with the other sources of rm heterogeneity. In Table 2.6, we
present the results of the regression of the estimated risk aversion coecients on a set of rm’s
characteristics. First, we nd no signicant correlation between risk aversion and productivity.
This observation is important, as we regard the estimated productivities as an observable. There-
fore, the coecient of risk aversions obtained from our estimation do not reect the eect of
rm’s productivity on sales. Second, we nd that risk aversion negatively correlates with rm
size. Third, we nd a negative correlation between rm’s age and risk aversion. Our interpre-
tation is that larger or more experienced rms are better at dealing with market risk. Finally, a
more risk averse rm tends to display a more diversied structure of sales. This nding suggests
that rms take advantage of possible diversication opportunities more extensively when they
are more concerned about the market turmoil. Moreover, the negative correlation between the
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Table 2.5.: Risk Aversion Across Industries
More risk averse
industries
Risk aversion Less risk averse
industries
Risk aversion
Average SD N Average SD N
Basic metals 1.39 4.98 34 Textile 0.20 0.19 20
Medical 0.79 0.93 68 Printing 0.18 0.30 26
Metal products 0.55 0.66 91 Machinery n.e.c. 0.18 0.92 196
Furniture 0.54 0.71 14 Wearing and leather 0.17 0.16 13
Electrical 0.35 0.49 75 Chemicals 0.14 0.42 90
Food and tobacco 0.34 0.70 44 Other transport 0.14 0.18 18
Plastic 0.31 0.33 93 Wood 0.13 0.14 7
Auto 0.25 0.78 73 Minerals 0.13 0.15 41
Communication 0.24 0.25 31 Paper 0.10 0.09 18
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase
Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
Figure 2.9.: Distribution of coecient of variation of demand, product level
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Source: UNIDO INDSTAT2 2016, authors’ calculations.
concentration measure and risk aversion48 is suggestive that the estimated risk aversion captures
rm’s attitude toward demand risk.
In addition, we nd a positive correlation between the share of debt in the rm’s capital and the
level of risk aversion.49 The intuition for this nding relates to the fact that nancially constrained
rms are more risk averse when they compose their sales portfolio.
To assess the goodness of t of our model to the real data, we compare the predicted trade
ows with real data across dierent regions. Table 2.7 shows that the model predicts accurately
48Note that this result is still valid when we consider other measure of concentration, like the Herndal index.
49See Table J.2 in Appendix J.
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Table 2.6.: Risk Aversion and Firm Characteristics
I II III
productivity
−0.0658
(0.0583)
0.0223
(0.1368)
−0.0829
(0.0589)
size
−2.0699∗∗∗
(0.0795)
−1.9597∗∗∗
(0.0801)
−1.9176∗∗∗
(0.0796)
age
−0.0819∗∗
(0.0399)
−0.1330∗∗∗
(0.0206)
productivity*age
−0.0364
(0.0281)
concentration
−0.6905∗∗∗
(0.1429)
constant
−1.3460∗∗∗
(0.1922)
0.9009∗∗∗
(0.2697)
−0.5058∗∗
(0.2181)
industry xed eects Yes Yes Yes
N 952 952 952
Note: We consider productivity of parent German rm. Risk aversion and
productivity are taken in logs. Size is equal to 1 for MNEs with more than
1000 employees. Concentration measure is measured by Herndal Index.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calcula-
tions.
trade ows in most regions. The underprediction of sales in North America and overprediction
of sales in Asia and Oceania can be partly explained by the fact that trade costs are estimated
outside the model. We believe that an estimation procedure able to match the characteristics of
multinational trade ows across countries would provide more accurate results.50
Table 2.7.: Regional Trade Flows of German Multinationals (Percentage Shares)
Regions Data Model N
Africa 1.1% 1.8% 47
Asia & Oceania 3.4% 10.9% 241
Europe 86.2% 82.2% 896
North America 7.3% 3.1% 205
South America 2.1% 1.9% 69
Source: Research Data and Service Centre
(RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Micro-
database Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014,
authors’ calculations.
50In particular, estimating jointly productivities and rm’s risk aversion may improve the ability of the model to
match the empirical data.
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Next, we estimate a proxy for the elasticity of MNE sales to the level of risk aversion.51
We nd that a change of 1% in risk aversion produces a change of sales approximately equal
to −0.8%.
Table 2.8.: Sales Response to Exogenous Change in Risk Aversion
Change in risk aversion Mean p25 p50 p75
5% increase −4.13% −4.40% −4.08% −3.79%
1% increase −0.85% −0.92% −0.85% −0.78%
1% decrease 0.85% 0.79% 0.87% 0.93%
5% decrease 4.46% 4.12% 4.51% 4.82%
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calcula-
tions.
We conduct an analogous exercise to measure the sensitivity of countries’ trade ows to
changes in risk aversion. Figure 2.10 depicts the increase in sales of German multinationals
to countries in response to a 1% decrease of risk aversion in the sample. Trade ows to all coun-
tries increase in absolute terms, which is in line with the result obtained in simplied setting in
Section 2.2.3. Moreover, the magnitude of response is negatively correlated with the riskiness
of the country. Safer markets gain more from the decrease in risk aversion, while more volatile
economies still attract relatively lower trade ows. At the same time, changes in risk aversion af-
fect to a larger extent countries whose economies are strongly co-moving with German economy.
We observe that many developing economies are less sensitive to changes in risk aversion, which
is again in line with the intuition provided in the comparative statics exercise: as risk aversion
increases, multinationals are less prone to concentrate sales in similar countries and increase
relative sales shares in less correlated countries.
51Changes of the degree of rm’s risk aversion in the market can take place as a consequence of the entrance of a
dierent population of rms in the market. Alternatively, changes in the level of nancial constraints can also aect
the attitude towards risk of the rms.
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Figure 2.10.: Sales response to exogenous increase in risk aversion, country level
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Counterfactual: Trade Liberalization in China. In this section, we consider the eect of a
trade liberalization occurring in China. In particular, we assume that the trade costs for the goods
imported to this country decrease by 10%. The results are reported in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9 shows how the trade ows to China from German MNEs would increase by approxi-
mately 23%. A trade cost decrease has a rst order eect on the import to China related to the fact
that selling products to this destination market becomes cheaper. However, not only trade ows
to China are aected but also those to other correlated countries. In particular, imports to the
USA and Japan from German MNEs greatly increase. As the exposure to demand risk in China
increased following the trade liberalization, German MNEs optimally reallocate their production
favoring those countries that oer better hedge to the increased risk in China. On the contrary,
countries like Hong Kong and Singapore are negatively aected by the policy change; though
their demand sizes are signicantly smaller than the Chinese one, the change is noticeable. We
also evidence that the trade ows to the other EU countries would slightly decrease. Overall,
the direction and magnitude of the change of imports depend on (i) how good a country is at
providing hedging for the increase in the demand risk, (ii) the correlation structure among the
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Table 2.9.: Response of Trade Flows to a Tari Decrease in China
by 10%
Country Change (in %) Country Change (in %)
China 22.94 EU −0.73
USA 11.20 Ukraine −0.95
Japan 6.05 Indonesia −0.96
Australia −0.01 Colombia −1.27
South Africa −0.04 Russia −1.32
South Korea −0.05 Mexico −1.76
India −0.16 Norway −2.04
Brazil −0.21 Singapore −2.45
Turkey −0.36 Peru −2.90
Chile −0.53 Hong Kong −5.93
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
countries in which the MNEs are present in, as predicted by our model.52 In general, the structure
of correlation makes prediction hard. Indeed, the reallocation patterns are rather complex as
spillovers to one country can propagate to other correlated countries. If countries are relatively
highly positively correlated countries, then a liberalization policy taking place in one of them
negatively aects the others. Indeed, rms need to reduce their exposure to demand risk due to
the increase in sales in one the countries.53
2.6. Conclusions
In this chapter, we develop a model of risk averse multinational rms conducting horizontal FDI
and serving foreign markets through export platforms under demand risk.
Our theoretical model predicts that MNEs exploit the presence of demand correlations across
foreign markets to hedge against the risk of unfavorable aggregate demand uctuations. The
quantity sold in a destination market diers from the one the rm would sell under no risk and,
in particular, depends on the riskiness of the country, on its diversication potential, and the
degree of risk aversion of the rm itself besides market size, distance, and production cost. As
rms are heterogeneously risk averse, this implies that they set rm-country-specic markups
even within a standard CES framework. We also nd that third-country eects can follow a trade
52On May 11 2017, China and US signed a trade agreement to remove some of the existing barriers in the trade
across the two countries. The agreement could be mutually benecial not only because rms operating in both
countries can take advantage of the lower trade costs but also because of the favorable correlation structure.
53This might have also implications for Brexit. Countries in the EU might benets in the case of an increase in
taris for the goods imported in the UK.
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liberalization episode. In particular, countries that are not directly involved in the policy change
can suer or gain from a change in taris, depending on the structure of the correlation across
demand realizations. Due to the interdependence across foreign markets and the presence of risk
aversion, a nonstandard rm’s entry policy obtains. Specically, the size of the location sets in
which a rm establishes its foreign production facilities does not necessarily vary monotonically
both with risk aversion and home productivity.
The empirical analysis relies on the data on German multinational enterprises. Our main
ndings are consistent with the existence of diversication patterns in the sales structure of
multinational enterprises. In particular, rms display strictly positive and heterogeneous degrees
of risk aversion. This heterogeneity can be related to rm’s characteristics, like size and age, and
to the demand characteristics of the sector in which the rm operates in. In particular, rms in the
relatively more volatile industries display a larger aversion toward risk. In two counterfactuals,
we show (i) how a tari reduction for goods imported into China would increase sales in less
correlated economies and harm, instead, those countries whose demand are more correlated with
the Chinese one, and (ii) how a reduction in risk aversion would result in a larger increase of sales
in countries that are either less risky or whose economies are more correlated with Germany.
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A. Existence and Uniqueness
Proposition 1. (Existence and Uniqueness). If the matrix Σ has cross-correlations bounded away
from −1 and 1, there exists a unique solution to the rm’s utility maximization problem.
Proof. Before delving into the proof of Proposition 1, we show an auxiliary lemma which turns
out to be useful for the following discussion.
Lemma 1. Let (P1) denote the following problem
max
q∈RN+
u(Π(q|L,ϕ, r)) =
∑
d
(
q
σ−1
σ
d
(
E[Ad]− cdq
1
σ
d
))
− r
2
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)q
σ−1
σ
d q
σ′−1
σ′
d′
Dene sd = f(qd;σ) ≡ q
σ−1
σ
d . Then, the problem (P2) dened as
max
s∈RN+
u(Π(s|L,ϕ, r)) =
∑
d
(
sd
(
E[Ad]− cds
1
σ−1
d
))
− r
2
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)sdsd′ .
is equivalent to (P1), i.e. q∗ is a solution to (P1) if and only if s∗ is a solution to (P2).
Proof. First, note that for qd ≥ 0 the function f(·) is a bijection. Consider the problems (P1) and
(P2). If sd = qd = 0 for all d, then the statement follows. Assume that qd, sd > 0 for some d.
Then, for such d, the rst order conditions for (P1) and (P2) are respectively given by
∂u(·)
∂qd
=
σ − 1
σ
E[Ad]q
− 1
σ
d − r
(
σ − 1
σ
q
− 1
σ
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)q
σ−1
σ
d′
)
− cd = 0, (A.1)
and
∂u(·)
∂sd
= E[Ad]− r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)sd′ −
σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1
d = 0 (A.2)
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respectively. Then, using the denition of sd, we can write (A.2) as
∂u(·)
∂sd
= E[Ad]− r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)sd′ −
σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1
d = 0 (A.3)
⇔ ∂u(·)
∂sd
= E[Ad]− r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)q
σ−1
σ
d′ −
σ
σ − 1cdq
1
σ
d = 0 (A.4)
⇔ ∂u(·)
∂sd
= E[Ad]q
− 1
σ
d − r
(
q
− 1
σ
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)q
σ−1
σ
d′
)
− σ
σ − 1cd = 0, (A.5)
where the last equivalence follows from the fact that qd > 0. So, if qd solves (A.1), then sd solves
(A.2), and vice versa. This shows that problems (P1) and (P2) are equivalent given the denition
of sd, and admit the same solution, provided this solution exists.
Next, we consider the problem (P2). We show that the solution exists and is unique. Then,
using Lemma 1, we can extend this result to the original problem (P1).
Existence. To show the existence of a solution, we use the notion of coercive function. Recall
that a continuous function f is coercive if and only if
lim
‖s‖→∞
f(s) = +∞.
Note that u(·) can be written as the sum of the expected prots and the variance of prots multi-
plied by a scalar r. These functions, taken with negative sign, are both coercive.1 Moreover, the
sum of coercive functions is coercive. We can then apply Proposition 2.1.1 in Bertsekas, Ozdaglar,
and Nedić (2003) to conclude the existence of a solution to the utility maximization problem.2
Uniqueness.To show the uniqueness of a solution, it is enough to show that the utility function
u is strictly concave in s.
Let Hu denote the Hessian matrix associated to the rm’s utility.
Note that any element of the main diagonal is given by
Hu(d, d) =
∂2u(Π(s|L, ϕ, r))
∂s2d
= − σ
(σ − 1)2 cds
2−σ
σ−1
d − rvar(Ad) < 0. (A.6)
1Note that the expected prot function is the sum of the prot realized in each destination d, which is a continuous
and concave function of sd admitting a unique global maximizer, i.e. the solution under no risk aversion or uncertainty.
Hence, the expected prot function is coercive when taken with the negative sign. Recall that cross-correlations are
bounded away from 1. Hence, the variance of prots is coercive, as it is non-negative and goes to innity when the
norm of s goes to innity.
2Indeed, maximizing a function is equivalent to minimizing its opposite.
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Moreover, the element outside the main diagonal can be written as
Hu(d, d
′) =
∂2u(Π(s|L, ϕ, r))
∂s2d
= −rcov(Ad, Ad′). (A.7)
Let
Du ≡ diag
({
σ
(σ − 1)2 cds
2−σ
σ−1
d
}
d
)
. (A.8)
Thus, the Hessian Hu can be written as
Hu = −(Du + rΣA). (A.9)
Then, we note that matrix Du is positive denite being a diagonal matrix with all diagonal
elements positive. Moreover, rΣA is positive denite being the product of a positive scalar with
a positive denite matrix. Hence, D + rΣA is positive denite being the sum of two positive
denite matrices3 implying that Hu is negative denite.
3See Horn and Johnson (2012).
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B. Risk Aversion Measure
Proposition 2. (Risk aversion measure). The measure of risk aversion is a function of the optimal
production portfolio, and is equal to
r =
∑
d (Epdqd − p˜dqd)(
q
σ−1
σ
)′
ΣAq
σ−1
σ
,
where Epd is the expected price in country d, p˜d = σσ−1cd is the price under certainty in country d,
and q
σ−1
σ is a vector whose d component is q
σ−1
σ
d , where qd is the optimal quantity sold in country d.
Proof. Let sd = q
σ−1
σ
d .
The rst order optimality condition with respect to sd is given by
∂u(Π(s|L, ϕ))
∂sd
=
∂E(Π(s|L, ϕ))
∂sd
− r
2
∂var(Π(s|L, ϕ))
∂sd
= EAd − σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1
d − rvar(Ad)sd
− r
∑
d′∈D
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ = 0
= EAd − σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1
d − r
∑
d
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd = 0.
(B.1)
Hence, multiplying both sides of equation (B.1) by sd, and summing over d the risk aversion
coecient r can be expressed as follows
r =
∑
d
[
EAdsd − σσ−1cds
σ
σ−1
d
]
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sdsd′
=
(Epdqd − p˜dqd)(
q
σ−1
σ
)′
Σq
σ−1
σ
≡ SP
SV
, (B.2)
where p˜d = σσ−1cd is the price rm would set under certainty, SP is the sales premium, and SV is
the sales variance.
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C. Small-Medium and Large
Multinationals
Table C.1.: Descriptive statistics on foreign aliates and parents of small-medium MNEs by coun-
try
Countries Totalsales
Sales aliate Sales MNE Employment NAverage Median Average Median Average Median
United States 2.4 24 14 121 86 428 388 100
France 1.6 23 17 116 86 410 372 69
Poland 1.3 18 14 111 81 468 474 76
Austria 1.3 30 16 124 103 462 411 43
Belgium 1.3 84 32 371 148 563 559 15
Czech Republic 1.1 16 13 107 83 523 491 70
China 1.0 15 9 118 85 538 527 71
United Kingdom 1.0 20 13 151 115 501 460 49
Italy 0.9 34 20 179 116 420 447 27
Switzerland 0.7 19 13 103 84 366 352 37
Germany 55.0 90 60 118 83 445 417 612
Note: Total sales are expressed in billion Euro. Sales of aliate and MNE are expressed in million
Euro. In this table we consider subsample of multinationals with less then 1000 employees.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase
Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
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Table C.2.: Descriptive statistics on foreign aliates and parents of large MNEs by country
Countries Totalsales
Sales aliate Sales MNE Employment NAverage Median Average Median Average Median
United States 45.1 531 73 3683 716 9286 2905 85
Spain 21.7 362 43 6438 848 17396 3117 60
Brazil 16.5 275 41 5443 982 15390 4010 60
France 15.3 167 63 4328 822 11370 2954 92
United Kingdom 14.5 219 48 7120 1310 18397 3840 66
Chezh Republic 12.8 199 40 4654 508 13290 2670 64
China 9.7 89 23 3218 685 10002 2809 110
Hungary 9.0 196 46 3204 718 10861 2755 46
Mexico 8.9 255 30 9602 912 24363 4081 35
Japan 8.6 346 109 7653 824 17767 3891 25
Germany 522.1 1454 344 2161 474 6158 2152 359
Note: Total sales are expressed in billion Euro. Sales of aliate and MNE are expressed in million
Euro. In this table we consider subsample of multinationals with more then 1000 employees.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase
Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
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D. Firm Risk Aversion
This section discusses some evidence in the data and other contributions in the literature related
to the assumption that rms might exhibit risk averse behavior.
Firms Diversification Strategies. In this paragraph, we discuss some patterns in the data
which are in line with the idea that rms adopt diversication strategies on both the intensive
and extensive margins of sales when carrying out their multinational activity.
The diversication of sales by rms operating in international markets has been widely dis-
cussed in the literature. Hirsch and Lev (1971) show that rms holding a more diversied foreign
sales portfolio display also more stable sales. Vannoorenberghe (2012) provides evidence that
foreign and domestic sales are negatively correlated at the rm level, which supports the hypoth-
esis that rms hedge against demand risk in the home country by selling abroad. This nding
contradicts the theoretical prediction provided by models considering only productivity, which
imply a positive correlation of sales across destination markets. Fillat, Garetto, and Oldenski
(2015) show that multinational prots benets from geographical diversication of sales.
Using data on German multinationals, we nd evidence in favor of sales diversication. In
particular, for a rm present in at least two locations (home included), we compute the following
measure of sales concentration as
C =
∑J
j=1
(
sharej − 1J
)2
J−1
J
, (D.1)
where J is the number of rm’s locations and sharej represents the ratio of rm sales in location
j to total rm sales. Note that C equals 0 if sales evenly distribute across dierent locations
(minimum level of concentration), and equals 1, if sales concentrate in one and only one location
(maximum level of concentration). Moreover, the proposed measure takes into account the number
of foreign locations a MNE is present in, as J diers across rms.
Figure D.1 shows that rms tend to spread their sales across locations rather than concentrate
their activities. We can notice that the mode of the concentration measure in the data is slightly
above 0.2.
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Figure D.1.: Distribution of concentration measure of sales, rm level
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment
(MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
Moreover, as Figure D.2 shows, the degree of sales concentration is directly related to rm
size; smaller rms are typically more nancially constrained so that holding a portfolio of well
diversied nancial assets is harder for this class of enterprises.1 As a response to this, they
diversify their sales across locations to reduce the degree of riskiness related to their activity.
Figure D.2.: Distribution of concentration measure of sales by size of MNEs, rm level
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment
(MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
1In our data, the median liquidity ratio for a small (large) rm equals 1.33 (1.47). The median solvency ratio for a
small (large) rm equals 35.85 (39.15). The median current ratio for a small (large) rm equals 1.19 (2.16). This shows
that the small median rm is more nancially constrained than the (large) median rm.
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Figure D.3.: Average distance of foreign aliates from Germany
Berlin
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Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment
(MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
We also relate the total sales to the average correlation of the given location with all other
markets present in our sample.2 Table D.1 shows that the sales are lower in those locations char-
acterized by a larger average correlation, as expected.
Table D.1.: Location sales and average correlation
Dependent variable: log(sales) Coecient SE
average correlation −0.3865∗∗∗ 0.1076
constant 17.8212∗∗∗ 0.0348
N 1611
R2 0.0080
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014,
authors’ calculations.
In addition, diversication patterns cannot be explained by heterogeneity in rm eciency as
we nd no correlation between the proposed measure of sales portfolio diversication and rm
eciency.3
2For country d, the average correlation in the sector i is given by
∑
d′∈D corr(αid, αid′)/|D|.
3Firm’s productivity estimation is described in Section 2.4.1.
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On the extensive margin, gure D.3 shows that the average distance from Germany of the
aliates does not monotonically increase with the number of countries the rm operates in.
Hence, rms that can aord to pay several times the xed costs of entry are not establishing
themselves necessarily in more distant markets as predicted by the standard theory of proximity-
concentration tradeo.
Table D.2.: Average distance from Germany per number of aliates hold by an MNE
Number of aliates Sample mean SD N
1 2795.74 3272.13 593
2 3271.36 2693.60 173
3 3676.50 2361.76 69
4 3843.34 2077.86 38
5 4223.96 2577.52 24
6 3593.86 2310.64 15
7 3455.94 1445.43 15
8 5006.77 1998.38 6
9 4177.81 1899.63 11
10 4569.92 1076.58 9
11+ 4486.80 1186.02 18
Average Distance 3119.01 2994.77 971
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi),
1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
Managers of Multinational Firms are Risk Averse. There are several papers showing that
rms are run by risk averse agents. Cucculelli and Ermini (2013) elicit CEOs’ risk attitude in a
sample of 178 manufacturing rms of dierent sizes. They nd that most respondents exhibit
an averse attitude toward risk.4 Moreover, their measure of risk aversion varies with dierent
rm characteristics like size and age.5 In particular, managers of larger or older rms tend to
be less risk averse. Other empirical papers like Esposito (2017), De Sousa et al. (2017), Herranz,
Krasa, and Villamil (2015) analyze risk aversion in managerial behavior. In particular, the rst
two contributions provide empirical evidence of risk averse attitude of exporters.
In addition, several recent surveys show that managers are concerned about the volatility of
demand in international markets and have a negative attitude toward risk. In particular, according
to the Capgemini Survey 2011, demand volatility is the most relevant business challenge (40%
476.4% (93.2%) of respondents are (weakly) risk averse.
5The average sales, number of employees, and range of supplied products are signicantly larger for those rms
run by risk loving managers than for those run by (weakly) risk averse managers.
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of responses) in the agenda of managers of global companies.6 These results are in line with the
Capgemini Survey 2012, in which the fraction of responses indicating demand volatility as the
most relevant concern topped 52%.7 An analogous study conducted by McKinsey in 2010 shows
that increasing volatility of customer demand is the most frequently mentioned challenge for
companies operating in a global environment (37% of responses).8 These surveys also point out
that rms react to demand risk by adjusting their production and sales plans.
The outcomes of these surveys are also relatable to the consideration that managers can hardly
perfectly diversify their endowment of human and physical capital across dierent rms.9 Indeed,
in most cases, the relation between a multinational company and a CEO tends to be exclusive.
Moreover, the theoretical contribution of Nocke and Thanassoulis (2014) nds that risk aversion
can be the outcome of credit constraints and diminishing marginal returns to scale of an investment
in a pledgeable asset.
Managers’ risk aversion can be also due to the fact that a part of managerial compensation
schemes is linked to company performance. In particular, the value of bonuses and company’s
shares depends crucially on the market performance realized by the rm. In this regard, Perrino,
Poteshman, and S. (2002) highlight that risk-reducing projects attract managers as they become
more risk averse. Relatedly, Abdel-Khalik (2007) shows that managers want to reduce the volatility
of rms they manage to avoid the reduction of company’s market value, as this would reect in a
decrease of the value of their assets.
Demands are Imperfectly Correlated across Destination Markets. Both the World Trade
Report 2008 and the World Investment Report 2008 highlight the importance of imperfectly cor-
related demands across countries during the 2007 crisis. While the Trade Report claims that
exporters did not hedge during the crisis, the Investment Report states the opposite for multi-
national rms. In particular, at the aggregate level multinational rms moved their export and
production toward those markets considered as more resilient to demand shocks. During the
crisis, transition and developing economies worked as a good hedge for the declining demand in
developed regions. In line with this observation, we nd that German multinationals operating
in both the OECD and non-OECD countries hold more diversied portfolios (in terms of sales)
than those with production plants only in one type of the country. In particular, the median
concentration for rms operating only in the non-OECD countries is 0.65, whereas the median
concentration of rms operating only in the OECD countries is 0.38. Firms operating in both
6Based on responses from 300 leading companies managers in Europe, North and Latin America, Asia. Demand
risk result more important than other factors, like increasing material costs, meeting changing customer requirements,
sustainability, etc.
7Based on responses from 350 leading companies managers in Europe, North and Latin America, Asia.
8Survey based on responses from 639 leading companies managers worldwide.
9This form of idiosyncratic risk cannot be diversied since markets are incomplete.
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types of countries display a median sales concentration equal to 0.32. Moreover, the extent of
sales diversication may be explained not only by the characteristics of the rms but also by the
features of the countries, with particular emphasis on market volatility.
Additionally, we compute the variance-covariance matrix at the 2-digit industry-level of the
consumption expenditure,10 using production and trade data of the top 45 German
export-destination countries for the period 2002 – 2006. Figure D.4 shows the distribution of
bilateral correlations at the industry level. As it can be noticed, the correlation of demands across
countries is imperfect for all industries, with the median correlation of demand being below 0.5.
Figure D.4.: Distribution of demand correlations, product level
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
D
en
si
ty
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Bilateral demand correlation
Source: UNIDO INDSTAT2 2016, authors’ calculations.
Therefore, the structure of demand correlations suggests that markets oer hedging opportu-
nities to multinational rms.
10For a given industry, the consumption expenditure is given by the dierence between total production and net
exports.
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E. Risk Aversion and Aggregate Sales
Proposition 3. (Risk Aversion and Aggregate Sales). The rm’s aggregate sales are decreasing with
risk aversion.
Proof. The system of rst-order necessary and sucient conditions reads as
EAd − σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1
d − r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ = 0, ∀d ∈ D. (E.1)
Dierentiating both sides with respect to r we obtain
− σ
(σ − 1)2 cds
1
σ−1−1
d s˙d −
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ − r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ = 0, ∀d ∈ D, (E.2)
where s˙d ≡ ∂sd∂r for all d ∈ D. Hence, ∀d ∈ D
σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1−1
d s˙d = −(σ − 1)
(∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′
)
. (E.3)
Again, using FOC we observe that
σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1
d = EAd − r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ , ∀d ∈ D. (E.4)
Combining equations (E.3) and (E.4) we obtain(
EAd − r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′
)
s˙d
= −(σ − 1)
(∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′
) (E.5)
57
for all d, which implies
EAds˙d = −(σ − 1)
(∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′
)
+r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d.
(E.6)
Summing both sides over d we obtain
∑
d
EAds˙d =− (σ − 1)
(∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′
)
+ r
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d.
(E.7)
where the left hand side is the derivative of the aggregate sales with respect to r. We want to
show that this derivative is negative.
Let’s consider the term in brackets of equation (E.7). Recall that
− σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1−1
d s˙d =
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ . (E.8)
Multiplying both sides of equation (E.8) by s˙d, we obtain
− σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1−1
d (s˙d)
2 =
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d + r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ s˙d. (E.9)
Summing both sides of equation (E.9) over d and re-arranging, we obtain∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d =− r
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ s˙d
−
∑
d
σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1−1
d (s˙d)
2.
(E.10)
We note that the left hand side of the above expression has to be negative since the right hand
side is the sum of two negative terms, i.e.∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d < 0. (E.11)
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Incidentally we also notice that
r
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙ds˙d′ +
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d < 0. (E.12)
Finally, note that var(A′s+ rA′s˙) can be written as∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sdsd′ + 2r
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d
+r2
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ s˙d =∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sdsd′ + r
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d
+r
(
r
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ s˙d +
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d
)
> 0.
(E.13)
From equation (E.12) we notice that the term in the brackets is negative. Hence, the sum outside
the brackets has to be positive since the variance is a positive number, i.e.∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sdsd′ + r
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d > 0. (E.14)
Hence, considering equations (E.7), (E.10) and (E.13), we conclude that aggregate sales are
decreasing in r.
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F. Price Seing
In this section, we assume that the rm maximizes its expected-utility function of prots realized
in the destination market with respect to the price rather than quantity.
Recall that consumer utility is
Ud =
I∑
i=1
αid lnQid +Q0d, (F.1)
with
Qid =
[∫
ω∈Ωid
qid(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
. (F.2)
Utility maximization implies the following direct demand function for the variety
qid(ω) = αidpid(ω)
−σP σ−1id , (F.3)
where
Pid =
[∫
ω∈Ωid
pid(ω)
1−σdω
] 1
1−σ
. (F.4)
Firm’s prots as a function of the price p = (p1, p2, . . . , pd, . . . , pN) are given by
Π(p|L,ϕ, r) =
∑
d
pdqd − cdqd
=
∑
d
αdp
1−σ
d P
σ−1
id − cdαdp−σd P σ−1d
=
∑
d
αdP
σ−1
d p
−σ
d (pd − cd) .
(F.5)
From equation (F.5), expected prots E[Π(p|L,ϕ, r)] are given by
EΠ[(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))] =
∑
d
α¯dP
σ−1
d p
−σ
d (pd − cd) , (F.6)
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whereas the variance var(Π(p|L,ϕ, r)) is given by
var(Π(p|L,ϕ, r)) =
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(αd, αd′)P σ−1d P
σ−1
d′ p
−σ
d p
−σ
d′ (pd − cd) (pd′ − cd′) . (F.7)
Recall that the objective function of the rm is given by
u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r)) = E[(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))]− r
2
var((Π(p|L,ϕ, r)). (F.8)
The rst order derivative of E[(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))] with respect to pd is given by
∂E[(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))]
∂pd
= α¯dP
σ−1
d p
−σ
d (1− σ) + cdα¯dσp−σ−1d P σ−1d
= α¯dP
σ−1
d
(
p−σd (1− σ) + cdσp−σ−1d
)
.
(F.9)
The expected prots have one critical point which corresponds to the standard constant markup
over cost pricing. In particular, a rm maximizes the expected prots if pd = σσ−1cd for all
destination markets. This corresponds to the problem when a rm is not risk averse or there is
no risk.
The rst order derivative of var(Π(p|L,ϕ, r)) with respect to pd is given by
∂var(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))
∂pd
= 2
(
p−σd (1− σ) + cdσp−σ−1d
)∑
d′
cov(αd, αd′)P σ−1d P
σ−1
d′ p
−σ
d′ (pd′ − cd).
(F.10)
Hence, the variance has two salient critical points: (i) pd = cd for all destination markets, and
(ii) pd = σσ−1cd for all destination markets. The second critical point is irrelevant as it is a local
maximum of the variance. Instead, the rst critical point is a global minimum of the variance
function. In particular, the rm can make the variance of prots equal to 0 if pd = cd for all
destination markets.
From the above analysis, we can draw the following conclusion. On the one hand a rm
wants to maximize its expected prots by setting the standard constant markup over marginal
cost implied by the CES preferences. On the other hand, the rm wants to minimize the variance
by pricing at the marginal cost in each destination market.
Let ζ(pd) ≡
(
p−σd (1− σ) + cdσp−σ−1d
)
. Then, the optimality condition ∂u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))/∂pd
can be written as
∂u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))
∂pd
= α¯dP
σ−1
d ζ(pd)− rζ(pd)
∑
d′
cov(αd, αd′)P σ−1d P
σ−1
d′ p
−σ
d′ (pd′ − cd′) = 0.
(F.11)
62
Equation (F.11) can be also arranged in the following way
pd =
σ
σ − 1cd + r
(
pd − σσ−1cd
)
α¯d
∑
d′
cov(αd, αd′)P σ−1d′
pd′ − cd′
pσd′
, (F.12)
which shows that the optimal price can be shifted upward or downward depending on the diver-
sication potential of market d.
We focus on two cases: (i) the case in which pd = σσ−1cd for all markets d, and (ii) the case in
which pd 6= σσ−1 for some market d.
Consider the case (i). The element (d, d′) in the Hessian matrix associated to the utility function
in (F.8) is given by
Hu(d, d
′) =
(
∂2u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))
∂pd∂pd′
)
. (F.13)
Then, if d 6= d′, the element of
Hu(d, d
′) = 0, (F.14)
when evaluated at pd = σσ−1cd for all d.
Instead, if d = d′, the element of Hu(d, d), evaluated at pd = σσ−1cd for all d, is given by
∂2u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))
∂p2d
= ζ ′
(
cd
1
σ − 1
)
P σ−1d
(
α¯d − rσ−σ(σ − 1)σ−1
∑
d′
cov(αd, α′d)P σ−1d′ c
1−σ
d′
)
,
(F.15)
as ζ
(
σ
σ−1cd
)
= 0. Moreover, ζ ′ (pd) < 0 for pd = σσ−1cd.
Hence, the a constant-markup over marginal cost is a local maximum if and only if Hu(d, d) < 0
or, equivalently, if and only if
r < min
d∈{1,...,N}
α¯d
σ−σ(σ − 1)σ−1∑d′ cov(αd, αd′)P σ−1d′ c1−σd′
for all d ∈ D.
Consider now case (ii). For some destination d, the rm charges a price dierent from the
constant markup over marginal cost. Then, we can rearrange equation (F.11) in the following way.
pd − cd
pσd
=
α¯d
rvar(αd)P σ−1d
−
∑
d′ 6=d
P σ−1d′
cov(αd, αd′)
var(αd)
pd′ − cd′
pσd
=
α¯d
rvar(αd)P σ−1d
−
∑
d′ 6=d
P σ−1d′ βd,d′
pd′ − cd′
pσd′
(F.16)
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where βd,d′ ≡ cov(αd,αd′ )var(αd) . The left hand side of the above expression measures rm’s market power.
A closed form solution for pd cannot be obtained in this case. However, to get some intuition,
let cov(αd, α′d) = 0 for all d, d′ with d 6= d′. Then, the above expression reads as
pd − cd
pσd
=
α¯d
rvar(αd)P σ−1d
. (F.17)
Hence, larger and stabler markets allow the rm to increase the price for that market. A more
risk averse rm tends to charge a lower price.
Assume also that σ = 2 similarly to De Sousa et al. (2017). Then, the solution1 implied by
equation (F.17) when σ = 2 is given by
pd =
rPdvar(αd) + α¯d
√
rPdvar(αd)(Pdrvar(αd)−4α¯dcd)
α¯2
2αd
≥ 2cd. (F.19)
As the Hessian is negative denite, the rst order conditions expressed by (F.11) are sucient.
From (F.19), We can observe that the rm charges a price which exceeds the standard constant
markup over marginal cost price.
Moreover, when σ = 2 and all covariances are equal to 0, we are able to compare the price
implied by the solution to the utility maximization problem under price choice with the price
selected by the rm in equation (F.19). To see this, consider (2.16). In this case, we obtain
qd =
(
E[Ad]
2cd
)2
·
(
1
1 + r var(Ad)
2cd
)2
. (F.20)
Recall that EAd = α¯dQ
−σ−1
σ
d . Hence, rearranging we obtain
qd =
α¯2dQd
(2cdQd + rvar(αd))2
. (F.21)
Plugging into the equation (F.3), we obtain an expression for the expected price Epd
Epd = 2cd + r
Pdvar(αd)
α¯d
(F.22)
1When σ = 2 and all covariances are zero, the Hessian of the utility function is a diagonal matrix whose d
element on the main diagonal is given by
Hd,d = − 64α¯
6
dc
2
dP
2
d rvar(αd)(
Pdrvar(αd) + α¯d
√
Pdrvar(αd)(−4α¯dcd+Pdrvar(αd))
α¯2
)6 < 0. (F.18)
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which does not solve the rst order conditions (F.11) with respect to price. Hence, the expected
price implied under quantity choice diers from that chosen by the prot maximizing rm under
price choice. Moreover, the expected price under quantity choice exceeds the risk-neutral price
by an amount which represents the per-unit risk-premium the rm asks for selling the product
in the destination market d.
Comparing the price expression from equation (F.22) with that of equation (F.19), we obtain
Epd ≥ pd ⇔ var(αd) ≥ 4α¯dcd
Pdr
(F.23)
provided α¯d ≥ 1.
Hence, when uncertainty is a relatively large concern for the rm (either high risk aversion
or high variance), the risk-premium in terms of extra markup required by the rm is larger in
the quantity setting case. This hints at the fact that with large variance the rm is shipping a
smaller amount of the good to the destination market than those expected under price choice.
Under quantity choice the rm needs to plan in advance and pay the production costs upfront.
Hence, the rm would be prefer to produce a relatively small quantity to reduce its exposure to
adversarial demand uctuations in the foreign markets.
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G. Dierent Timing
Recall that rm’s problem consists of three decisions, as discussed in Section 2.2. Specically, one
of the assumptions of the model is that the rm decides on how much to sell in each destination
market before observing the actual realizations of the demand. In this section, we relax this
assumption in the following way.1 We assume that the rm decides the level of production in
each of its foreign aliate before observing the demand shocks. However, the rm can optimally
readjust its sales according to the demand realizations in the dierent markets in which it is
operating, given the chosen level of production. As a preliminary, we notice that this dierent
specication of the timing does not aect location and shipment decisions as presented in Section
2.2.
Assume that the rm has chosen a level of production ql for l ∈ L. As discussed, the level of
production in each plant reects the plant productivity, the benets (in terms of trade cost savings
and market sizes of the destination markets) associated to the export platform, and the degree of
rm’s risk aversion.
Suppose that the rm has to decide on how much to sell in each destination market after having
observed the demand realizations Ad in each market d. Then, the rm needs to solve
max
q∈RL+N+
∑
d
∑
l
(pd − τld)qld
s. t.
∑
d
qld ≤ ql ∀l ∈ L,∑
l
qld = qd ∀d.
(G.1)
The rst set of constraints expresses the fact that the output sold in the dierent markets from
the plant in country l cannot exceed the output therein produced. The second set of constraints
states that the quantity sold in d equals the sum of outputs produced in the dierent locations
and meant to be sold in the destination market d itself.
1Notice that also other specications are possible. For example, demand realizations might be observed by the
rms after the entry has taken place. However, this would imply that risk aversion only aects entry choices, which
is inconsistent with what we observe in the data.
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After the shocks have realized, the production costs are sunk. Hence, the rm only wants
to maximize the dierence between the price in each destination market and the trade costs
associated to that market, given the capacity constraints set in the previous stage. As the rm
considers the realized demand, we observe that pd = Adq
− 1
σ
d . Notice that this specication of the
problem complicates the analysis. When the rm makes the production and shipment decisions
at the same time, then each destination market is served by one and only one location, as trade
costs and marginal production costs are constant. However, when these decisions are separated,
the amount of production carried out in one plant, which operates as a capacity constraint, can be
insucient to accommodate the total demand in a given destination market. In other words, the
rm serves a destination market from the optimal origin as long as the built-up capacity suces.
Then, it has to resort to some stored capacity available in other plants. Moreover, the original
location-destination paths that rm accounts for when selecting the optimal level of production
can be no longer relevant, as the production costs are sunk. In particular, when maximizing its
prots, the rm only considers the trade costs associated to each plant together with its capacity,
and this fact potentially determines dierent location-destination paths from the original one.
Using pd = Adq
− 1
σ
d and the constraint
∑
l qld = qd, rm’s problem (G.1) can be written as
max
q∈RL+N+
∑
d
Ad
(∑
l
qld
)σ−1
σ
−
∑
d
∑
l
τldqld
s. t.
∑
d
qld ≤ ql ∀l ∈ L.
(G.2)
Then, the optimality conditions for the problem (G.2) are given by
(i) σ − 1
σ
Ad
(∑
l
qld
)− 1
σ
− τld − λl + µld = 0 ∀l, d (G.3)
(ii) λl
(
−ql +
∑
d
qld
)
= 0 ∀l (G.4)
(iii)
∑
d
qld ≤ ql and λl ≥ 0 ∀l (G.5)
(iv) µldqld = 0 ∀l, d (G.6)
(v) µld ≥ 0 ∧ qld ≥ 0, (G.7)
whereµld is the multiplier associated to the non-negativity constraint for qld andλl is the multiplier
associated to the capacity constraint in location l. Notice that the existence of a solution to the
problem (G.1) derives from Weierstrass theorem whereas uniqueness follows from concavity
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of the objective function and linearity of the constraint functions. This timing does not aect
qualitatively our major ndings concerning the structure of multinational sales. The realized price
in each market for the optimal (qld)l∈L,d∈D diers from the standard markup over marginal cost
and that they are heterogeneous with respect to rm and destination. To note this point, we write
the set of conditions (G.3) in terms of qd as a function of the parameters
qd =
(
σ − 1
σ
Ad
τld − µld + λl
)σ
∀l, d. (G.8)
Then, it follows from the conditions in (G.8) that
τl′d − τld = (λl − λl′) + (µl′d − µld) ∀l, l′, d. (G.9)
Hence, if the dierence between the trade costs of serving market d from locations l and l′ is large,
then the value of relaxing the capacity constraint associated to the plant l compared with that
associated to plant l′ has to be large as well. In addition, notice that if τld = minl′ τl′d, then for
any l′ 6= l, then
λl − λl′ + µl′d − µld ≥ 0. (G.10)
This means that when a rm sells its product to a country in which it has a production facility,
either it does from the location itself, in which case µld = 0, or it needs to be the case that the
dierence between λl and λl′ has to be relatively large. This might be the consequence of the fact
that the rm has built a low level of capacity in the plant l itself in the previous stage.
In addition, we note that the quantity qd depends negatively on the level of trade costs to
serve the market d, positively on the market size and the capacity built-up in the previous period.
Moreover, the quantity sold in a market under demand risk is not larger than the quantity sold
under no risk if rm’s capacity in l associated to the rst scenario is lower than the one in the
second one.
Finally, from equation (G.8), we can obtain an expression for the realized price. In particular,
pd =
σ
σ − 1(τld − µld + λl) ∀d. (G.11)
From the expression (G.11), though high marginal costs of production induce large prices, we
observe that the price in this setting is potentially dierent from that emerging in the parallel
model where we set the demand risk equal to zero.
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H. Liberalization
Proposition 4. Suppose a rm sells its variety in the destination market d˜ from its foreign aliate
located in l. Then, a reduction in the trade cost τld˜ increases rm’s sales to the destination market d˜.
Proof. As discussed in the chapter, for each rm there is a unique location-destination path which
is optimal. For this reason, we suppress the subscript of the origin location l, assuming that the
rm serves the foreign market d˜ in the optimal way.
Consider the rst order condition (A.2) given by
E[Ad]− r
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)sd′ −
σ
σ − 1cds
1
σ−1
d = 0. (H.1)
Then, for any d, we can dierentiate both sides of the above equation with respect to τd˜. We
distinguish two cases. If d = d˜, then
− σ
(σ − 1)2 cd˜s
2−σ
σ−1
d˜
s˙d˜ − r
∑
d′
cov(Ad˜, Ad′)s˙d′ =
σ
σ − 1s
1
σ−1
d˜
c˙d˜. (H.2)
If d 6= d˜, then
− σ
(σ − 1)2 cds
2−σ
σ−1
d s˙d − r
∑
d′
cov(Ad˜, Ad′)s˙d′ = 0. (H.3)
By multiplying both sides of the above equations by s˙d and adding them up side by side over
destinations, we obtain∑
d˜
σ
(σ − 1)2 cd′s
2−σ
σ−1
d s˙
2
d + r
∑
d˜
∑
d′
cov(Ad˜, Ad′)s˙ds˙d˜ = −
σ
σ − 1s
1
σ−1
d˜
s˙d˜. (H.4)
Note that
∑˜
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad˜, Ad′)s˙ds˙d˜ > 0 which is a positive quadratic form, being ΣA positive
denite. Hence, the left-hand side of equation (H.4) is positive, as it is the sum of positive numbers.
Therefore, s˙d < 0.
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I. Fixed Cost Estimation
Estimation of xed costs can be carried out adapting the approach discussed in Tintelnot (2017).
Consider the problem of a rm with risk aversion equal to r, core productivity ϕ, and xed entry
costs f . Firm productivity in each foreign country l is γlϕ where γl is a country-specic shifter
common to all rms. Hence, if a rm establishes a foreign aliate in country l, its marginal cost
equals 1/(γlϕ). The rm selects the set L ∈ 2N−1 if for all L′ ∈ 2N−1
V (L)−F(L) ≥ V (L′)−F(L′), (I.1)
where V (L) is the indirect utility function associated to the set L and F(L) = ∑l∈L fl.
Hence, the probability that the rm selects the set L over all other location sets is given by
Pr(L|ϕ, r, τ ,γ,EA,ΣA,θf ) =∫
f
1
(
V (L)−F(L) ≥ V (L′)−F(L′) ∀L ∈ 2N−1) dGf (f ;θf ), (I.2)
where Gf is the (dierentiable) cdf of the xed costs parametrized by the vector θf .
Once rm enters the chosen locations, productivity, risk aversion and the market character-
istics (expected and realized sizes and variance of demand realizations, trade costs and shifters)
determine the level of sales associated to each location. The theoretical revenues realized by the
rm depend on r and all the above variables.
We assume that the risk aversion and core productivities are respectively distributed according
to continuous parametric cdfs Gr(r;θr) and Gϕ(ϕ;θϕ), where θr includes the parameters associ-
ated to the distribution of risk aversion, whereas θϕ includes those associated to the distribution
of core productivities.
Hence, the contribution of rm i to the likelihood is given by the product of observing the
chosen location sets multiplied by the densities of rm’s revenues si in the dierent plants, i.e.
li(θ|Li, si) =
∫
ϕ
∫
r
Pr(Li|ϕ, r, τ ,γ,EA,ΣA,θf )dGs(si|Li, ϕ, r)dGr(r;θr)dGϕ(ϕ;θϕ), (I.3)
73
where θ = (θf ,θr,θϕ) and Gs is the cdf of the revenues. As our model does not yield a closed-
form solution for the revenues, the density of sales needs to be non-parametrically estimated.
The likelihood function implied by our model is then given by
l (θ|{Li}i=1,...,I , {si}i=1,...,I) =
I∏
i=1
li(θ|Li, si), (I.4)
where I equals to total number of rms in our sample. In order to obtain estimates of θ, we can
maximize function in (I.4) subject to the constraint that the theoretical sales for each rm implied
by our model match those observed in the data.
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J. Firm Characteristics and Risk Aversion
Table J.1.: Aggregate sales and risk aversion
Dependent variable: total group sales Coecient SE
risk aversion −0.5835∗∗∗ 0.0133
productivity 0.6740∗∗∗ 0.0283
number of aliates 0.1478∗∗∗ 0.0083
constant 2.7747∗∗∗ 0.0954
industry xed eects Yes Yes
N 952
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calcula-
tions.
Table J.2.: Gearing and risk aversion
Dependent variable: gearing Coecient SE
risk aversion 17.5022∗∗ 8.5526
size −21.2136 31.0504
size*risk aversion −13.0365 10.4800
age −4.4616 3.8717
constant 248.1135 37.3606
industry xed eects Yes Yes
N 393
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014,
authors’ calculations.
75

3. Serving Abroad: Export, M&A, and
Greenfield Investment
joint with Ekaterina Kazakova
3.1. Introduction
Going abroad, rms select between opening a foreign branch, which allows them to be close to
their consumers, and exporting, which is associated with variable trade costs but avoids duplica-
tion costs. This so-called proximity-concentration tradeo is extensively discussed in the trade
literature. In line with the empirical evidence for the manufacturing sector, a seminal paper by
Helpman et al. (2004) nds that only the most productive rms conduct foreign direct investment
(FDI), while less productive rms serve foreign markets via exports.1 However, the entry patterns
for service exporters and multinationals do not correspond to the ones predicted by the classical
proximity-concentration literature. Specically, in the German professional services industry,2
only the most productive rms export their services, while less productive rms opt for FDI.3
In particular, the average exporter is 3.0 times larger and sells 2.1 times more domestically than
an average multinational rm.4 When breaking down service FDI by entry mode, 73% of FDI
occurs via cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and only 27% via the opening of new
1For the manufacturing sector in Germany, Ottaviano and Mayer (2007) nd that relative to exporters, multina-
tionals are substantially larger, more productive, pay higher wages and generate higher value added. In particular,
exporters are 3.0 times larger than domestic producers, while multinational rms are 13.2 times larger. Same dierence
holds true for other countries.
2Professional services can be described as a broad consulting industry, including legal and accounting activities,
management consultancy activities, architectural and engineering activities, technical testing and analysis, scientic
research and development, advertising and market research, veterinary activities and other professional, scientic and
technical activities. In our analysis, we also consider IT consulting and administrative and support service activities.
3According to the General Agreement in Trade in Services, there are four possible modes to trade services abroad.
A transaction can occur without a physical movement of a consumer or a service provider to a location of the other
(mode 1); a consumer can receive the service in the country of a service supplier, which would be specied under
the mode 2; nally, a service provider can temporarily move to the location of its foreign buyer (mode 4) or establish
a branch there (mode 3). The statistical data on services trade for German rms further aggregate these modes and
classify modes 1, 2 and 4 as export.
4Similar evidence was found by Bhattacharya, Patnaik, and Shah (2012) for the Indian software industry and by
Oldenski (2012) for the US services industry.
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establishments abroad (greeneld investment).5 Moreover, M&A generates larger aliate sales
than greeneld investment.
In this chapter, we rationalize the dierences in foreign-market entry patterns across industries
and analyze their implications for trade-liberalization outcomes. The study of the last question
is particularly relevant for understanding the eects of service-trade liberalization and potential
dierences in the outcomes compared to manufacturing due to the specic features of this sector.6
This chapter contributes to the area of the literature concerned with the structural estimation
of the proximity-concentration tradeo by taking into account the distinction between M&A
and greeneld investment, as well as by introducing industry- and country-specic returns to
exporting and FDI. Due to the potential dierences in the sorting patterns into FDI and exporting,
the liberalization can have dierent eect in the services sector compared to manufacturing, so
that the main change in the intensive and extensive margins would come from FDI rather than
exporting.
We build a structural model of horizontal FDI with rms that are heterogeneous in terms of their
service quality. Firms can choose to serve foreign markets via exporting, cross-border mergers
(M&A), or greeneld investment. Since foreign consumers can have a dierent perceiption of
the service quality, entry into a new foreign market is associated with uncertainty about demand.
Therefore, rms face the tradeo between trying to transmit their core quality to a prospective
market without ex ante observing the tastes of foreign consumers (via greeneld investment and
exporting), and “buying demand” of a preexisting foreign rm in order to get access to its network
of consumers and its expertise (via M&A).7 Moreover, as replicating a quality abroad is potentially
subject to larger costs for rms with initially higher quality, these rms may decide to export
in order to avoid larger entry costs associated with high-quality greeneld investment. In our
model, the M&A process features “cherry-picking,” meaning that better targets are more likely to
be acquired. Finally, acquisitions provide a higher return to core quality when the magnitude of
synergies between the acquirer and the targets is larger.
The model generates a completely exible relationship between quality and entry types8 for
each market. Entry patterns depend on the industry- and country-specic parameters, which
5The statistics is reported for the average parameters over the period 2005 – 2014 in Germany. For comparison,
in the manufacturing sector, 62.6% of FDI entries in during this period occur via M&A.
6Analyzing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Francois, Manchin, Norberg, Pindyuk,
and Tomberger (2013) nd that reduction in non-tari barriers has larger impact for the manufacturing sector than
for the services.
7The Baker & McKenzie (2014) survey names “the acquisition of customers or distribution networks” as the main
incentive for cross-border mergers and acquisitions. According to their survey, the chief nancial ocer of a South
African MNE in the professional-services sector say about the M&A in Mauritius: “The customer base was very
attractive and we were condent of extracting the value by targeting the customer base of the target company.”
8Hereafter entry alternatives are called “entry types” in order to avoid any confusion with the GATS specication
of entry modes in the services sector.
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determine the return to rm’s core quality for each entry type in a given market. For example,
high-quality services are more likely to be provided via greeneld investment if expected perceived
quality is high and FDI entry costs do not increase much in quality. Alternatively, one will observe
high-quality services to be exported if variable trade costs are low and expected perceived quality
is high. Finally, high-quality services will be provided via M&A if targets are on average of high
quality and synergies between acquirers and targets are substantial. Thus, depending on the
characteristics of the industry, the model is able to deliver dierent outcomes regarding entry
patterns and foreign sales for each entry type.
We then structurally estimate the fundamental parameters of the model for each market. We
base our empirical analysis on rm-level data for German multinationals and exporters operating
in the professional services sector. In particular, we consider the cross-section of the rst entries
of German multinationals into the EU, the US and the rest of the world markets during the period
2005 – 2014. In the structural estimation, we use information on the aliate and domestic sales,
as well as the entry types selected by rms in each market. The unique feature of the data is
that it distinguishes between greeneld investment and M&A entries for each new FDI case. The
structural estimation delivers the fundamental parameters which determine returns associated
to each activity (change in the perception of quality across markets, synergies magnitude, trade
costs, quality of M&A targets, and the cost of quality transmission with greeneld investment),
as well as institutional entry costs specic to the foreign market and the entry type.
We nd that the resulting equilibrium thresholds reverse the standard outcome for the manu-
facturing sector, where high-quality (or high-productivity) rms tend to engage in FDI. In contrast,
rms with lower service quality prefer FDI to exporting. This result partly comes from the fact
that the costs of replicating quality in a new market increase in core service quality, so that high-
quality rms try to avoid these costs by serving foreign markets from their home location via
exporting. Moreover, we nd that the market dierences in the distribution of foreign quality
perception, as well as dierences in the quality of M&A targets result in market-specic relations
between the average service quality and FDI entry modes. While greeneld investors in the US
exhibit a higher service quality than rms engaging in M&As, this relation is reversed for the EU
and the rest of the world.
In the nal part of our analysis, we aim to use the estimated model to examine the potential
impact of a service-trade liberalization episode between the EU and the US, as planned for TTIP
(Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). We consider the impact on average service
quality for each entry type and the average level of service quality provided in each market: the EU,
the US, and the rest of the world. The model can be used to simulate two main features of TTIP for
the services sector. First, we look at a reduction of institutional entry barriers, including facilitation
of cross-border M&As and easier market access through reductions in costs associated to licensing
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and approvals of businesses. We consider a moderate scenario with a 10%-reduction in non-tari
barriers, as well as a more ambitious scenario of a 25%-reduction of barriers. Accordingly, this
policy mainly impacts on the threshold quality that makes each entry alternative protable, while
the relative ranking between quality and entry modes remains unchanged. Second, we look at the
introduction of quality standards, which reduces the costs of transferring core quality overseas.
The corresponding reallocation eects can result in changes of relative qualities exported and
provided via greeneld investment. Moreover, given the predictions on the ordering of entry
alternatives in our model, we can expect that facilitating quality transmission abroad leads to
higher quality of M&A targets, so that mergers become less frequent but of a better quality.
3.1.1. Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the literature on the proximity-concentration tradeo with hetero-
geneous rms. We depart from Helpman et al. (2004), who describe the selection of rms into
exporting and greeneld investment, by (i) allowing rms to acquire foreign targets in order to
resolve uncertainty regarding the quality perception and to exploit the potential merger synergies;
(ii) introducing the exibility in the returns each entry activity provides to rm’s revenue produc-
tivity. These novelties make our model empirically tractable and allow us to explain dierences
in the entry patterns across industries and countries.9 This chapter relates to a small set of papers
that structurally estimate a model of the Helpman et al. (2004) type. The recent contributions
by Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2013), Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), Ramondo
(2014), Tintelnot (2017) propose frameworks suitable for the empirical analysis of multinational
production and trade. In contrast to the model described in this chapter, these models predeter-
mines the relation between productivities of rms selecting into exporting and FDI, since the
return from exports is always smaller due to the presence of iceberg trade costs. Moreover, these
papers do not consider M&A, which are conceptually dierent from the greeneld investment
in terms of the technology transfer and, therefore, are driven by dierent incentives and provide
dierent outcomes from greeneld investment.
This chapter also relates to the literature analyzing the determinants of cross-border mergers,
among those the papers by Nocke and Yeaple (2007, 2008) are the closest to the present chapter.
Analogously to Nocke and Yeaple (2007), we regard M&A as a vehicle for obtaining the network
and service quality of an existing rm in the prospective market. Similar to their model, we regard
quality as a non-transferable capacity. For example, a high-quality rm in the services sector may
have an exceptional consultant, so that the costs of nding a new worker with the same set of
skills are larger than those of sending the worker herself to the foreign country. Unlike Nocke and
9Geishecker, Schröder, and Sørensen (2017) show that the exporter productivity and size premia vary across
countries and industries.
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Yeaple (2007), we do not restrict the realization of perceived quality in the foreign market to be
lower than at home. Moreover, in our framework, the ordering of cutos for greeneld investment
and M&A is not determined by the source of rm heterogeneity but instead by the country-specic
distribution of perceived quality shocks and the structure of entry costs. Additionally, we nd
that rms conducting greeneld FDI in the professional services sector have lower quality than
exporters, so that we have a dierent ordering of cutos for these two entry types. Similarly to
Nocke and Yeaple (2008), the incentives of engaging in cross-border acquisition and greeneld FDI
dier across countries. As the distribution of target quality in the EU and the US is characterized
by larger expectations of the targets’ quality, the acceptance rate of M&A oers is higher, too.
This chapter extends the trade literature on the services sector. Bhattacharya et al. (2012) model
the choice between FDI and export in IT-oriented services. They nd that rms with high service
quality prefer exporting over FDI. Dierently from our work, the choice between entry types
is driven by the dierences in the overseas transferability of quality via export and greeneld
investment. By contrast, we do not assume that the physical presence in the country reduces
demand uncertainty. Given that services export involves personal contact between a supplier
and a consumer, it seems hard to justify an assumption about the dierences in perception of
service quality between export and FDI. Moreover, perception of quality in our model reects
country-specic tastes, so that consumer preferences are independent of the supply mode. Old-
enski (2012) also emphasizes the importance of personal presence in the country for providers
of commercial services, which can aect the entry choice. In our model, the choice for M&A
and greeneld investment is endogenous and not amplied by any restriction on the need for
commercial presence for the personal contact with a consumer.
One of the key ingredients of our model is the uncertainty about foreign quality perception.
Rob and Vettas (2003), Nguyen (2012b), Albornoz et al. (2012), and Conconi et al. (2016) highlight
the importance of non-observability of demand in new destination markets, and learning about
demand which occurs via entry in related foreign locations. For the services sector, we do not
observe sequentiality of entry into foreign markets, and consider the rst entry into a given
market in order to avoid confusion between the mechanism of our interest and learning occurring
via foreign activities. Aeberhardt, Buono, and Fadinger (2014) consider rms that can choose to
serve a foreign market either directly, facing the costs of getting to know the foreign market, or
indirectly, via a local partner who can potentially hold them up. Similar to their paper, we nd
that the characteristics of foreign markets can be crucial for determining the incentives to select
one of the available alternatives.
Finally, this chapter also contributes to the literature highlighting the role of product quality
in international trade. Analogously to Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Johnson (2012), and Feenstra
and Romalis (2014), we argue that service quality is one of the key factors explaining rm het-
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erogeneity. Similar to Cagé and Rouzet (2015), we assume that perceived quality is not observed
prior to entry into the foreign market, therefore rm’s choice is based on the expected perceived
quality. Since we allow for M&A as a way to avoid informational frictions, we observe relatively
less ecient rms active via acquired aliates in the foreign markets. Moreover, since the pro-
fessional services sector is a long quality ladder industry, we use the results of Khandelwal (2010)
to argue that the sales of a rm are a good proxy for rm’s service quality.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.4 describes the data used in the
empirical analysis and presents the entry patterns observed in the services sector for German rms.
Section 3.5 estimates the fundamental market-specic parameters for German multinational rms.
Section 3.6 calibrates the industry equilibrium and describes the way to conduct counterfactual
analysis for the services sector liberalization according to the TTIP proposal. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2. Theoretical Framework
We build a structural model to explain the entry choice of a rm when it decides to go abroad.
There are three entry types distinguished: direct export, cross-border mergers and acquisitions,
and greeneld investment. The main aim of the model is to rationalize the dierences in the
entry patterns across industries and countries. We describe the model for a rm operating in
the services sector, and therefore highlight the importance of quality and brand recognition in
generating heterogeneity across rms. However, the model can be applied to other sectors, when
equivalently describing rm heterogeneity in terms of the revenue productivity.
3.2.1. Demand
The economy consists of a set I = {1, . . . , N} of countries. Each country i ∈ I admits a rep-
resentative consumer whose preferences are given by the quasi-linear utility function in the
homogeneous good Ai
Ui = βs,i ln
[∫
ω∈Ωi
(ϕ˜i(ω)qi(ω))
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
+ Ai, (3.1)
where βs,i denotes the absorption of services sector in country i, qi(ω) the amount of service
ω, σ elasticity of substitution, Ωi the endogenous set of varieties sold in country i, and ϕ˜i(ω)
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the perceived quality of service ω in country i.10 In order to reect potential dierences in the
perception of the service quality across dierent foreign markets, the quality ϕ˜i(ω) of the variety
ω can vary across countries. Quality perception of the service ω reects the dierences in tastes
of consumers, value of quality to them, as well as the awareness of the brand of variety ω. A
representative consumer in country i can evaluate the quality of a given variety with certainty.11
Let Yi and pi(ω) denote the total expenditure per consumer and the price of service ω in country
i, respectively. Then, the representative consumer i’s budget constraint given the upper-tier of
utility maximization reads as ∫
ω∈Ωi
pi(ω)qi(ω)dω + Ai ≤ Yi. (3.2)
By solving the consumer i’s utility maximization problem subject to the budget constraint (3.2),
we obtain the direct demand function for variety ω in country i which is given by
qi(ω) =
ϕ˜i(ω)
σ−1p−σi
P 1−σi
βs,i = ϕ˜i(ω)
σ−1pi(ω)−σΦi, (3.3)
where Pi ≡
(∫
ω∈Ωi ϕ˜i(ω)
σ−1pi(ω)1−σdω
)1/(1−σ)
is a country i’s quality-adjusted price index,
Φi ≡ P σ−1i βs,i is a demand shifter. The expression (3.3) implies that the demand for variety ω
increases with its perceived quality ϕ˜i(ω) in country i.
3.2.2. Supply
A rm from country o ∈ I provides the same service variety ω in all markets it decides to operate.
Therefore, we identify the rm by the supplied service variety ω.
10The homogeneous good is chosen as the numeraire; it is produced with a linear technology requiring a unit
input of labor and is freely traded. In equilibrium, all countries produce a positive amount of a homogeneous good,
which results in the equalization of the factor prices across markets. Thus, for the rest of the analysis, we consider
the equilibrium wages in an open economy. In particular, this means that the level of wages, and therefore all entry
costs expressed in labor terms, stay unaected by any policy changes, and wages can be set equal to 1.
11Since the aim of this chapter is to analyze the determinants of the entry choice by rms, we disregard the
potential uncertainty on the side of consumers. Therefore, in our setting, we model uncertainty regarding the quality
perception at the side of a service provider, while consumers know with certainty the value each service provides
to them. Alternatively, one can think about learning from the side of consumers about the quality of a given variety
(Bagwell and Staiger (1989), Chisik (2003), Cagé and Rouzet (2015)). We can accommodate this concept in our model
by assuming that the perceived quality reects the current belief of a representative consumer regarding the quality
of the product, so that she consumes a service basing her consumption choice on this belief.
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Each rm is a monopolist for the service it provides, and makes its entry and provision choice
taken aggregate price and market size as given. Firms are heterogeneous in the quality of their
services. In particular, each rm ω is endowed with a core level of quality ϕ.12
As consumers have dierent tastes towards quality and are dierently aware of services’ brands,
same quality is dierently perceived within and across countries. The country- and variety-specic
perceived quality shock i adjusts the core quality level of the rm to the perceived level in country
i. In particular, the perceived quality of the service in country i is ϕi = ϕi, which implies that
services with initially higher core quality have on average better realizations of the perceived
quality across markets. Since each rm operates a domestic unit, the perception of quality in the
origin market is known by the rm.13 At the same time, the rm cannot observe ex ante how its
quality is perceived by foreign consumers if it was never present in the country.14
The problem of the rm can be separated into two stages. At the rst stage, for each foreign
market i ∈ Ifo ≡ I \ {o} the rm decides whether to enter, and if so, with which out of three
alternatives: direct export or establishment of a cross-border greeneld investment or acquisition
of a foreign target rm. Accordingly, the rm pays the entry costs associated with the selected
foreign activities. Upon entry, the rm observes how its quality is perceived in each market it
selected to operate in. At the second stage, the rm solves the prot maximization problem and
sets the unit of service provision for each market.
A rm is dened by the variety of service it provides, ω, its country of origin, o, its core quality,
ϕ, a vector of perceived quality shocks , a vector of quality of M&A oers,ϕM , a vector of export
entry costs, fE , and vector of institutional exntry costs with greeneld investment, f¯G.
12A core level of quality is an adjusted level of quality by the physical productivity, and is represented as a product
of quality itself and the physical productivity of a rm. Hereafter, we refer to the quality adjusted by the physical
productivity, ϕ, as the main source of heterogeneity across rms. Since the physical productivity of services rms
is dicult to measure, we explain the variation in adjusted quality (or revenue productivity) by dierences in the
quality component. In other words, one can consider all rms in the services sector to exhibit the same level of
physical productivity, but dierent service quality.
13In the absence of rm-specic origin quality shifter, the model would imply zero likelihood. This is due to the
fact that home sales would solely dene rm’s core quality which in turn would result in deterministic supply choices
for foreign markets. In other words, this means that two rms with identical core quality would opt for the same
foreign activity choices while selecting between exporting and greeneld investment, which is not observed in the
data. For more details, we refer to the estimation section.
14Nguyen (2012b) introduces learning about demand in untested destination markets through the positive correla-
tion of demand in them with markets rm is present in. In our model, we abstract from the learning aspect, dening
markets to be large enough to capture specic tastes of consumers to the service. Moreover, the learning by operating
abroad would imply sequentiality of entry, which is not observed in the data for the professional services industry.
84
3.3. Serving the Foreign Markets
Now we consider the choice of the rm to serve a foreign market i. In order to highlight the
tradeo among dierent entry types, we compute the payos associated with each alternative.15
Export and Greenfield Investment. Entering via exporting or greeneld investment, the rm
transmits its quality abroad and does it under uncertainty about the perception of its quality by
foreign consumers. This uncertainty can be mapped to the problem of incomplete transferability
of quality (or technologies) overseas.16 Therefore, a rm evaluates the benets of entering via
export or greeneld investment by considering the expected perceived quality in the prospective
destination market. Accordingly, the more favorable is the expectation regarding the perceived
quality shock in the foreign country, the higher the return to the core quality the rm expects
from conducting greeneld FDI or exporting.
Although exporting and greeneld investment are similar to each other on the demand side,
there are dierences in the marginal and entry costs associated to these activities. In order to serve
foreign market i via export, the rm pays an additional ad valorem trade cost τi,o > 1. Therefore,
the marginal costs of serving market i are larger for exporters. Entry costs of exporting, fEi ,
reect non-tari restrictions rms face by serving foreign market i via export, e.g. restriction to
movement of people, licensing discrimination, or non-perfect regulatory transparency. In turn, as
the replication of a higher level of quality and the establishment of a better brand can be more costly,
we allow the entry costs of greeneld investment, fGi (ϕ), to be dependent on the core quality ϕ
of the rm. One can also rationalize this assumption by regarding these entry costs as related to
advertisement expenses, which are proportional to the number of consumers a rm intends to
reach in the new market.17 In particular, we assume that the rm pays fGi (ϕ) = f¯Gi + αGi vi(ϕ)
when it establishes a foreign aliate in country i, where vi is the rm’s value in market i under
the assumption that it can fully transfer its core quality ϕ to the country i and there are no
perceived quality frictions, i.e. vi ≡ (σ − 1)σ−1σ−σϕσ−1Φi.18 Thus, we associate the variable part
of the entry costs to the rm’s value in country i provided that country i’s consumers attach the
evaluation ϕ to the service itself. The parameters of the entry costs function can be interpreted as
15For what follows, we maintain that the prot associated with no activity in country i
is normalized to 0.
16In particular, imperfect foreign mobility of technologies and loss to productivity associated to foreign locations
are discussed by Nocke and Yeaple (2007), Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012), and Tintelnot (2017).
17See Arkolakis (2010) who models explicitly the choice of marketing investment of rms that are heterogeneous
in revenue productivity.
18Similarly to Arkolakis (2010), the aggregate market shifter, Φi, captures the fact that entry costs can be larger
for larger markets. Moreover, since this shifter contains information about the average perceived quality in the
market, one can think about larger replication costs for quality when entering a market with higher average quality
of services.
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follows. The component f¯Gi of the entry costs for greeneld investment represents the institutional
entry barriers that the rm faces in country i. In particular, the level of institutional entry costs
reects the development of legal institutions, ease of getting the license, quality of capital markets,
closeness of services regulations of a host country and the origin, and other regulatory and non-
regulatory restrictions to entry. The quality cost for greeneld investment, αGi , is determined by
the country characteristics which aect the ease of quality transmission, e.g. size of the labor
markets, advertisement costs.
The expected prots associated to the two above suitable choices are given by
EpiGi =
[
Eσ−1i − αGi
]
Φ˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Gi
ϕσ−1 − f¯Gi ,
EpiEi = E
(
i
τi,o
)σ−1
Φ˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Ei
ϕσ−1 − fEi ,
(3.4)
where Φ˜i ≡ (σ − 1)σ−1σ−σΦi, ∆Gi denotes the greeneld investor’s return to the core quality
in country i, and ∆Ei denotes the exporter’s return to the core quality in country i. From the
expressions above, we can see that the return to greeneld investment will be larger the more
favorable is the expectation of perceived quality and the lower are the costs of replicating the
brand’s quality abroad. Similarly, the exporter’s return is larger the higher is expected perceived
quality and as lower is the increase in the marginal costs associated to this activity.
Mergers and Acquisitions. The uncertainty of quality perception can be eliminated via M&A.
By acquiring a foreign rm, a multinational gets access to the target rm’s local market and, as
a consequence, to its already established group of consumers. One can see the acquisition of
a foreign rm as a device to “buy the demand” of a preexisting local rm.19 Therefore, before
accepting the merger, a rm knows with certainty how its service is perceived by consumers in
the foreign location, and, specically, which volume of sales it can generate.
We model the M&A market as follows. The rm receives a take-it-or-leave-it oer from a
target rm with perceived quality ϕMi .20 Since the foreign rm observes the realization of the
perceived quality shock to its service in its origin market i, the quality level ϕMi is represented
19An analogous interpretation of M&A can be found in Nocke and Yeaple (2007).
20To make our model more tractable, we assume that each rm gets oers for M&A in each market. Alternatively,
we can introduce the probability of getting an oer from each market, which will not change the results of the model,
but this variation is not empirically tractable as identifying the corresponding parameters require additional data
on M&As. At the same time, we allow the oer to be such that no rm nds it protable to accept. Therefore, the
resulting distribution of the target oer can be seen as the combination of the actual distribution and the probability
of an oer.
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by a product of the core quality of the foreign target, ϕ′, and the perceived quality shock, ′i. The
acquisition price serves the role of the entry costs with M&A, fMi
(
ϕMi
)
, and consists of the value
of the foreign rm, vMi ≡ Φ˜iϕMi , and the institutional entry costs, f¯Mi . The institutional costs
include not only the legal costs of M&A in a given country but also capture the level of entry
barriers imposed for mergers and acquisitions.
Though the acquirer cannot perfectly transfer its quality abroad, some common practices or
brand name can be used by an acquired aliate. Therefore, the acquisition process generates
synergies Si(ϕ), the size of which increases in the core quality of an acquirer.21 The perceived
quality of the acquired aliate is ϕi = Si(ϕ)ϕMi , so that perceived quality is Si(ϕ) times larger
than prior acquisition. It is important to note that should the synergies be positive, the net prot
from M&A (weakly) increases with target rm’s quality. Therefore, if the rm faces several merger
proposals from one country, it optimally select the one from the highest quality target rm.
There are several things worth noting. First, the oers for M&A are independently and identi-
cally drawn across rms and countries. This assumption eliminates any self-selection of acquired
rms to more (or less) productive acquiring rms. We rationalize it by the fact that foreign rms
do not observe the quality of the service of potential acquirers, so that all foreign rms are ex
ante identical for them. Moreover, the acquisition price is solely determined by the quality of the
target rm, so that the benet of a foreign rm from M&A is independent of the acquirer identity.
Second, we parameterize synergies by a linear function, i.e. Si(ϕ) = siϕ.22 The prots from
acquiring the foreign rm are given by
piMi = s
σ−1
i
(
ϕMi
)σ−1
Φ˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Mi
ϕσ−1 − Φ˜i
(
ϕMi
)σ−1 − f¯Mi , (3.5)
where ∆Mi denotes the acquirer’s return to the core quality in country i. This return is higher
as better is the target rm, and is higher the magnitude of synergies si. In particular, one would
expect higher synergies in the markets where common practices are more applicable and the
brand name of an acquirer has a better reputation.
Third, we do not model any competition for the target rms from the side of potential acquir-
ers. Since this does not drive our main results regarding the entry type choice, we avoid any
complication for the merger market to keep our model as parsimonious as possible.
21Here we note that if the function of synergies is constant, so that the size of synergies is independent of the
core quality of an acquirer, the M&A will be regard as an outside option, so that the lowest quality served abroad will
be supplied via M&A. Moreover, we assume that the magnitude of synergies is observed by an acquirer prior making
an entry decision. Therefore, we take M&A as a safe option or normalize all levels of uncertainty with respect to the
level of uncertainty of m M&A.
22The linear function is needed to insure the single-crossing of the prots associated to each entry alternative.
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To sum up, the quality of potential targets varies across and within countries and this, to-
gether with country-specic entry barriers, results in the dierences of M&A price and merger
protability across foreign locations.
3.3.1. Entry Decision
Having described the prots associated to each of the three activities, we are ready to consider
the rst stage of the rm’s problem: which markets to enter and via which entry alternatives.
Prior to deciding about the entry into foreign markets, the rm observes (i) its core quality level
ϕ, (ii) perceived quality in the origin ϕo, (iii) country-specic M&A oers ϕM , (iv) entry costs
associated to each entry type. The entry choice, e ≡ {ei}i∈Ifo , combines the entry type the rm
selects for each foreign market i ∈ Ifo (if any), such that
ei = arg max
ei∈{0,E,G,M}
{EΠeii } ∀i ∈ Ifo , (3.6)
where EΠeii corresponds to the (expected) prot from not entering (0), exporting (E), conducting
greeneld investment (G), and M&A (M ).
In the next paragraphs, we discuss the tradeos existing among the three described entry
alternatives when entering market i. First, we describe the traditional proximity-concentration
tradeo between greeneld investment and exporting. Second, we analyze the choice between
two types of foreign direct investment.
Proximity-Concentration Tradeo. Consider the tradeo between exporting and greeneld
investment. We observe that exporting is preferred to greeneld investment in market i if and
only if
EpiEi ≥ EpiGi ⇔ ϕσ−1
[
αGi − (1− τ 1−σi,o )Eσ−1i
] ≥ fEi − f¯Gi
Φ˜i
. (3.7)
We can separate into two groups the set of parameters aecting the value for the quality cuto
between exporting and greeneld investment. The rst group includes those parameters that
determine the relative quality of services provided via each of the two entry types. Accordingly,
these are the parameters that change the return to the core quality for exporters and greeneld
investors, i.e. quality cost for replicating brand abroad, αGi , trade costs, τi,o, and the expectation
of the perceived quality, Eσ−1i . The second group of parameters aects the propensity of each
entry type to be selected and include entry costs of export, fEi , and institutional entry costs for
greeneld investment, f¯Gi .
If the replication of high quality abroad is harder, that is αGi  0 and replication costs outweigh
the proximity benets, then rms with higher quality will export in order to avoid large entry
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costs with greeneld FDI. Therefore, the average quality exported will be higher than the one
provided via greeneld investment. Moreover, the lower the trade costs are and the less favorable
the expectation of the perceived quality is, the more likely that high quality rms export their
services to market i. The special case of this cuto ordering arises if the institutional entry costs
of greeneld are so large that all rms nd it more protable to export.
An inverse ordering of cutos in the core quality arises if greeneld entry costs are lower for
rms with higher quality. This assumption would invert the condition for exporting and imply
that high quality rms self-select into greeneld investment, while rms with relatively lower
quality choose to export.23 Moreover, the larger trade costs and the expectation of perceived
quality are, the more likely it is that high-quality rms self-select into greeneld FDI, rather than
exporting. In particular, if export entry costs are suciently large, all rms will conduct greeneld
investment rather than export.
Two Types of Foreign Direct Investment. Now we turn to the choice between greeneld
investment and M&A. The rm prefers greeneld investment over M&A in the market i if and
only if
EpiGi ≥ piMi ⇔ ϕσ−1
[
Eσ−1i − αGi − sσ−1i
(
ϕMi
)σ−1] ≥ f¯Gi − f¯Mi
Φ˜i
+
(
ϕMi
)σ−1
. (3.8)
The selection of rms with higher or lower quality into greeneld investment rather than M&A
depends on the rm-specic target draw and country-specic parameters. Therefore, we can talk
about the ordering of cutos only subject to the clusters of rms dened by the quality of M&A
oer rms receive in the foreign market i. Within a cluster, high quality is provided via greeneld
investment rather M&A if (i) expected perceived quality is high, (ii) the increase in greeneld entry
costs due to high core quality is low, (iii) synergies are low. Thus, the order of cutos is determined
by the relation between the loss/gain in perceived quality and variable entry costs for greeneld
FDI, as well as by the magnitude of synergies. In countries where the costs of nding abroad a
consultant with an equal level of home skills are prohibitive, or the advertising expenditures are
large, relatively more productive rms self-select into M&A rather than greeneld investment.
If the institutional costs of mergers and acquisitions are too high, acquisition is not protable
for middle-quality rms, and only greeneld investment can be selected. We note that with the
presence of uncertainty in quality perception, the set of accepted M&A is dierent from the case
23In the empirical analysis, we do not restrict the sign of αGi , thus we are not assuming any ordering of exporting
and greeneld investment cutos. In particular, with αGi = 0 we will obtain a standard proximity-concentration
tradeo, when entry costs for greeneld investment are equal across rms with dierent quality.
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with perfect forecasting of foreign consumer tastes for a service; also there is no clear ordering of
this activity with respect to others in terms of the core quality.24
3.3.2. Equilibrium
Now we aggregate the industry-level parameters, as market sizes and quality adjusted price in-
dexes, and derive the general equilibrium for our model. Each country i ∈ I is populated with
mass ni of rms heterogeneous in their service quality. We assume that all rm-specic parame-
ters are independently drawn across countries and rms from corresponding distributions. The
core quality ϕ is drawn from an arbitrary distribution G(ϕ). The perceived quality shocks i
are drawn from an arbitrary country-i- and origin-o-specic distribution Hi,o(i).25 The M&A
oers ϕMi are drawn from an arbitrary country-i-specic distribution Mi
(
ϕMi
)
. The entry costs
of export to market i, fEi , and institutional costs for greeneld investment, f¯G are drawn from
the distribution FEi,o
(
fEi
)
and FGi,o
(
f¯Gi
)
with the positive supports, correspondingly.
Conditional on being active in market j, the share of rms from country j 6= iwith core quality
level ϕ that enter market i with entry type e is
ζei,j(ϕ) =
∫
fEi
∫
f¯Gi
∫
ϕMi
1
[
ei
(
j, ϕ, fEi , f¯
G
i , ϕ
M
i
)
= e | ei
(
j, ϕ, fEi , f¯
G
i , ϕ
M
i
) 6= 0]
dMi
(
ϕMi
)
dFGi,j
(
f¯Gi
)
dFEi,j
(
fEi
)
.
(3.9)
We note that dierent realizations of rm-specic entry costs of export, greeneld and quality of
M&A targets would result in dierent prots associated to those entry types.
The total sales generated by rms from country j 6= i with core quality ϕ in country i via
entry type e are given by
Xei,j(ϕ) = nj
∫
fEi
∫
f¯Gi
∫
ϕMi
1
[
ei
(
j, ϕ, fEi , f¯
G
i , ϕ
M
i
)
= e
]
·
∫
i
rei
(
j, ϕ, i, ϕ
M
i
)
dHi,j(i)dMi
(
ϕMi
)
dFGi,j
(
f¯Gi
)
dFEi,j
(
fEi
)
.
(3.10)
24Empirically, if M&A quality is observed, this can be reected in the higher variance of domestic sales generated
by acquirers relative to exporters and rms conducting greeneld FDI compared to the case when quality of M&A is
unobservable.
25Similar to Schott (2008), this assumption reects the presence of the origin-specic shifters to the perception of
quality.
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Dierent realizations of perceived quality shocks and quality of targets would result in dierent
foreign revenues. Integrating over the core quality levels of foreign rms and summing over all
entry types and foreign countries, the aggregate trade inow of services to country i is
Xforeigni =
∑
j∈Ifi
∑
e={E,G,M}
∫
ϕ
Xei,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ). (3.11)
The home production in country i is given by
Xdomestici = ni
∫
ϕ
∫
i
ri(i, ϕ, i)dHi,i(i)dG(ϕ). (3.12)
Total labor income in country i consists of two components. The rst component is the labor
cost of services provision in country i, which includes the sum of wages paid for domestic services
suppliers, exporters from country i, as well as FDI-makers in country i. The second component
combines entry costs paid by FDI- and export-entrants from foreign markets. The third component
constitutes labor income in the homogeneous good sector. Given that wages are equalized in the
open economy when each country produces the homogeneous good, the labor market clearing
condition reads as
Li =
σ − 1
σ
Xdomestici + ∑
j∈Ifi
ni ∫
ϕ
XEj,i(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
∑
e={G,M}
nj
∫
ϕ
Xei,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)

+
∑
j∈Ifi
nj
∫∫∫∫
ϕ,fEj ,f¯
G
j ,ϕ
M
j
(
1
[
ej
(
i, ϕ, fEj , f¯
G
j , ϕ
M
j
)
= E
]
fEj
)
+ 1
[
ej
(
i, ϕ, fEj , f¯
G
j , ϕ
M
j
)
= G
]
fGj
(
ϕ, f¯Gj
)
(
+ 1
[
ej
(
i, ϕ, fEj , f¯
G
j , ϕ
M
j
)
= M
]
fMj
(
ϕMj
))
dFEj,i
(
fEj
)
dFGj,i
(
f¯Gj
)
dMj(ϕ
M
j )dG(ϕ) + LA,i,
(3.13)
where LA,i denotes the labor in the homogeneous sector in country i.
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The quality-adjusted price index in country i is formed by the contribution of foreign and
domestic rms
Pi =
σ − 1
σ
[∑
j∈Ifi
nj
∫
ϕ
∑
e
ζei,j(ϕ)
(
ϕ
τ
1[e=E]
i,j
)σ−1
dG(ϕ)
]
[
+ ni
∫
ϕ
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ)
] 1
1−σ
.
(3.14)
Finally, we assume that a representative consumer in country i owns the domestic rms, so
that the aggregate income is given by the sum of the labor income and the prots generated by
rms with origin in country i
Yi = Li +
1
σ
Xdomestici
+ ni
∫
ϕ
∑∑
j∈Ifi
e∈{E,G,M}
∫
fEj
∫
f¯Gj
∫
ϕMj
1
[
ej
(
i, ϕ, fEj , f¯
G, ϕMj
)
= e
]
·
∫
j
(
rej
(
j, ϕ, j, ϕ
M
j
)
σ
− f ej
(
ϕ, f¯Gj , ϕ
M
j
))
dHj,i(j)dF
E
j,i
(
fEj
)
dFGj,i
(
f¯Gj
)
dMj
(
ϕMj
)
dG(ϕ).
(3.15)
The next denition describes the general equilibrium of the model.
Denition 1. (General Equilibrium) Given parameters τi,o, αGi , si, σ and distribution functions
G(ϕ), Hi,o(i),Mi
(
ϕMi
)
, FEi,o(f
E
i ), F
G
i,o(f¯
G
i ) for all countries o, i ∈ I , the equilibrium constitutes a
set of levels of service consumption, qi(ω), and homogeneous good, Ai, prices, pei (o, ϕ, i, ϕ
M
i ), entry
choices, e(o, ϕ,fE, f¯G,ϕM ), price indexes, Pi, and income, Yi, such that
(i) the optimal level of consumption of service variety ω and homogeneous good Ai is given by
(3.2) and (3.3),
(ii) e(o, ϕ,fE, f¯G,ϕM ) solves the rm’s entry problem (3.6),
(iii) pei (o, ϕ, i, ϕ
M
i ) solves the rm’s prot maximization problem,
(iv) Pi satises equation (3.14),
(v) the labor market clears (3.13),
(vi) Yi satises equation (3.15).
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3.3.3. Discussion
Our model is agnostic about the ordering of cutos between dierent entry types. Depending on
the return parameters Eσ−1i , τi,o, αGi and si, as well as the distribution of target rms’ quality, dif-
ferent groups of rms in terms of quality self-select into the corresponding activities.26 Therefore,
our model can explain the entry patterns specic to a given industry or country.
In particular, we expect that M&A is particularly relevant for sectors where quality is of high
importance and its perception can vary a lot across countries. This can be no longer the case for
industries with more homogeneous products or services, as well as industries where the physical
productivity explains most of the rm heterogeneity. The perception of quality in such industries
does not play an important role, which changes the tradeo between M&A and other entry types.
Moreover, synergies in the technologies are more relevant for sectors with rms heterogeneous
with respect to the physical productivity. Therefore, by introducing synergies in the model, we are
able to capture the patterns arising in the manufacturing sector and allow for a reverse ordering
of the export-acquisition cuto.
Regarding the greeneld investment, in manufacturing, more productive rms can be more
ecient in transferring their production technologies abroad and use of scale economies in build-
ing new foreign plants. Thus, greeneld investment entry costs can be lower for more ecient
rms, which reverses the ordering of proximity-concentration cuto with respect to the services
sector.
3.4. Data
We rely on three main data sources for the empirical analysis: (i) the Microdatabase Direct in-
vestment (MiDi), (ii) the Statistics on International Trade in Services (SITS) database, and (iii) the
AMADEUS database.
The data on the foreign aliates of German multinational rms are obtained from MiDi.27
According to the German Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation, all German rms are obliged
to report outward FDI activities if (i) the share or voting rights of the German enterprise in the
foreign aliate constitutes at least 10% directly or 50% indirectly, and (ii) the balance sheet of
the foreign aliate exceeds 3 million Euros. The database is maintained since 1996 onwards and
is available for researchers from 1999. Therefore, we observe the balance sheets of all German
aliates abroad that satisfy the above reporting requirements during the time period 1999 – 2014.
In addition, MiDi provides information about the country of the foreign subsidiary and, since 2005,
26The detailed description of all possible orderings of cutos is provided in the Appendix M.
27Deutsche Bundesbank (2016): Microdatabase Direct Investment 1999-2014. Version: 2.0. Deutsche Bundesbank.
Dataset. http://doi.org/10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03
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the type of entry in the foreign market, distinguishing between newly established enterprises
(greeneld investment) and purchases, mergers or acquisitions (M&A).
We combine MiDi with SITS, which documents international service transactions carried out
by German residents, where activities correspond to modes 1, 2 and 4 in the GATS classication.28
Dierently from MiDi, the reporting requirement for SITS is more stringent, so that all transactions
exceeding 12,500 Euros monthly are included. In order to make the reports of multinationals and
exporters comparable, we consider only those transactions in SITS that would also be included in
MiDi if carried out via commercial presence. In other words, we restrict our focus on those rms
whose annual service exports exceed one million Euros.29
Finally, we use AMADEUS to obtain data on domestic activities of pure exporters, i.e. rms
which are not present in MiDi, but only in SITS.30
Since we are concerned with the heterogeneity in the quality of the provided service, we fo-
cus on the professional services sector, among which are consulting, marketing, research and
administrative activities.31 This sector accounts for more than a half of all international transac-
tions occurring in the services sector.32 Together with nancial services, the professional services
sector is the one with the fastest growth of its share in the aggregate trade ow in developed
countries. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of international trade ows generated by German rms
operating in this sector. We can see that the professional services represent a substantial share of
international services ows from Germany.
28Refer to the Section 3.1 for the description of the modes according to the GATS classication.
29Since the domestic sales of excluded exporters are comparable to those we consider in our analysis, the restriction
of the sample does not drive main empirical results. Moreover, we note that requirements for MiDi are easier to
satisfy for manufacturing rms rather than services. Therefore, we expect that larger proportion of services FDI is
excluded from the database compared to manufacturing due to the features of FDI in these sectors. Specically, un
manufacturing, the settlement of a new plant requires larger capital investment which is more likely to overshoot the
reporting threshold relative to the services FDI, where capital investment can be associated with renting the oce
for a consulting rm.
30SITS contains information exclusively about foreign transactions, but does not provide any data on operations
in Germany. These data are recovered via matching with MiDi, as well as with AMADEUS. The matching of the
AMADEUS with Bundesbank’s datasets has been performed by the Research Data and Service Center of the Deutsche
Bundesbank. For more details, please, refer to Schild, Schultz, and Wieser (2017). Accordingly, we consider the subset
of rms that is present both in SITS and AMADEUS datasets.
31According to Francois and Hoekman (2010), professional services is one of the sectors most exposed to uncer-
tainty in quality.
32See the International Trade Statistics report 2015 (WTO) and the World Investment Report 2015 (UNCTAD).
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Figure 3.1.: International trade ows in services from Germany
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Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics
on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
In the nal sample, we consider German rms operating in the professional services sector
in the period 2005 – 2014.33 We exclude rm-market-specic observations starting before 2005,
as this is the rst year when the type of FDI entry is reported. This exclusion ensures that the
perceived quality is unobserved in the foreign market before entering, as rms that operated in
the market in previous years could already have developed their consumer network, so that they
did not face uncertainty on the demand side. Moreover, we consider only the rst entries for
each market. Furthermore, we disregard those rms which operate exclusively in the foreign
markets.34 During the period of the analysis, we observe a sample of 2,589 market-specic entries
by 2,049 German rms. Since the choice to operate abroad is endogenous, we extend our sample
with 1,727 domestic rms.35 We consider three foreign markets: the European Union countries,36
the United States, and the rest of the world. Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of total sales
of rms operating in the services sector and serving foreign markets.37 The sales distribution is
skewed and there is a substantial number of relatively small players in the market.
33See Appendix K for more detail on the combination of entries by multinationals and pure exporters by year.
34We exclude from the sample rms with zero domestic sales.
35We consider rms which are not present in MiDi and SITS databases and that satisfy the reporting requirement
for capital.
36In the EU countries we include only EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
37We note that due to the presence of the missing data for sales, we proxy those missing entries by regressing
sales on capital stock.
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Figure 3.2.: Distribution of domestic sales
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics
on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.3 displays that the patterns of entry into foreign markets are in line with the predictions
of our theoretical model. Among multinational rms, most rms nd it protable to enter via
M&A, followed by greeneld investment and exporting. As was noticed before, the requirements
for reporting on exporting and FDI dier, so that the comparison made is based on the restricted
sample. Moreover, we compare the entry patterns in the service industry with those in a less
dierentiated sector (wholesale) and nd that the frequency of entry types is dierent from that
discussed for professional services (see Appendix L). In particular, in the wholesale sector, most
rms select export to FDI, which is in line with the predictions of the standard framework for
manufacturing (Helpman et al., 2004).
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Figure 3.3.: Frequency distribution of entry types
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Note: The middle line represents the number of exporters that conduct multinational activity.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics
on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
Services rms operate in dierent markets and can select dierent entry types for each. Table
3.1 presents the statistics for pairs of entry types selected by rms in the sample, as well as
combinations of markets rms select to be present in. The presence of rms conducting several
multinational activities is important for our empirical analysis, since it reects the dierences in
the entry-type choices of a given rm across markets.
Table 3.1.: Frequency tabulation of entry types and markets
Other activity Other market
Export GreeneldFDI M&A
No other
activity US RoW
No other
market
Export 346 10 13 436 EU 160 485 737
Greeneld FDI 37 74 349 US 113 197
M&A 278 800 RoW 651
Notes: For combinations of entry types, we consider only those rms which enter one or two markets due to the conden-
tiality requirements. There are 246 rms that operate in all markets.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi),
1999-2014, and Statistics on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.4 shows the density of domestic sales of parent rms selecting dierent entry types
in foreign markets. The average exporter is larger than the average rm entering with greeneld
investment and average company acquiring a foreign rm. These descriptive statistics give an
insight on the specics of the services sector.
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Figure 3.4.: Density of log-domestic sales, by entry type
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics
on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
We also conduct tests for the cuto ordering. Table 3.2 presents the sales premium associated
to each entry type. In all three foreign markets, exporters sell signicantly more at home, which
suggest that high-quality rms self-select into exporting.38 At the same time, the ordering of M&A
and greeneld FDI diers across foreign markets. While in the US the sales premium is larger for
rms conducting greeneld investment, it is smaller in other markets.
Table 3.3 presents a similar test for the cutos in terms of rm size. Again, exporters have
more employees in Germany compared to rms conducting FDI. Here, the size premium is larger
for greeneld investors in all foreign markets compared to acquires.
Next, we consider the importance of each entry alternative by foreign market. The frequency
of entry types diers across foreign markets (see Figure 3.5). Greeneld FDI is a relatively more
frequent entry type in the rest of the world. At the same time, M&A activity is more frequent
in the EU compared to the US and the rest of the world. Our model would rationalize those
dierences with the level of xed entry barriers associated to each foreign activity and the quality
of foreign acquisition targets. With particular reference to the EU countries, this pattern could
be explained by the relatively higher and less spread quality of potential targets. For the rest of
the world, instead, the propensity of M&A might be linked to the high uncertainty of perceived
38Given the worldwide evidence on the international ows in services, we believe that the ordering of cutos
for export and FDI are not peculiar to German services rms. In particular, we notice that worldwide i) most of
transactions in the services sector occur via FDI, ii) value added of exports is generated in the services sector is larger
than in the manufacturing sector. This observation shows that only a minority of rms self-select into exporting and
this minority is highly productive.
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quality related to greeneld FDI and exporting, as well as to the lower price for M&A. Therefore,
we would expect that the role of M&A in resolving demand uncertainty is particularly relevant
for these countries.
Figure 3.5.: Entry type, foreign market level
0 20 40 60 80 100
EU
US
Rest of the world
Time in SecondsGreeneld FDI M&A Export
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment
(MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
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3.5. Structural Estimation
In this section, we describe the empirical strategy for the estimation of the fundamental market-
specic parameters determining returns and entry costs corresponding to each entry alternative.
We use rm-level data for German multinationals described in the previous section. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, we describe the parameterization, discuss the identication and estimation
strategies, and present the estimation results.
3.5.1. Parametrization
Since in this section we consider only German rms, the origin country o is Germany for all
rms.39
We make the following parametric assumptions on the distributions. The core quality ϕ is
drawn independently across rms from a Pareto distribution with scale parameter a and shape
parameter γ. The perceived quality shocks i are drawn independently across rms and coun-
tries from a country-specic log-normal distribution, logN (µ,i, σ). We normalize µ,GER to zero
and regard the quality perception relative to Germany. The M&A oers ϕMi are drawn indepen-
dently across rms and countries from a country-specic Pareto distribution with scale parameter
aMi and shape parameter γ. Export-entry costs fEi are drawn from a log-normal distribution,
logN (fEi , σfE). Institutional entry greeneld costs f¯Gi are drawn from a log-normal distribution,
logN (f¯Gi , σfG).40 Finally, we parameterize the demand shifter Φi using country i’s services sector
absorption.41 In particular, we take the market size of a country reported in MiDi or SITS as the
recipient of a given transaction, rather than the average market value in the aggregated markets
(the EU and the rest of the world). Then, we compute the average market size of a country in the
aggregated market in each year, and take the maximum average market size when consider the
outside option.
3.5.2. Identification Strategy
In this section, we briey discuss the sources of variation we use to identify the parameters of
interest. We separate the parameters into four groups: the domestic market parameters (a, γ), the
export and greeneld investment parameters
({µ,i}i∈If , σ, {fEi }i∈If , {τi}i∈If , σfE , {f¯Gi }i∈If ,
{αGi }i∈If , σfG
)
, the M&A parameters
({si}i∈If , {f¯Mi }i∈If , {aMi }i∈If ), and the general parameter
39In this section, we abstract from the use of the subscript o.
40This parametrization does not exclude the negative realizations of greeneld entry costs if αGi is negative.
Therefore, in the estimation we restrict the realizations of total entry costs for greeneld investment, fGi , to be
non-negative. Alternatively, one could make the mean of the underlying normal distribution to be dependent on φ,
so that the total entry costs for greeneld investment would come from logN (f¯Gi + αGi vi(ϕ), σfG).
41The data are taken from the World Bank database.
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σ. In the next paragraphs, we describe the main source of variation used to identify each group
of parameters.
Domestic Market Parameters. Given the structure of our model, the intensive margin of
domestic activity is explained by the variation in quality. Therefore, the distribution parameters
(a, γ) for the core quality ϕ are mainly determined by the sales generated by rms in Germany,
as well as by the sales generated by rms outside Germany.
Export and Greenfield Investment Parameters. Everything else equal, the dierence in the
foreign sales realized with greeneld investment and exporting with respect to the domestic sales
determines the shocks to perceived quality and the corresponding parameters ({µ,i}i∈If , σ).
Identication of greeneld investment quality costs {αGi }i∈If is based on the tradeo between
greeneld FDI and exporting. In particular, the sign of these parameters determines if higher (or
lower) quality rms self-select into exporting rather than opening new aliates. The export entry
costs and the institutional greeneld investment entry costs
({fEi }i∈If , {f¯Gi }i∈If , σfE , σfG) are
identied by observing the entry choices of rms conditional on their core quality. Finally, ad
valorem trade costs {τi}i∈If are evaluated from the dierence in revenues generated by rms via
exports and greeneld investment. In particular, the lower the intensive margin of exporting is,
the higher are trade costs associated with services exports.
M&A Parameters. The parameters related to the M&A activity deserve some discussion, since
the quality of potential acquisition targets, aMi , aects directly both intensive and extensive mar-
gins of M&A. Therefore, one can nd dierent combinations of a triple (aMi , si, f¯Mi ) that can
rationalize the distribution of M&A sales and entries in the market i. For instance, xing one
triple of M&A parameters, it could be possible to nd another one with a higher magnitude of
synergies, lower quality of acquisition targets and lower level of institutional M&A entry costs,
that would t the observed data.
To identify those parameters, we consider two specications.42 In the rst specication, we
assume that the magnitude of synergies depends on the relative advance of a rm with respect
to the least productive rm in the industry. Accordingly, we restrict the magnitude of synergies
42Two natural restrictions are on the magnitude of synergies, which restricts the intensive margin, and the level
of institutional entry costs, which puts restrictions on the extensive margin. The third restriction on the quality of
M&A targets is less tractable, as it would imply restrictions not only on the parameters related to M&A entries, but
also on the other entry modes. When conducting the Monte-Carlo simulations under an assumption that distribution
parameters {aMi }i∈If are all the same and equal to a, we are able to show that it is not always possible to nd the
corresponding triple of M&A parameters in order to rationalize the observed data. The intuition behind this nding
is that aMi enters revenues and entry costs simultaneously and it aects the Pareto distribution, which restrict the
possible set of ϕMi realizations.
102
and parametrize it to si = 1/ai. This restriction implies that a rm with the core quality ϕ can
increase the level of quality of acquisition target by ϕ/a, which represents the ratio of rm’s core
quality to the lowest core quality in the market. Moreover, it follows that the least productive
rm in the industry is just indierent between being engaged in M&A or not should there be no
institutional entry costs. In this specication, the magnitude of synergies a rm can generate is
the same across all markets. Everything else equal, the quality of acquisition targets would be
the main determinant of the dierences in M&A sales realized across locations. In the second
specication, we assume that the institutional restrictions for M&A and greeneld investment
are similar. In particular, we restrict the level of M&A institutional entry costs to be equal to the
median of the distribution of the institutional entry costs for greeneld investment. Hence, in
this specication we can talk only about overall institutional barriers for entering via FDI.
Independent of the restriction specication, the parameters related to the intensive margin of
M&A are recovered from the sales rms generate via acquired aliates. The extensive margin
determines the related entry cost parameters. In the Appendix N we simulate the model and show
that all parameters are identied for both specications.
General Parameters. Since the assumption of CES preferences implies that markups are con-
stant, we can use data on sales and variable costs to recover the corresponding σ parameter.43
3.5.3. Estimation Strategy
There are two sources of heterogeneity in service quality which are observed by rms, but not
observed by the econometrician: the core qualityϕ and the draws for target rm quality
{
ϕMi
}
i∈If .
When we construct the maximum likelihood function, we need to integrate over all possible
realizations of the quality levels, so that the combination of the two sources determines the
optimal choice of the entry type. Moreover, we need to account for all possible orderings of
cutos with respect to the core quality depending on the distribution parameters of perceived
quality shocks ({µ,i}i∈If , σ), ad valorem trade costs {τi}i∈If and quality transmission costs
{αGi }i∈If .44 In order to avoid this complication, we exploit the assumptions on the independence
of draws for target rms’ qualities and core quality, which allows us to separate entry choices
across markets conditional on the rm’s core quality.
43At the moment, we set σ = 3.18 to make our results comparable to Francois et al. (2013).
44Three possible orderings of cutos in ascending in core quality order are: i) M&A – Greeneld Investment –
Export, ii) Greeneld Investment – M&A – Export, iii) M&A – Export – Greeneld Investment.
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The construction of the likelihood implies several steps. In particular, we divide the choice
of entry type into two stages. If the rm ω selects the entry type eω,i in the foreign market i, it
should prefer it to (i) entering via M&A, (ii) entering via any other entry type than M&A, i.e.
eω,i = arg max
e′i
{
EΠ
e′i
i
}
e′i∈{0,E,G,M}
⇔
eω,i = arg max
e′i
{
max
e′′i
{
EΠ
e′′i
i
}
e′′i ∈{0,E,G}
,Πe
′
i=M
}
.
(3.16)
Therefore, in the rst stage we determine for each rm the probability of preferring observed
entry types to entering into all markets with M&A. We note that conditional on the core quality
and entry costs, choice of an alternative over M&A in one market is solely determined by the
draw of target rm’s quality. Given that M&A draws are i.i.d. across markets, we can consider
probability of entry type choice over M&A in each foreign market separately. Then, for the rm
ω with core quality level ϕ the probability of selecting alternative eω,i in the foreign market i over
M&A is
Pr1i
(
eω,i M&A | ϕ, f eω,ii ; θ1i
)
=∫
1
{
EΠ
eω,i
i
(
ϕ, ϕMi , i, f
eω,i
i , τi, si;µ,i, σ
)
≥ ΠMi
(
ϕ, ϕMi , si, f¯
M
i
)}
dM(ϕMi ; a
M
i , γ),
(3.17)
where θ1i =
{
µ,i, σ, a
M
i , γ, τi, si
}
.
In particular, the draw of target rm’s quality should be below the corresponding country-
specic cuto, which in turn is represented by a function in the core quality ϕ and (institutional)
entry costs of a selected activity f eω,ii . Let ∆˜Gi denote rm’s return to core quality associated to
greeneld investment in a foreign market, respectively; that is,45
∆˜Gi ≡ Eσ−1i Φ˜i. (3.18)
45Here we adopt a dierent notation for returns, as entry costs for greeneld investment should be considered in
total when comparing this entry type to M&A.
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Then, the corresponding upper bounds for the realization of ϕMi for the choice of not entering
into the market i, ϕM0i , entering via exporting, ϕMEi , and greeneld investment, ϕMGi , for the rm
with core quality ϕ > 1/si are as follows
ϕM0i =
[
f¯Mi
Φ˜i(ϕsi)σ−1 − Φ˜i
] 1
σ−1
,
ϕMEi =
[
f¯Mi + ∆
E
i − fEi
Φ˜i(ϕsi)σ−1 − Φ˜i
] 1
σ−1
,
ϕMGi =
[
f¯Mi + ∆˜
G
i − fGi
Φ˜i(ϕsi)σ−1 − Φ˜i
] 1
σ−1
,
(3.19)
while if the rm has the core quality level ϕ < 1/si, it never nds it protable to acquire a
target rm in the market i, so that such rm selects any alternative over M&A with deterministic
probability in the market i.46
In the second stage, we determine the probability of choosing a given entry type in each market
over all other alternatives, but M&A. The cutos (if relevant47) in the core quality with respect to
Export, Greeneld investment, and No entry are
ϕ0Ei =
fEi
∆Ei
, ϕ0Gi =
f¯Gi
∆Gi
, ϕGEi =
fEi − f¯Gi
∆Ei −∆Gi
, (3.20)
where ϕjki denes rm’s threshold such that with core quality ϕ satisfying ϕσ−1i = ϕ
jk
i rm is
indierent between entering with the entry type j or k into the foreign market and enters with k
if the core quality is above the relevant cuto, where j, k ∈ {0, E,G} with j 6= k.
The cutos for choosing M&A depend both on the core quality and realization of target rms’
qualities. Thus, the density of the revenues in each location and the choice of M&A are inter-
dependent. However, using the monotonicity of M&A revenues in the target rm’s quality, we
can constrain the possible realizations of target rms’ draws of quality to rationalize the sales
associated to M&A and observed in the data. In particular, we can express the target rm’s qual-
46For simplicity, if ϕ > 1/si we assume that Greeneld Investment is preferred to M&A with probability 1 in
the market i. In this case, option of not entering dominates both M&A and Greeneld investment. Therefore, in the
second stage the Greeneld investment will be dominated by No entry, so that the likelihood of selecting Greeneld
investment will be zero independent of the value which we assign to the probability to select Greeneld investment
over M&A in the rst stage. The probability of selecting M&A over M&A is one.
47The relevance of cutos is discussed in the Appendix M.
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ity as ϕMω,i = rMω,i/Φ˜i(siϕ)σ−1 and redene all cutos for rm ω for selecting M&A over other
alternatives in terms of the sole core quality.48
Finally, the likelihood for each rm consists of (i) the probability of observing chosen entry
types {eω,i}i∈If , (ii) the density of the country-specic revenues {rω,i}i∈If ,49 (iii) the density
of the domestic revenues rω,GER conditional on the entry choices and rm’s core quality. We
transform the density of revenues into the density of perceived quality shocks forExport, Greeneld
investment, and domestic sales. The density of M&A sales is transformed into the density of M&A
quality draws. Since the perceived quality shocks are i.i.d. across rms and countries, the nal
representation of the contribution of the rm ω to the likelihood is
lω
(
θ; {eω,i, rω,i}i∈If , rω,GER
)
=∫
Pr
(
eω = e| ϕ; {θ1i }i∈If
)
· ∣∣J ω (ϕ; {τi}i∈If )∣∣ ∏
ei∈{E,G}
y
(
r−1i (rω,i)
∣∣ ϕ; {µ,i}i∈If , σ )
·
∣∣∣JϕMω (ϕ; {si}i∈If )∣∣∣ ∏
ei=M
m
(
r−1i (rω,i)
∣∣∣ ϕ;{aMi }i∈If , γ)
·
∣∣∣∣drGER(GER)d (r−1GER (rω,GER))
∣∣∣∣−1 y (r−1GER (rω,GER) | ϕ;σ ) dG(ϕ; a, γ),
(3.21)
where θ is the vector of parameters to estimate,
∣∣J ω (ϕ; {τi}i∈If )∣∣ is the absolute value of the
determinant of the Jacobian associated to the transformation of the density of foreign revenues
generated via export and greeneld investment into the density of the perceived quality shocks,∣∣∣JϕMω (ϕ; {si}i∈If )∣∣∣ is the absolute value of the Jacobian associated to the transformation of the
density of M&A foreign revenues into the density of the M&A quality draws, y
(· ∣∣ {µ,i}i∈If , σ )
is the univariate density of the perceived quality shocks, m
(
·
∣∣∣ {aMi }i∈If , γ) is the univariate
density of the M&A quality draws, and G(ϕ; a, γ) is the distribution of the core quality.
To estimate the model we solve the constrained optimization problem, which is specied as
follows
max
θ,{ϕi}i∈If ,ϕGER
log
∏
ω∈ΩGER
lω
(
θ; {eω,i, rω,i}i∈If , rω,GER
)
subject to: rω,i = ri(ϕi) ∧ rω,GER = rGER(ϕGER) ∀ ω ∈ ΩGER, i ∈ If .
(3.22)
48Formal expressions for cutos in the core quality for selecting M&A over other alternatives can be found in the
Appendix P.
49Here we drop the entry-type superscript for sales to reduce notation complication.
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3.5.4. Estimation Results
Table 3.4 presents the estimates of the structural parameters.50 Institutional entry costs of both
types of FDI are below the institutional export-entry costs. Therefore, only the rms with the
highest core quality nd it protable to export.51 Entry costs of greeneld investment increase
with the core quality of the rm, which conrms the hypothesis that transferring higher quality
is more costly. The cost of quality for greeneld investment is higher in the US relative to the
rest of the world and the EU. This result can be explained by higher average quality of services
provided in the US market, as well as higher advertisement costs.
Table 3.4.: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Common parameters Estimates
Scale parameter of core quality distribution, a 0.139
Shape parameter of core quality distribution, γ 4.649
S.d. log perceived quality shock, σ 0.887
S.d. log export-entry costs, σfE 2.996
S.d. log greeneld investment entry costs, σfG 9.436
Country-specic parameters EU US RoW
Median entry cost with export, exp(fE) 4.455 1.069 3.803
Iceberg trade costs, τ 1.468 2.259 2.897
Median log perceived quality shocks, exp (µ) 0.858 0.375 0.655
Median institutional entry costs with greeneld FDI, exp
(
f¯G
)
0.279 0.611 0.764
Quality price for greeneld FDI, αG 0.224 0.575 0.200
Median institutional entry costs of M&A, exp
(
f¯M
)
0.216 0.048 1.565
M&A synergies, s 6.457 1.729 3.934
Scale parameter of M&A quality distribution, aM 0.115 0.148 0.368
Number of rms 3776
Log-Likelihood −3.245E+4
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment
(MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
Next, we discuss the parameters which determine the revenues associated with each activity.
The perception of quality in the foreign markets is lower with respect to the median perceived
quality in Germany. When the loss in the perception is only 14% for the EU, the mode perceived
quality in the US and the rest of the world markets for German services is substantially lower. In
particular, this results in the change of the cuto ordering between M&A and greeneld for the
US market: more productive rms prefer to acquire rms in the US. Iceberg trade costs in the
services sector are mainly explained by the gravity parameters. Not surprisingly, an increase in
the marginal costs is the lowest for the EU market. Finally, the magnitude of synergies generated
via M&A is larger in the EU compared to the US and the rest of the world, which reects larger
applicability of German common practices in this market and better brand-name recognition.
50We note that results are subject to change.
51The orderings of the returns and xed part of the entry costs across entry types are the same.
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3.6. Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, we address the question of how the liberalization aects the services sector. Specif-
ically, we examine the potential eect of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) related to the services sector on the average quality of services provided via each entry
type and overall quality of services provided in the EU, the US, and the rest of the world.
We describe the main steps of conducting a counterfactual analysis with the proposed model.
First, we discuss how to calibrate the iceberg trade costs and parameters of the origin-specic
distributions of the perceived quality shocks to data on bilateral multinational and trade ows
between markets. Second, we explain how to simulate a trade liberalization with our model
and what can be the dierences in liberalization outcomes in the services sector with respect to
manufacturing. As previous steps done, we can analyze the eect of the introduction of quality
and safety standards which result in the reduction of the costs of quality transfer with greeneld
investment.
3.6.1. Calibration
Some additional data are needed to calibrate the general equilibrium of the model. For the multi-
national and trade outows and inows in the EU and the US, we use the data provided by the
OECD. The multinational outows type-specic FDI in Germany are taken from MiDi. We set
the mass of rms in each market proportional to the number of listed companies in the region.
Accordingly, we use data from the World Bank to determine the size of the labor force in each
market and the share of labor employed in the services sector.
Taking Germany as a representative EU country, we set all origin-specic structural parameters
for the EU rms equal to the ones estimated for Germany. Specically, we assume that EU rms
face the same uncertainty in quality perception in the foreign markets, draw entry costs from the
same distributions and pay same iceberg trade costs. Moreover, as the magnitude of the iceberg
trade costs in the professional services sector can be explained by gravity parameters, we restrict
the trade costs to be symmetric.
Following the theoretical specication of our model, we account for the possibility that quality
perception and the level of entry costs can depend not just on the destination country, but also
on the origin of trade ows. The perception of quality can dier due to the presence of “country-
brands”, for instance German services could be perceived dierently from those provided by US
rms in the RoW market. The exibility in parameters corresponding to the perceived quality
shocks would allow us to match closer intensive margin of services trade. At the same time,
the closeness of regulations on services sector between origin and host countries would make
the institutional entry barriers dierent across various country pairs. When allowing for origin-
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and destination-specic entry costs, we are able to match better extensive margin, and therefore
selection patterns into dierent activities. Moreover, those two assumptions allow us to regard
all countries the same in terms of the core quality distribution.52
More specically, we assume that ki,o = ki + ko, where ki,o =
{
µ,i,o, f
E
i,o, f¯
G
i,o, f¯
M
i,o
}
can be
represented as a sum of the destination country component ki, and the origin country component
ko. We normalize all parameters related to the EU market to zero, so that the estimates for entry
costs and quality perception shocks obtained for Germany can be regarded as the corresponding
destination country components.
Thus, there are eight parameters, θc, to be calibrated: (i – ii) US – RoW and RoW – RoW iceberg
trade costs, and (iii – viii) origin country components of the perceived quality shocks’ distribution
and entry costs for the US and the rest of the world.
Using the predictions of the model on the export and FDI ows across foreign markets, we
construct the set of moments for our calibration. The rst subset of moments includes the shares
of each foreign market in the US and the EU trade and multinational ows. The theoretical
decomposition of export and import across foreign markets is given by
κ
1,import
i,j =
∫
ϕ
XEi,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)∑
i 6=j
∫
ϕ
XEi,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, κ
1,export
i,j =
∫
ϕ
XEi,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)∑
i 6=j
∫
ϕ
XEi,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, (3.23)
where i ∈ {EU,US}, j ∈ {EU,US,RoW}.53 For each country, we drop a moment with respect
to one foreign country. This results in six moment conditions.54
Next, we take the shares of each foreign market in the FDI inows and outows in the US and
the EU markets. The model prediction for these moments is
κ
1,inow
i,j =
∫
ϕ
[
XGi,j(ϕ) +X
M
i,j (ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)∑
i 6=j
∫
ϕ
[
XGi,j(ϕ) +X
M
i,j (ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)
,
κ
1,outow
i,j =
∫
ϕ
[
XGj,i(ϕ) +X
M
j,i (ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)∑
i 6=j
∫
ϕ
[
XGj,i(ϕ) +X
M
j,i (ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)
,
(3.24)
where i ∈ {EU,US}, j ∈ {EU,US,RoW}. Accordingly, we consider six additional moment
conditions.
52With non-origin specic institutional entry barriers the model will predict the same cutos for a given country
for all entrants independent of their origin. This would largely restrict the set of possible market shares of foreign
suppliers and make the calibration of the model not feasible.
53We allow for trade between countries within the same aggregated region (the EU and the rest of the world).
Therefore, only non-feasible pair of i and j combination is US − US.
54Correspondingly, there are two moment conditions for ows associated to the US and four moment conditions
for the EU.
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Then, we include the shares of each foreign market in the greeneld investment and M&A
services ows from Germany. Here we assume that the German FDI composition is similar to the
aggregate EU composition of FDI. The proportion of country j in the greeneld investment and
M&A outows from Germany is
κ1,GEU,j =
∫
ϕ
XGj,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)∑
j
∫
ϕ
XGj,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, κ1,MEU,j =
∫
ϕ
XMj,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)∑
j
∫
ϕ
XMj,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, (3.25)
where j ∈ {EU,US,RoW}. This condition gives us four additional moments.
The second set of moments denes the composition of a trade ow to each foreign destination
by export and FDI. First, the theoretical share of import from country j to country i in total
expenditure of country i to services from country j is given by
κ
2,import
i,j =
∫
ϕ
XEi,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)∑
e∈{E,G,M}
∫
ϕ
Xei,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, (3.26)
where i ∈ {EU,US}, j ∈ {EU,US,RoW}. Analogously, the theoretical share of export in total
sales ows from country i to country j is given by
κ
2,export
i,j =
∫
ϕ
XEj,i(ϕ)dG(ϕ)∑
e∈{E,G,M}
∫
ϕ
Xej,i(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, (3.27)
where i ∈ {EU,US}, j ∈ {EU,US,RoW}.
Finally, we include the proportion of destination-specic greeneld investment ows and M&A
ows in outward German activities. The proportion of M&A in the total FDI ow to the foreign
market from the EU is
κ2,MEU,j =
∫
ϕ
XMj,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)∫
ϕ
[
XMj,EU(ϕ) +X
M
j,EU(ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)
, (3.28)
where j ∈ {EU,US,RoW}. This condition gives us three additional moments.
Therefore, we construct 31 moments, κ. We then minimize the squared dierence between
theoretical moments and the data targets conditional on the vector of the aggregate market pa-
rameters satisfying the model equilibrium
max
θc
(κ(θc)− κ)′ (κ(θc)− κ)
subject to: Li(θc) = Li ∧ Pi(θc) = Pi ∧ Yi(θc) = Yi ∀i ∈ I,
(3.29)
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where Li(θc) is given by (3.13), Pi(θc) is given by (3.14), and Yi(θc) is given by (3.15). We take all
moments with the equal weights.
3.6.2. Counterfactual Analysis
In the counterfactual analysis, we simulate the liberalization in the services sector as it is described
for TTIP agreement. According to the proposals of the European Commission,55 the services sector
liberalization has two important policies which are the reduction of the non-tari trade barriers
and introduction of services quality standardization. In terms of the model, an increase in mobility
of professional consultants, fastening of licenses approvals and elimination of legal restrictions of
professional services trade will be reected in the reduction of the institutional trade barriers, that
is fE, f¯G and f¯M . Standardization of the quality requirements can decrease costs of entering
foreign markets with the greeneld investment by facilitating the transferring of quality overseas;
therefore, we would expect that the costs of quality transfer, αG, will decrease.
The reduction in the institutional entry costs does not change the relative quality provided
by each entry mode, but in turn it aects the absolute value of the average quality supplied by
exporters, FDI-makers and domestic rms as institutional barriers determine the proportions of
rms selecting in one or another entry mode. Contrarily, the introduction of quality standards
results in an increase of a return to greeneld investment and therefore could have implications on
the sorting entry patterns. A suciently stringent quality requirements could revert the sorting
between export and greeneld investment and result in the highest quality services to be provided
with FDI. Moreover, an increase in the return to greeneld investment would have an eect on
the acceptance of M&A oers, leading to less M&A but of a higher quality.
Following Francois and Hoekman (2010), we consider two possible scenarios for trade liberal-
ization. In the moderate scenario, we simulate a 10%-reduction of the non-tari barriers, where
we reduce bilateral institutional entry costs for the US and the EU markets. In the more ambitious
scenario, we simulate a 25%-reduction of institutional entry barriers. For each case we consider a
change in the aggregate income, as dened by (3.15); a change in the average quality ϕ˜i of services
in the market i, as dened by (3.30); and a change in the average quality provided by exporters
and FDI-makers, that is by groups gei separated according to dierent entry types e, as dened by
(3.31)
ϕ˜i =
∑
j∈Ifi
nj
∫
ϕ
ζei,j(ϕ)ϕ
σ−1dG(ϕ) + niϕσ−1dG(ϕ)
 1σ−1 , (3.30)
55Detailed information about proposals could be found on the website of the European Commission.
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ϕ˜i,gei =
∑
j∈gei
nj
∫
ϕ
ζei,j(ϕ)ϕ
σ−1dG(ϕ)
 1σ−1 . (3.31)
Given the structural parameter estimates obtained in Section 3.5, we can expect the main eect
of liberalization to come from the changes in the multinational activity in the services sector. As
non-tari trade barrier fall, previously domestic rms can become protable for starting the FDI
activity in the foreign market. While export can increase, this would be mainly due to selection into
exporting over FDIrather than deriving from entries of previously internationally inactive rms.
This is a crucial dierence with the eect of liberalization in manufacturing, which highlights
the importance of a proper consideration of the selection patterns into foreign activities across
industries and countries.
3.7. Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the entry patterns into foreign markets specic to the professional services
sector. We explain theoretically why the largest service rms in the industry export, while the
smaller companies open new foreign aliates or acquire preexisting foreign targets. Since in-
ternational activities are associated with high uncertainty in the perception of service quality in
the non-tested destination markets, most rms nd it protable to enter a new market by buying
foreign rms with an already established consumer network in order to avoid demand risks. At
the same time, the most productive rm can generate higher sales by engaging in greeneld FDI
or by exporting the quality of their origin country abroad subject to entry costs.
Our parsimonious model ts the empirical evidence on German rms. We nd that entry pat-
terns are reversed compared to the standard sorting in manufacturing: only the rms providing
the highest service quality export, while lower-quality rms conduct FDI. The relative sorting
of M&A vs. greeneld FDI in terms of rm quality is market-specic and depends on the rela-
tive importance of uncertainty about quality perception, the structure of entry costs, and size of
synergies associated with M&A. Finally, we calibrate the model equilibrium to the data on multi-
national and trade ows between the EU, the US, and the rest of the world. The theoretical model
suggest that the service-trade liberalization, based on the reduction of non-tari trade barriers
and introduction of quality standards, can reallocate quality across entry alternatives, increase
quality of acquired targets, and make FDI a more prominent entry type.
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K. Entry by Year
Figure K.1 reports the number of entries by year into foreign countries observed in the sample of
rms supplying professional services. The green bars refer only to entries related to multinational
enterprises whereas the gray bars include also pure exporters. We note that entry activity is
larger at the beginning of the sample (2005 – 2007). However, starting from 2008, we note that the
economic crisis reduced the entries activity of both groups of rms (especially for multinationals).
Entries has been slowly reverting to the levels observed before the crisis with respect to pure
exporters, whereas they are still below the pre-crisis level with respect to multinational enterprises.
Figure K.1.: Foreign Market Entries
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Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics
on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
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L. Wholesale
Figure L.1 displays the patterns of entries into foreign markets. Generally, in the wholesale sector
the quality is not the most important business driver. The patterns we observe for this sector are
in line with the literature describing entry behavior for manufacturing (Helpman et al., 2004). In
particular, we observe that most rms enter via export whereas entry by greeneld investment
activity is the less frequent, dierently from professional services.
Figure L.1.: Entry type in wholesale
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Note: The middle line represents the number of exporters that conduct multinational activity.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics
on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
The results in Table L.1 are also in line with patterns described for manufacturing. In particular,
we nd that the sales premium for the exporters is the lowest across the various entry types,
reecting that exporters are relatively less productive than foreign direct investors.
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Table L.1.: Sales and size premia in wholesale sector
Premia 95% Conf.Interval
Exporters
Sales premia 11.667 (0.254) [11.168, 12.165]
Size premia 4.483 (0.221) [4.049, 4.917]
M&A
Sales premia 11.765 (0.271) [11.226, 12.305]
Size premia 4.949 (0.237) [4.478, 5.420]
Greeneld investment
Sales premia 11.759 (0.331) [11.109, 12.408]
Size premia 4.418 (0.288) [3.853, 4.983]
Notes: We estimate entry type premia as follows: Yω,t = β1EXPω,t + β2MAω,t + β3GIω,t +
It + ω,t, where t is the year index, I are year dummies, and Y is the log of rm characteristic for
which the premia are estimated. All estimates are signicant at the 1 percent level. Estimation of sales
premia: N = 901, R2 = 0.9760. Estimation of size premia: N = 894, R2 = 0.8773.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct
investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’
calculations.
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M. On the Intuition of Cuto Ordering
Let ∆E , ∆M , and ∆G denote rm’s return to core quality associated to export, M&A, and greeneld
investment in a foreign market, respectively;1 that is,
∆E := Eσ−1τ 1−σΦ˜,
∆M :=
(
ϕM
)σ−1
sσ−1Φ˜,
∆G :=
(
Eσ−1 − αG) Φ˜.
Let ϕjk dene rm’s threshold such that with core quality ϕ satisfying ϕσ−1 = ϕjk rm is
indierent between accessing the foreign market with entry type j or k, where
j, k ∈ {0, Export,Greeneld investment,M&A} with j 6= k.
We distinguish six cases depending on the relation between returns to core quality and then
specify sub-cases according to the relation between xed part of entry costs. This case distinction
allows us to determine the relevant intervals of core quality corresponding to the selection into
one of three activities (if any). Depending on the structure of the entry costs, some option can
dominate another one in terms of prots. Firm’s choice between alternatives is determined by
the level of core quality. Therefore, we can describe rm’s optimal choices given the level of its
core quality.
Case 1. ∆E > ∆G ≥ ∆M .2
This case corresponds to the situation in which rm’s largest returns to core quality are associated
to Export, whereas lowest returns are associated to M&A.
Case 1.1. fE > f¯G > fM .3
In this case, the activity with the highest return to core quality is also the most expensive in
1Hereafter, we skip country index.
2For illustrative purpose, we provide for all sub-cases of case 1 the corresponding gure with prot lines. For the
next cases, we skip gures as they are analogous to the case 1.
3For the simplicity of notation, in this section we denote fM := fM
(
ϕM
)
.
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terms of entry costs. According to the ordering of zero cutos (that is, ϕE0, ϕG0, and ϕM0),
we specify four possible sub-cases.
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Case 1.1.1. ϕM0 < ϕG0 < ϕE0.
We further separate two sub-cases depending on the relation between the quality level
required to switch from M&A to Greeneld investment or to Export.
Case 1.1.1.1. ϕEM ≥ ϕGM .
In this case, all alternatives can be optimal for some intervals of core quality. In
particular, the rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; rm chooses M&A if
ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; rm chooses Greeneld investment if ϕGM ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG;
rm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 1.1.1.2. ϕEM < ϕGM .
In this case, Greeneld investment is not optimal. Indeed, Greeneld investment
becomes more protable than M&A at a larger level of quality than that required
for Export to become more protable than M&A. Hence, rm decides to stay out
if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; rm chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM ; rm chooses Export if
ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
ϕσ−1
0
−fM
−f¯G
−fE
piG piM
piE
Case 1.1.1.1. ϕM0 < ϕG0 < ϕE0 ∧ ϕEM ≥ ϕGM .
ϕσ−1
0
−fM
−f¯G
−fE
piG
piM
piE
Case 1.1.1.2. ϕM0 < ϕG0 < ϕE0 ∧ ϕEM < ϕGM .
Zero cuto for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cuto for Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cuto for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cuto between M&A and Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cuto between Greeneld investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cuto between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum prots for a given level of core quality
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Case 1.1.2. ϕM0 < ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, Export provides a higher return than Greeneld investment, while it be-
comes protable at the lower level of quality. Thus, Greeneld investment is not optimal.
If ϕσ−1 < ϕM0, then rm chooses to stay out. If ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM , rm chooses
M&A. If ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM , rm chooses Export.
ϕσ−1
0
−fM
−f¯G
−fE
piG
piM
piE
Case 1.1.2. ϕM0 < ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
Zero cuto for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cuto for Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cuto for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cuto between M&A and Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cuto between Greeneld investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cuto between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum prots for a given level of core quality
Case 1.1.3. ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0 ∧ ϕG0 < ϕE0.
In this case, Greeneld investment provides a higher return thanM&A, while is becomes
protable at the lower level of core quality than M&A. Thus, no rm nds it optimal
to serve foreign markets via M&A. In this case, rm stays out if it is not productive
enough to conduct greeneld investment, i.e. ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; rm chooses Greeneld
investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; nally, rm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
120
ϕσ−1
0
−fM
−f¯G
−fE
piG piM
piE
(a) ϕM0 < ϕE0.
ϕσ−1
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−fM
−f¯G
−fE
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(b) ϕM0 ≥ ϕE0.
Case 1.1.3. ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0 ∧ ϕG0 < ϕE0.
Zero cuto for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cuto for Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cuto for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cuto between M&A and Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cuto between Greeneld investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cuto between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum prots for a given level of core quality
Case 1.1.4. ϕE0 ≤ min{ϕM0, ϕG0}.
In this case, only Export can be optimal since this alternative provides the highest
return to core quality and is the rst alternative to become protable among the avail-
able ones. In particular, rm chooses Export if it is ecient enough to export, i.e.
ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0, and stays out otherwise.
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(a) ϕG0 < ϕM0.
ϕσ−1
0
−fM
−f¯G
−fE
piG pi
MpiE
(b) ϕG0 ≥ ϕM0.
Case 1.1.4. ϕE0 ≤ min{ϕM0, ϕG0}.
Zero cuto for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cuto for Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cuto for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cuto between M&A and Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cuto between Greeneld investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cuto between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum prots for a given level of core quality
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Case 1.2. fM ≥ f¯G ∧ fE > f¯G.
In this case, M&A cannot be optimal since it provides lower return than Greeneld investment
but requires larger entry costs. We distinguish two additional sub-cases depending on the
relation between zero cutos associated to Greeneld investment and Export.
Case 1.2.1. ϕE0 > ϕG0.
In this case, both Export and Greeneld investment can be protable at some levels of
core quality. Firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greeneld investment
if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; nally, it selects Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
ϕσ−1
0
−fM
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(a) fM < fE .
ϕσ−1
0
−fM
−f¯G
−fE
piG
piM
piE
(b) fM ≥ fE .
Case 1.2.1. ϕE0 > ϕG0.
Zero cuto for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cuto for Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cuto for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cuto between Greeneld investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cuto between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum prots for a given level of core quality
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Case 1.2.2. ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, the activity yielding the largest returns, Export, becomes protable at a
lower level of core quality compared with Greeneld investment. Thus, only Export can
be optimal. In particular, if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0, rm chooses Export and stays out otherwise.
ϕσ−1
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(a) fM < fE .
ϕσ−1
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−fE
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(b) fM ≥ fE .
Case 1.2.2. ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
Zero cuto for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cuto for Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cuto for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cuto between Greeneld investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cuto between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum prots for a given level of core quality
Case 1.3. f¯G ≥ fE > fM .
In this case, Greeneld investment is more costly than Export but has lower return. Thus, no
rm nds it optimal to conduct Greeneld investment. We further separate two sub-cases
depending on the relative positioning of the zero cutos for M&A and Export.
Case 1.3.1. ϕM0 < ϕE0.
In this case, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕEM ; it chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 1.3.2. ϕM0 ≥ ϕE0.
In this case, only Export can be optimal. This occurs since M&A requires higher core
quality than Export to be protable although it gives a lower return. Thus, rm chooses
Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0 and stays out otherwise.
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Case 1.3.1. ϕM0 < ϕE0.
ϕσ−1
0
−fM
−f¯G
−fE
piG
piM
piE
Case 1.3.2. ϕM0 ≥ ϕE0.
Zero cuto for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cuto for Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cuto for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cuto between M&A and Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cuto between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum prots for a given level of core quality
Case 1.4. fE ≤ min{fM , f¯G}.
In this case, only Export can be optimal since this option yields the highest return to core
quality and, at the same time, is the cheapest, in terms of entry costs. Thus, rm chooses
Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0 and stays out otherwise.
ϕσ−1
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−fM
−f¯G
−fE
piG
piM
piE
(a) fM < f¯G.
ϕσ − 1
0
−fM
−f¯G
−fE
piG
piM
piE
(b) fM ≥ f¯G.
Case 1.4. fEi ≤ min{fMi , f¯Gi }.
Zero cuto for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cuto for Greeneld investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cuto for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Maximum prots for a given level of core quality
125
Case 2. ∆E ≥ ∆M > ∆G.
In this case, Export is still providing the largest return to core quality, followed by M&A and
Greeneld investment. Similarly to the rst case, we distinguish all relevant cases depending on
the structure of the entry costs for three activities.
Case 2.1. fE > fM > f¯G.
In this case, more expensive in terms of entry costs alternative is also providing higher
return to core quality, so that all activities can be potentially optimal for some levels of core
quality.
Case 2.1.1. ϕG0 < ϕM0 < ϕE0.
Next two sub-cases are specied according to the position of cutos between Greeneld
investment and two other choice options.
Case 2.1.1.1. ϕEG ≥ ϕGM .
In this case, Greeneld investment becomes more protable than M&A at the lower
level of quality than Export. This means that medium-productive rms will nd
it protable to acquire foreign rms. In particular, rm chooses to stay out if
ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greeneld investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; it chooses
M&A if ϕGM ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM ; it chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 2.1.1.2. ϕEG < ϕGM .
In this case, M&A is never optimal. Thus, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0;
rm chooses Greeneld investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; nally, rm chooses
Export if ϕσ−1 > ϕEG.
Case 2.1.2. ϕG0 < ϕE0 ≤ ϕM0.
Since the quality required for M&A to be protable is higher than the one for Export,
rm will not go for M&A. Hence, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses
Greeneld investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 2.1.3. ϕM0 ≤ ϕG0 ∧ ϕM0 < ϕE0.
In this case, Greeneld investment cannot be optimal, as it becomes protable at the
higher level of core quality than M&A, which provides higher return. Therefore, rm
chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; rm chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM ; rm
chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 2.1.4. ϕE0 ≤ min{ϕG0, ϕM0}.
In this case, only Export can be optimal. This happens since this alternative is of the
highest return and becomes protable at the lowest level of core quality. In this case,
rm chooses Export if it is ecient enough, i.e. ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0, and stays out otherwise.
126
Case 2.2. f¯G ≥ fM ∧ fE > fM .
In this case, Greeneld investment cannot be optimal, as it is dominated by M&A which
provides higher return for lower price. Depending on the ordering of zero cutos for Export
and M&A we can distinguish two sub-cases.
Case 2.2.1. ϕE0 > ϕM0.
In this case medium-productive rms nd it protable to acquire foreign targets. In
particular, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕEM ; nally, it chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 2.2.2. ϕE0 ≤ ϕM0.
In this case, Export is the only alternative that can be optimal. This is due to the
fact that Export provides a higher return to core quality and requires lower quality
to become protable. In particular, if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0, rm chooses Export and stays out
otherwise.
Case 2.3. fM ≥ fE > f¯G.
In this case, M&A is dominated by Export which provides higher prot at all quality levels.
Case 2.3.1. ϕE0 > ϕG0.
In this case, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greeneld investment
if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 2.3.2. ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
If Greeneld investment becomes protable at the higher level of core quality than
Export, then only Export can be optimal. In particular, rm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥
ϕE0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 2.4. fE ≤ min{f¯G, fM}.
In this case, only Export can be optimal as the alternative with the highest return to core
quality and the lowest entry costs. In particular, rm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0 and
stays out otherwise.
Case 3. ∆G ≥ ∆E > ∆M .
We switch to the case when Greeneld investment provides the largest return to core quality; the
middle-level return is provided by Export and the lowest return corresponds to M&A.
Case 3.1. f¯G > fE > fM .
First we consider the subcase, when the entry costs increase with the return to core quality
that entry type provides.
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Case 3.1.1. ϕM0 < ϕE0 < ϕG0.
In this case case, an activity with higher return becomes protable at the higher level
of core quality.
Case 3.1.1.1. ϕGM ≥ ϕEM .
In this case, all activities can be optimal for some levels of core quality. In partic-
ular, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕEM ; it chooses Export if ϕEM ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it chooses Greeneld investment
if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 3.1.1.2. ϕGM < ϕEM .
In this case, Greeneld investment becomes more protable than M&A at the lower
level of quality than Export. Thus, Export cannot be optimal. Firm chooses to stay
out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; it chooses Greeneld
investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 3.1.2. ϕM0 < ϕG0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, Export cannot be optimal, since it becomes protable at the higher level of
quality than Greeneld investment. Firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses
M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; it chooses Greeneld investment otherwise.
Case 3.1.3. ϕE0 ≤ ϕM0 ∧ ϕE0 < ϕG0.
M&A cannot be optimal, as it requires higher level of core quality to be protable
than Export. Thus, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; rm chooses Export if
ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; rm chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 3.1.4. ϕG0 ≤ min{ϕM0, ϕE0}.
Greeneld investment becomes protable at the lowest level of core quality among
three options being of the highest return. Thus, only Greeneld investment can be
optimal in this case. In particular, rm chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0
and stays out otherwise.
Case 3.2. fM ≥ fE ∧ f¯G > fE .
In this case, M&A is dominated by Export which has higher prot at all levels of core quality.
Case 3.2.1. ϕG0 > ϕE0.
Firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it
chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 3.2.2. ϕG0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, Export is not optimal for rms in the middle range of quality. There-
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fore, only Greeneld investment can be optimal. In particular, rm chooses Greeneld
investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 3.3. f¯E ≥ fG > fM .
In this case, Export provides lower prot than Greeneld investment at all levels of core
quality. Thus, this option cannot be optimal.
Case 3.3.1. ϕG0 > ϕM0.
In this case, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; rm goes for M&A if ϕM0 ≤
ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; nally, it chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 3.3.2. ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0.
In this case, only Greeneld investment can be optimal, as it becomes protable at the
lower level of core quality than M&A, but provides higher return. Therefore, rm
chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 3.4. f¯G ≤ min{fM , fE}.
In this case, Greeneld investment dominate both Export and M&A. Thus, rm chooses
Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 4. ∆G > ∆M ≥ ∆E .
In this case, we keep Greeneld investment as the activity which provides the rm with the highest
return to core quality. On the contrary, the lowest returns are associated with Export, followed
by M&A.
Case 4.1. f¯G > fM > fE .
Under the above assumption, none of the alternatives is a priori dominated by another one,
as higher entry costs correspond to higher returns from a given action. Depending on the
position of the zero cutos, we distinguish four sub-cases.
Case 4.1.1. ϕE0 < ϕM0 < ϕG0.
In this case, relevant cutos of quality are determined by the position of Export cuto
with respect to the other two entry types.
Case 4.1.1.1. ϕEG ≥ ϕEM .
If M&A becomes more protable than Export at a lower level of core quality than
Greeneld investment, rms in the middle range of quality nd it optimal to acquire
foreign targets. In particular, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses
Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM ; it chooses M&A if ϕEM ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; it chooses
Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
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Case 4.1.1.2. ϕEG < ϕEM .
If M&A becomes more protable than Export at a higher level of core quality than
Greeneld investment, M&A cannot be optimal. Thus, rm chooses to stay out
if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it chooses Greeneld
investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 4.1.2. ϕE0 < ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0.
M&A cannot be optimal as this activity provides lower returns than Greeneld invest-
ment but becomes protable at a higher level of core quality. In this case, rm chooses
to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; nally, rm
chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0.
Case 4.1.3. ϕM0 ≤ ϕE0 ∧ ϕM0 < ϕG0.
In this case, Export cannot be optimal. This is due to the fact that Export provides lower
returns than M&A but requires a larger level of core quality to become protable.
Therefore, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; rm chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤
ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; nally, rm goes for Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 4.1.4. ϕG0 ≤ min{ϕE0, ϕM0}.
Only Greeneld investment can be optimal since it provides higher returns to core
quality than other alternatives and, at the same time, becomes protable at a lower
level of quality. In particular, rm chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and
stays out otherwise.
Case 4.2. fE ≥ fM ∧ f¯G > fM .
In this case, Export cannot be optimal as it provides lower prots than M&A for any level
of core quality.
Case 4.2.1. ϕG0 > ϕM0.
In this case, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕGM ; it chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 4.2.2. ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0.
In this scenario, only Greeneld investment can be optimal. Therefore, rm chooses
Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 4.3. fM ≥ f¯G > fE .
In this case, M&A cannot be optimal as it is dominated by Greeneld investment. Indeed,
Greeneld investment yields higher returns to core quality than M&A does at a lower xed
cost.
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Case 4.3.1. ϕG0 > ϕE0.
In this case, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕEG; it chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 4.3.2. ϕG0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, only Greeneld investment can be optimal. This happens because this
action provides higher returns than Export and becomes protable at the lower level
of core quality. In particular, rm chooses Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and
stays out otherwise.
Case 4.4. f¯G ≤ min{fE, fM}.
In this case, Greeneld investment dominates Export and M&A. In particular, rm chooses
Greeneld investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 5. ∆M > ∆E > ∆G.
In this case, we assume thatM&A provides the largest return to core quality; middle-range return is
provided by Export; nally, the lowest return to core quality corresponds to Greeneld investment.
Case 5.1. fM > fE > f¯G.
For the given structure of entry costs, all three alternatives can be optimal for some level of
core quality.
Case 5.1.1. ϕG0 < ϕE0 < ϕM0.
Firm’s choice as a function of core quality is driven by the ordering of the cutos for
switching between from Greeneld investment to either M&A or Export.
Case 5.1.1.1. ϕGM ≥ ϕEG.
In this case, all entry types can be optimal for some level of core quality. In
particular, the rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greeneld
investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; rm selects Export if ϕEG ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM ;
nally, rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 5.1.1.2. ϕGM < ϕEG.
In this case, M&A becomes more protable than Greeneld investment at a lower
level of core quality than Export. Since M&A provides the rm with a higher return
to core quality than Export, the later cannot be optimal. Hence, rm chooses to
stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greeneld investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ;
nally, rm goes for M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 5.1.2. ϕG0 < ϕM0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, Export cannot be optimal since it becomes protable at a higher level of
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quality than M&A which yields higher returns to core quality. Therefore, rm chooses
to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greeneld investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ;
nally, it chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 5.1.3. ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0 ∧ ϕE0 < ϕM0.
In this case, Greeneld investment cannot be optimal. This is due to the fact that
Greeneld investment provides the rm with a lower return than Export, but becomes
protable at a higher level of core quality. Therefore, rm chooses to stay out ifϕσ−1 <
ϕE0; rm selects Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM ; rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 5.1.4. ϕM0 ≤ min{ϕG0, ϕE0}.
In this case, M&A provides the rm with the highest return and becomes protable
at a lower level of core quality than the other two alternatives do. Therefore, only
M&A can be optimal. In particular, rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out
otherwise.
Case 5.2. f¯G ≥ fE ∧ fM > fE .
In this case, Greeneld investment cannot be optimal as this option is dominated by Export.
Case 5.2.1. ϕM0 > ϕE0.
In this case, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses Export if ϕM0 ≤
ϕσ−1 < ϕEM ; it chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 5.2.2. ϕM0 ≤ ϕE0.
Since M&A gives a higher return to core quality than Export and, at the same time,
becomes protable at a lower level of quality, Export cannot be optimal. In particular,
rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 5.3. fE ≥ fM > f¯G.
In this case, Export cannot be optimal as it provides the rm with a lower prot than M&A
for any level of core quality.
Case 5.3.1. ϕM0 > ϕG0.
In this case, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; rm picks Greeneld investment
if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; it chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 5.3.2. ϕM0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal since this option yields the largest return and
becomes protable at a lowest level of core quality than Greeneld investment and
Export do. In particular, rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
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Case 5.4. fM ≤ min{f¯G, fE}.
In this case, M&A provides the rm with higher prot than other alternatives for any level
of quality. Therefore, rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 6. ∆M ≥ ∆G ≥ ∆E .
In the last case, we assume thatM&A gives the largest return to core quality, followed byGreeneld
investment and Export.
Case 6.1. fM > f¯G > fE .
In this scenario, all three alternatives can be optimal as higher returns to core quality is
associated to higher entry costs.
Case 6.1.1. ϕE0 < ϕG0 < ϕM0.
In this scenario, Export becomes protable before Greeneld investment and M&A.
Hence, the possibility of engaging in each of the alternatives crucially depends on the
relative position of the cutos for switching from Export to eitherGreeneld investment
or M&A.
Case 6.1.1.1. ϕEM ≥ ϕEG.
In this case, middle-range quality rms nd it protable to conduct greeneld
investment. Thus, rm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if
ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it selects Greeneld investment if ϕEG ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ,
nally, rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 6.1.1.2. ϕEM < ϕEG.
Since the level of quality that makes M&A more productive than Export is lower
than the level of quality required for Greeneld investment to be more productive
than Export, Greeneld investment is not optimal. Therefore, rm chooses to stay
out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM ; nally, it goes for
M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 6.1.2. ϕE0 < ϕM0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, Greeneld investment cannot be optimal as this activity becomes protable
at a larger level of quality than the one at which M&A does. In particular, rm decides
to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; rm chooses Export if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM ; rm goes for
M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 6.1.3. ϕG0 ≤ ϕE0 ∧ ϕG0 < ϕM0.
In this scenario, Export cannot be optimal due to the fact that it provides lower re-
turns than Greeneld investment but requires a higher level of quality to be protable.
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Therefore, rm decides to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greeneld investment if
ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; nally, rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 6.1.4. ϕM0 ≤ min{ϕE0, ϕG0}.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal since this is the alternative yielding the highest
return and becomes protable at a lower level of quality than the other two options.
Thus, rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 6.2. fE ≥ f¯G ∧ fM > f¯G.
In this case, Export gives lower prots than Greeneld investment for any level of core quality
and, thus, it cannot be optimal.
Case 6.2.1. ϕM0 > ϕG0.
Firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses Greeneld investment if ϕM0 ≤
ϕσ−1 < ϕGM ; it chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM .
Case 6.2.2. ϕM0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal as it becomes protable at a lower level of core
quality than Greeneld investment but also gives higher returns. Hence, rm chooses
M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 6.3. f¯G ≥ fM > fE .
In this case, M&A dominates Greeneld investment.
Case 6.3.1. ϕM0 > ϕE0.
In this case, rm decides to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕEM ; nally, it goes for M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM .
Case 6.3.2. ϕM0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal. This happens as M&A provides the rm with a
higher return to core quality than Export does, and it requires lower quality to become
protable. Hence, rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 6.4. fM ≤ min{fE, f¯G}.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal as it dominates prots associated to the other two
alternatives. Therefore, rm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
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N. Sensitivity Analysis for Two
Specifications for M&A Parameters
In order to identify the parameters of the model, we need to put restrictions on those parameters
aecting M&A protability. We specify two possible restrictions: (i) the magnitude of synergies
is determined by the relative productivity of a rm with respect to the least productive rm in
the market, (ii) the medians of the institutional entry costs for the two types of FDI are the same.
For each specication, we simulate 10 datasets with 10,000 rms. Each dataset keeps the same
parameters, except those related to M&A, across the two specications. We take the elasticity of
substitution σ = 6 and set demand shifters to ΦGER = 100, ΦEU = 90, ΦUS = 100, ΦRoW = 80.
Then, we estimate the model using each simulated dataset. The averages of estimated parameters
are reported in Table N.1 for the rst specication and in Table N.2 for the second one.
Table N.1.: Specication of M&A with s = 1/a
Common parameters True parameters s = 1/a
Scale parameter of core quality distribution, a 0.4 0.400
Shape parameter of core quality distribution, γ 8.0 7.899
S.d. log perceived quality shock, σ 0.05 0.051
S.d. log export-entry costs, σfE 0.1 0.082
S.d. log greeneld investment entry costs, σfG 0.1 0.049
Country-specic parameters EU US RoW EU US RoW
Median entry cost with export, exp(fE) 0.091 0.067 0.050 0.087 0.066 0.051
Iceberg trade costs, τ 1.020 1.050 1.070 1.027 1.052 1.072
Median log perceived quality shocks, exp (µ) 0.970 0.905 0.932 0.974 0.907 0.934
Median institutional entry costs with greeneld FDI, exp
(
f¯G
)
0.082 0.050 0.030 0.080 0.050 0.030
Quality price for greeneld FDI, αG 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.126 0.201 0.311
Median institutional entry costs of M&A, exp
(
f¯M
)
0.100 0.050 0.010 0.098 0.050 0.011
Scale parameter of M&A quality distribution, aM 0.350 0.300 0.310 0.349 0.299 0.311
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Table N.2.: Specication of M&A with f¯M = exp
(
f¯G
)
Common parameters True parameters f¯M = exp
(
f¯G
)
Scale parameter of core quality distribution, a 0.4 0.401
Shape parameter of core quality distribution, γ 8.0 8.183
S.d. log perceived quality shock, σ 0.05 0.051
S.d. log export-entry costs, σfE 0.1 0.072
S.d. log greeneld investment entry costs, σfG 0.1 0.054
Country-specic parameters EU US RoW EU US RoW
Median entry cost with export, exp(fE) 0.091 0.067 0.050 0.086 0.066 0.050
Iceberg trade costs, τ 1.020 1.050 1.070 1.046 1.057 1.071
Median log perceived quality shocks, exp (µ) 0.970 0.905 0.932 0.979 0.908 0.935
Median institutional entry costs with greeneld FDI, exp
(
f¯G
)
0.082 0.050 0.030 0.079 0.051 0.031
Quality price for greeneld FDI, αG 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.164 0.201 0.306
M&A synergies, s 2.300 2.500 3.700 2.292 2.509 3.747
Scale parameter of M&A quality distribution, aM 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.403 0.300 0.203
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O. Technical Notes on the Constrained
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
In the estimation, we simulate and numerically integrate the likelihood function. We discuss in
detail the integration procedure for each dimension of heterogeneity.
Core ality ϕ. The core quality ϕ is drawn independently across rms from a Pareto distri-
bution. We simulate a grid of 50 points in order to integrate the likelihood function with respect
to ϕ. First, we generate 50 random points that come from the dierent quartiles of the Pareto
distribution.
If rm does not acquire a foreign rm in any market, we follow the procedure applied in
Tintelnot (2017). In particular, we construct 10 intervals using the following set of points
{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.98, 0.99, 0.999, 1},
and draw 5 points from each interval assuming they constitute the support of a uniformly dis-
tributed random variable. This allows us to obtain the corresponding nodes of a Pareto cumulative
distribution function. Each node has a weight proportional to the length of the interval. For exam-
ple, a node from the interval [0, 0.2] enters the estimation with a weight 0.04. Since the underlying
distribution of the core quality is Pareto, we attribute more weight to the nodes in the rst per-
centiles of the distribution.
If rm acquires a foreign rm abroad, this implies restrictions on the possible realizations of ϕ.
Recall that in order to estimate the constrained maximum likelihood, we use (i) a transformation
of the density of M&A foreign sales into the density of the M&A quality draws, (ii) the restrictions
implied by realized M&A sales in order to rewrite the whole problem in terms of ϕ. In particular,
the density of M&A draws reads as m(ϕi/(sϕM)|ϕ; aMi , γ). Since M&A quality draws come from
a Pareto distribution, this implies a technical restriction, which makes the likelihood equal to zero
when integrating in the regions ϕ > ϕi/(siaMi ). In this case, we account for the presence of the
technical restrictions of ϕ realizations that can result in non-zero likelihood and construct the grid
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for nodes of ϕ distribution accordingly. In order to do so, we rst take the technical upper bound
implied by M&A choices for each rm. If M&A is selected as an entry type for several foreign
markets, we take the minimum of upper bounds, that is ϕ¯techω = min{ϕi/(siaMi ) | eω,i = M&A}.
Then, we compute the value of the Pareto cumulative distribution function for the obtained upper
bound and check in which of the previously discussed 10 intervals the value falls. We set the
upper bound of this interval to the cdf ϕ¯techω and take all lower quartile intervals as given. To select
the number of points to sample from each interval, we weights the importance of the interval
as a length of the interval relative to its initial length. For example, if ϕ¯techω felt into the second
interval, [0.2, 0.4], we will assign weight (ϕ¯techω −0.2)/(0.4−0.2) and weight 1 to the rst interval,
[0, 0.2]. Here we draw nodes using the quasi-random Hatlon number generator to grant more
representation of the integration region and to avoid any random component in the realization
of the likelihood function. Similarly to the benchmark case without M&A choice, the weights are
taken proportionately to the length of the interval. Therefore, for each rm conducting M&A in
any of the regions we obtain a rm-specic grid for the numerical integration needed to compute
the likelihood function. It is important to note that without this correction we would underesti-
mate likelihood for rms engaged in M&A, as we would sample integration points for ϕ from the
interval where the likelihood is equal to zero.
Export Entry Costs fE and Institutional Entry Costs for Greenfield Investment f¯G. En-
try costs are drawn from a destination-specic log-normal distribution. We simulate 1,000 draws
for each entry costs using the quasi-random Hatlon number generator. Recall that we divide
the entry choice into two stages. In the rst stage, we compute the probability of selecting the
observed entry types over entering in all foreign markets with M&A. In the second stage, we
condition on the observed choice by using an indicator function of choosing the observed entry
type in each region over No entry, Greeneld investment, and Export. Following Train (2009), we
approximate the indicator choice function with a smooth, strictly positive function. This is done in
order to avoid jumps in the likelihood value across dierent simulations and make the likelihood
function dierentiable.
We normalize all prots with respect to the most protable alternative and use the logit trans-
formation function with a scale factor λ, that is
EΠ˜eii = EΠ
ei
i −max
{
EΠ
e′i
i
}
e′i∈{0,E,G}
and Sei =
exp
(
EΠ˜eii /λ
)
∑
exp
(
EΠ˜eii /λ
) , (O.1)
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where Sei approximates the identity function for choice ei. We note that the limit of the approx-
imated identity function as λ goes to zero is the identity function. Normalization allows us to
make λ smaller and therefore increase the precision of the approximation.
To make the estimation procedure consistent for M&A, we use an approach similar to that
implemented for the other entry types by adding a noise to f¯M , such that ˜¯fMi = f¯Mi + Mi , where
Mi is drawn from N (0, 1E–6).
Perceived quality shocks . The perceived quality shocks follow a destination-specic log-
normal distribution. We use the closed form of the log-normal expected value.
ality of M&A Targets ϕM . The quality of M&A targets is drawn independently across
markets and rms from a destination-specic Pareto distribution. The integration with respect to
M&A quality draws is done at the rst stage of the entry choice, when a rm decides whether to
enter a market via M&A or via any other entry type. We derive a closed form for the probability
of this choice. Here we eliminate the simplication assumed in the footnote 46 that Greeneld
investment is preferred to M&A in the rst stage if M&A is dominated by No entry (when rm
has low core quality and it not able to generate positive synergies). This simplication was valid
under the fact that Greeneld investment is never selected in the second stage being dominated
by No Entry. However, this is not necessarily true with an introduction of the approximation
of the identity function for the second stage entry choice, which can be larger than zero even if
Greeneld investment yields lower returns than No Entry. Accordingly, we take the probability of
the rst stage as given and revert the cuto condition, meaning that we compute the probability
that the M&A quality draw is large enough to make costs of acquiring a foreign rm large enough
for M&A to be less protable that non-protable Greeneld investment.
The constrained maximum likelihood function estimation follows the procedure described by
Su and Judd (2012). First, for a given guess of parameters, we invert the sales function in order to
obtain the level of the perceived quality which rationalizes the observed in the data foreign sales.
Second, we compute the likelihood function and iterate till it is maximized. According to Su and
Judd (2012), the proposed approach is asymptotically equivalent to a nested xed-point approach
in terms of results. Similarly to Tintelnot (2017), who implements the proposed algorithm in his
estimation, we face the problem that the estimates are bias as the model is estimated on the nite
sample of rms. In Appendix N we show that the estimates obtained with a proposed algorithm
are close to the true parameters of the data generation process.
139
We maximize the likelihood with the simulated annealing algorithm together with the hybrid
global maximizing algorithm patternsearch. Same algorithms are used in the calibration of the
general equilibrium.
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P. Cutos for Selecting M&A
To selectM&A overNo entry the core qualityϕ of the rm ω should satisfy the following inequality
(
ϕ0Mi
)σ−1 ≥ rω,i
sσ−1i
[
rω,i − f¯Mi
] .
However, if the sales realized via M&A, rω,i, do not exceed the level of the institutional entry costs
for M&A f¯Mi in country i, rm will not be involved in M&A independently on its level of core
quality.
To select M&A over Export the core quality ϕ of the rm ω should be in the interval
(
ϕEMi
)σ−1 ∈ [fEi − f¯Mi + rω,i −√DEi
2∆Ei
,
fEi − f¯Mi + rω,i +
√
DEi
2∆Ei
]
,
where DEi =
[
fEi − f¯Mi + rω,i
]2 − 4rω,i∆Ei s1−σi . If DEi < 0, then rm will not be involved in
M&A independently on its level of core quality.
To select M&A over Greeneld investment the core quality ϕ of the rm ω should be in the
interval
(
ϕGMi
)σ−1 ∈ [fGi − f¯Mi + rω,i −√DGi
2∆˜Gi
,
fGi − f¯Mi + rω,i +
√
DGi
2∆˜Gi
]
,
where DGi =
[
fGi − f¯Mi + rω,i
]2 − 4rω,i∆˜Gi s1−σi . If DGi < 0, then rm will not be involved in
M&A independently on its level of core quality.
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